292 - Fall 2021 Quantitative Information Flow and Side Channels

Instructor: Tevfik Bultan Lecture 2 Slides for this lecture are based on the following papers:

Geoffrey Smith. On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow. FOSSACS 2009: 288-302

Geoffrey Smith. Quantifying Information Flow Using Min-Entropy. QEST 2011: 159-167



How do we quantify information leakage?

- How can we quantify information leakage from a side channel (or main channel)?
- Before we figure out how to quantify information leakage, we need answer the following question:
 - How do we quantify information?



How do we quantify information?

- Shannon Entropy
- Intuitively
 - a measure of uncertainty about a random variable X
 - expected (average) amount of information gain (i.e., the expected amount of surprise) by observing the value of the random variable expressed in terms of bits
- More precisely


expected (average) number of bits required to transmit X optimally

Entropy example:

Example:

- Seattle weather, always raining: p_{rain} = 1
- Entropy: H = 0
- Costa Rica weather, coin flip: $p_{rain} = \frac{1}{2}$, $p_{sun} = \frac{1}{2}$
- Entropy: H = 1
- Santa Barbara weather, almost always beautiful: p_{rain}=1/10, p_{sun}=9/10
- Entropy: H = 0.496

Binary Entropy





How do we quantify information?

- Random variable: X
- Set of possible values for the random variable: ${\cal X}$
- Probability that the random variable takes the value $x \in \mathcal{X}$

$$P[X = x]$$

• Shannon Entropy: H(X)

$$egin{aligned} H(X) &= \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P[X=x] \log_2(1/P[X=x]) \ H(X) &= E[\log_2(1/P[X=x])] \end{aligned}$$

• i.e., Shannon entropy is the expected value of: $\log_2(1/P[X=x])$

How do we quantify information leakage?

- Now that we know how to quantify information, how can we quantify information leakage?
- First, let's give a simple program model:

S is the secret input to the program. We will model it as a random variable.

O is the public output of the program. We will model it also as a random variable

f is a function from values of S to values of O we use to model a deterministic program



Initial uncertainty

- What is the initial uncertainty for S?
 - What is the amount of information that we need to learn about the secret?

$$H(S) = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} P[S=s] \log_2(1/P[S=s])$$

- Assume that the probability distribution for the secret is uniform
 - so all values are equally likely
 - then, the amount of information that we need to learn is:

$$H(S) = \log_2 |\mathcal{S}|$$



Partitioning the secret domain

• Given a program

$$f:\mathcal{S}
ightarrow\mathcal{O}$$

• The values we observe as the output of the program define an equivalence relation for the secret S

$$s\sim s' ext{ iff } f(s)=f(s')$$
 .

• So, by observing output of the program, we partition the secret values to equivalence classes



Partitioning the secret domain

• The number of equivalence classes in the partition are:



• If the function is a constant function, where the output is constant, then

$$|\mathcal{O}| = 1$$

• and, there is a single equivalence class where

$$\mathcal{S}_o = \mathcal{S}$$



Non-interference

- So, if the output function is a constant function
 - the amount of information we need to learn remains the same

$$H(S) = \log_2 |\mathcal{S}|$$

• means there is no information leakage

- This correspond to non-interference!
 - If the output/observable remains constant for all values of the secret then there is no information leakage!



Partitioning the secret domain

- Now, let us assume that the output values partition the secret domain to two equivalence classes with equal number of elements
 - I.e., there are two output values, half of the secret values map to one and the other half map to the other

• What is the remaining entropy?



Another example

f(S) { print S & 0xF; }

- Assume that S is a 32-bit unsigned integer
- 0xF is the hexadecimal constant corresponding to decimal 15, and & denotes bitwise "and" operation
 - So, the above code prints the last 4 bits of the secret
- The output partitions the secret domain to 16 equivalence classes, each of which has 2²⁸ values in it
 - \circ $\,$ So, the remaining entropy is 28 bits $\,$



How do we quantify information leakage?

- Now that we know how to quantify information, how can we quantify information leakage
- Here is what we would expect:

initial uncertainty = information leaked + remaining uncertainty

• Equivalently

information leaked = initial uncertainty - remaining uncertainty



How do we quantify the remaining uncertainty?

- Remaining uncertainty can be characterized as the conditional entropy
- Conditional entropy: What is the uncertainty about S given O?

$$H(S|O) = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O}} P[O = o]H(S|O = o)$$

$$H(S|O=o) = \sum_{s\in\mathcal{S}} P[S=s|O=o]\log_2(1/P[S=s|O=o])$$



Conditional Entropy uses Conditional Probability

$$H(S|O=o) = \sum_{s\in\mathcal{S}} P[S=s|O=o]\log_2(1/P[S=s|O=o])$$

P[S = s | O = o] = P[S = s, O = o] / P[O = o]



Mutual information

- Mutual information I(S;O) is the amount of information shared between S and O
- It is defined as:

$$I(S;O) = H(S) - H(S|O)$$

• Mutual information is symmetric:

$$I(S;O) = I(O;S)$$



How do we quantify information leakage?

• So, the intuitive property

information leaked = initial uncertainty - remaining uncertainty

• is formalized as

$$I(S; O) = H(S) - H(S|O)$$



Examples

$$I(S; O) = H(S) - H(S|O)$$

- f(S) { print 10; } 0 = 32 32
- f(S) { print S + 10; } 32 = 32 0
- f(S) { print S & 0xF; } 4 = 32 28



What about side channels?

```
f(S) { sleep(S); }
```

f(S) { if (S % 2 == 0) sleep(1); else sleep (2); }

- These programs do not return any output or print any information.
 So, they do not leak information from the main channel of the program.
- However, they do have side channel leakage
 - They leak information from the execution time



What about side channels?

$$I(S; O) = H(S) - H(S|O)$$

f(S) { sleep(S); } 32 = 32 - 0



Deterministic programs

- If we assume that the program is deterministic with only input S and only output O
 - then the value of O is determined only by the input S
 - which means H(O|S) = 0

Then, we have:

I(S;O) = I(O;S) = H(O) - H(O|S) = H(O)

• So, for deterministic programs with input S and output O, the information leaked is equivalent to the uncertainty of O

