



# Low cost RFID and the EPC

Sanjay Sarma,

Steve Weis,

Dan Engels

MIT



# outline

- RFID and the Auto-ID Center
- Protocols
- Security issues





# Part I Outline

- What and why of RFID
- The cost issue
- Manufacturing low-cost RFID
- Handling the data
- Current status



# RFID System







# outline

- What and why RFID
- The cost issue
- Manufacturing low-cost RFID
- Handling the data
- Current status




# why low cost?

END USER	ESTIMATE NO. OF UNITS IN SUPPLY CHAIN (BILLIONS)
CHEP	0.2
JOHNSON & JOHNSON consumer goods division	3.0
KIMBERLY CLARK*	10.0
WESTVACO*	10.0
THE GILLETTE COMPANY	11.0
YFY*	15.0
TESCO	15.0
THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY	20.0
UNILEVER	20.0
PHILIP MORRIS GROUP*	25.0
WAL-MART*	30.0
INTERNATIONAL PAPER	53.0
COCA-COLA*	200.0
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>412.2</b>
(Adjust for double counting @15%)	- 61.8
United States Postal Service	205.0
<b>TOTAL INCLUDING USPS</b>	<b>555.4</b>



# low cost rfid


Silicon: 4c/mm<sup>2</sup>







# why is rfid expensive today?










# Cheap protocol



## OPERATIONAL SPECIFICATION FOR A VERY LOW COST RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM



Programming Commands [CMD]	8-Bit Pattern MSB ← LSB	Comment
PROGRAM	0011 0001	
ERASE	0011 0010	After manufacture and Tag has been LOCKed, this bit pattern is used for the WAKE command.




This document is the result of enormous and productive work by the Auto-ID Center's Cheap presents considerable and ongoing collaboration between Auto-ID Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Technology, with assistance from Rafsec and Thing Magic, as delaid. We acknowledge and recognize the generous emarkable expertise of all concerned.




# the hypothesis or bet


- Place unique number on tag  
Electronic Product Code, EPC  
64 bit, 96 bit, and upwards



- Develop manufacturing technology for small chips and tags



- Move data on the network  
Network service for resolving EPC  
Network architecture for gathering and routing data






# outline

- What and why RFID
- The cost issue
- Manufacturing low-cost RFID
- Handling the data
- Current status




# Low cost RFID




# Slicing and Dicing

- Standard saw-dicing wasteful
- Instead, use separation by thinning



Fig

Fig




**Fig. 6:** Handling scheme as proposed by the „Dicing-by-Thinning“ concept; explanations see 5.






# Antenna

- Screen printing
- Etching
- Forming





# vibratory Assembly



Orientation Check


*Courtesy Philips*

(C) Marcus Toth






# vibratory assembly





# conversion

- Paper/package/label industry expertise
- Scales well with mass production
- Capital equipment expenditure






# outline

- What and why RFID
- The cost issue
- Manufacturing low-cost RFID
- Handling the data
- Current status




# Architecture: Local






# Architecture: Global





# Inference





# outline

- What and why RFID
- The cost issue
- Manufacturing low-cost RFID
- Handling the data
- Current status



# Status of center

## Research

RFID/routing software technology: MIT & Adelaide

Manufacturing /Control Applications: Cambridge

## Standards

Air-interface between reader and tags

Software for handling/routing data

## Sponsorship


48 sponsors

4 continents





# field trial





# outline

- RFID and the Auto-ID Center
- Protocols
- Security issues



# components

- Signaling
- Anti-collision
- Functions



## Things to keep in mind

- You will not read one tag:  
you will read many!
- Bandwidth becomes an issue



# Line codes

1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0



# trade-offs

## Probability of error

## Bandwidth

## Collision detection







Figure 3.7: N

(a) NRZ



(b) Manchester




Z, (c) Manchester.



# modulation

- Amplitude Shift Keying
- Phase shift keying
- Frequency shift keying


## Reader to Tag Modulation





# Bandwidth

$$\cos(\omega_c)\cos(\omega_s) = \frac{\cos(\omega_c + \omega_s) + \cos(\omega_c - \omega_s)}{2}$$









# bandwidth

## Proposed FCC Rule Change at 13.56 MHz



Current regulations allow very low power transmission in this frequency band, with a "hole" where radio astronomers survey signals from outside the solar system.

Moderate power levels would be allowed where they do not overlap the astronomy band.



The proposed change will allow slightly higher transmission for applications that do not radiate energy in directions that would interfere with the astronomers.




# components

- Signaling
- Anti-collision
- Functions




# anticollision

- Multiple tags in the field
- Need to be sorted
- Tags relatively dumb






# aloha protocols



**Figure 6.3:** The four SuperTag variants. Black fill indicates a successful read. Grey fill indicates a failed read.



# tree walking





# Aloha vs tree-walking

Asymmetric



Aloha schemes  
13.56 MHz ISM

Symmetric



Tree schemes  
915 MHz ISM



# anticollision

- The backbone function
- Extract unique ID
- Must leverage for any security scheme



# components

- Signaling
- Anti-collision
- Functions





# Functions

*One time*

- Write address
- Lock address
- Pointer
- Read ID (anti-collision)
- Read payload
- Write payload
- Sleep
- Wake
- Destroy



# How to interpret standards

RFID Technologies Using the 13.56MHz Frequency (Proposed Methods)

Format	Proximity type			Vicinity type		
ISO	14443			15693		
Type	Type A	Type B	Type C	Type X	Type Y	
Communication Distance (cm)	>10 cm	>10 cm	>10 cm	>10 cm	>10 cm	
Transfer from reader/writer to card (Downlink)	Carrier Frequency (fc)	13.56MHz	13.56MHz	13.56MHz	13.56MHz	
	Digital Modulation Type	ASK	ASK	ASK	ASK	
	Modulation (Modulation Level)	AM100%	AM10+/-2%	AM10%	AM100%	AM10%
	Power Pause Time	2.95 $\mu$ s	0 $\mu$ s	0 $\mu$ s	11.1 $\mu$ s	0 $\mu$ s
	Subcarrier Frequency	None	None	None	None	None
	Required Bandwidth	+/- (1/Power Pause Time)	+/- communication speed x 1	+/- communication speed x 2	+/- (1/Power Pause Time)	+/- communication speed x 2
	Data Rate (kbps)	105.9375(fc/128) 211.875(fc/64)	105.9375(fc/128) 211.875(fc/64)	105.9375(fc/128) 211.875(fc/64)	6.2 to 9	1.6 to 26.5
	Bit Coding	Modified Miller	NRZ	Manchester	Pulse Width	Pulse Position
	Self-clock in Data	Self-clock	No self-clock	Self-clock	Self-clock	Self-clock
Peak Difference between Main and Sideband	Approx. 14 dB	Approx. 28 dB	Approx. 28 dB	Approx. 14 dB	Approx. 28 dB	
Transfer from card to reader/writer (Uplink)	13.56MHz transmission from reader/writer	Load Modulation	Load Modulation	Load Modulation	Load Modulation	Load Modulation
	Communication with reader/writer	Reader/writer Talk first *1	Reader/writer Talk first *1	Reader/writer Talk first *1	Reader/writer Talk first *1	Reader/writer Talk first *1
	Digital Modulation Type	ASK Subcarrier	BPSK Subcarrier	ASK	FSK Subcarrier	ASK Subcarrier
	Subcarrier Frequency	847.5kHz(fc/16)	847.5kHz(fc/16)	None	423.75kHz(fc/32) 484.2857kHz(fc/28)	423.75kHz(fc/32)
	Data Rate (kbps)	105.9375(fc/128) 211.875(fc/64)	105.9375(fc/128) 211.875(fc/64)	105.9375(fc/128) 211.875(fc/64)	26.7	1.6 to 26.5
	Bit Coding	Manchester	NRZ	Manchester	Manchester	Manchester



# outline

- RFID and the Auto-ID Center
- A peek at the protocol

- Security issues

- Discussions with: Dan Engels, Peter Cole, Steve Weiss, Ron Rivest



# Does protocol compromise privacy?

Not necessarily. Your choice.

You can destroy the tag and opt out

or

You can keep tag for later use  
(physics is your friend)




# mass hijack of tags

- Could happen in destroy or re-programming
- Physics our friend
  - Bandwidth limited: 200 tags a second anti-collision
  - Destroy must be individually addressed
  - So it takes time to kill
  - Surveillance



## For the future: issues

- Tags are light-weight
- Anyone can read the tags (promiscuity)
- The same number shows up all the time
- Channel is open and shared





# problem: unique and promiscuous

## Kill Serial number?

- Product still readable
- Person can be tracked by constellation

## Personalize the number?

- Repeated reads yield same number
- You could still be tracked by constellation



## using keys – iteration 1

- Tag, reader share a key
- They challenge each other
- They establish trust
- They communicate

But wait:

There still needs to be a unique number for anticollision

Key management problem





# rolling number

*Temporary\_number = Key{ID|nonce}*

Perform anticollision on *Temporary\_number*

Extract ID

Advantages:

Promiscuous, but who cares

Can't track

No privacy issue

Disadvantage:

Still a key management problem



# keyless approach

$lock = hash(key)$

Tag knows *hash* and *lock*

*Lock* used as ID and for anticollision

## Administrative functions

Reader provides *key*

Tag computes *computed\_lock*

If  $computed\_lock == lock$ ,

then tag unlocked,

ready for administration until new *lock*



# administering the tag

## Problems

Air interface always vulnerable

Grey area of ownership in retail

## Solutions

Physical contact for reprogramming

Physical contact reset of memory

(Resurrected duckling, University of Cambridge)



## conclusions

- RFID is here
- As more functionality goes on RFID, security challenges
- 0.2 milli-cents per gate, cost is paramount
- Minimize data on tag