

CS 290

Host-based Security and Malware

Christopher Kruegel

chris@cs.ucsb.edu

Social Networks



- Social networks
 - massive growth and rise in popularity
 - people provide significant amount of private/sensitive information
 - security and privacy threats not well understood
 - often, protection offered by social network providers lacking

Social Network Security Issues

- Data privacy
 - blackmail
 - identity theft
 - personalized spear-phishing
 - targeted advertisement
- New venue to reach large number of potential victims
 - spam
 - malware / worms
 - links that point to sites with browser exploits (drive-by downloads)

Social Network Security Issues

- Rogue applications
 - developed and under control of third parties
 - access to profile information and those of friends
- Support for regular crime
 - absence notes for burglary opportunities
 - monitor victim's spending habits
- Crawlers
 - obtain large amount of data against will of social networks

Social Network Security Issues

- Data privacy
 - blackmail
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 - links that point to sites with browser exploits (drive-by downloads)

Data Privacy

Breaking news

 Search

Firing dispatcher for Facebook drug joke was right, Wisconsin council claims

NewsCore | May 25, 2010 12:11am

A+ A-   Share

A CITY council in Wisconsin defended its decision to fire a Police and Fire Department dispatcher who joked about drug addiction on her Facebook page.

Dana Kuchler, a 21-year veteran of the West Allis' Dispatch Department, joked that she was addicted to "Vicodin, Adderall, quality marijuana, MD 20/20 Grape and (absinthe)" on the social networking site.

She was fired from her job for the remarks and appealed to an arbitrator, claiming the Facebook post was a joke. She pointed out she had written "ha" in it and urine and hair samples tested negative for drugs.

The arbitrator said she should be entitled to go back to work after a 30-day suspension, but the City of West Allis complained that was not appropriate.

"Making stupid jokes on Facebook where the line between public and private communications is admittedly blurred, calls into question that good judgment and common sense of the grievant and her resulting ability to perform her job," the City argued.

Related Coverage

[Facebook issues warning after killing](#)

Daily Telegraph, 7 days ago

[Murder prompts Facebook revolt](#)

Courier Mail, 8 days ago

[Teacher wrote 'loser' on child's](#)

It added that Kuchler's post "mocks and is blatantly inconsistent with the mission of the Police Department that employs her."


In firing Kuchler, the West Allis Police Chief wrote that Kuchler's Facebook posting "destroyed the city's trust and confidence in (her) ability and integrity" as a dispatcher and was "an embarrassment to the city."



Data Privacy

- Wealth of sensitive and private information
 - not everything on Facebook is cool
 - so, how do social networks protect this data

Facebook's Gone Facebook announces 'simplified' privacy settings

By Ryan Singel  May 7, 2010 | 6:58 **Press conference follows tumultuous month for social network**

Facebook has gone rogue, disrupting Zuckerberg's dreams of world conquest. The rest of the web ecosystem recoils, ready to replace it with something open and transparent.

Facebook used to be a place to connect with thoughts with friends and family. It became a place for stupid games that let you pretend to be a homesteader. It became a place to connect with your friends, long-time members. Even if you didn't realize it, they were there.

By Helen A.S. Popkin
msnbc.com
updated 5:31 p.m. PT, Wed., May 26, 2010

The [Facebook](#) public image offensive continued today with a press conference at the social network's Palo Alto headquarters announcing its new "simplified" privacy settings.

The event is a marked departure from Facebook's general method of announcing changes via relatively subtle blog posts and notices on the site. The news conference, announced yesterday, came as a surprise to industry analysts who expected privacy setting changes to come in the next few weeks, not days.

 **Video**



[Launch](#)

 [Zuckerberg on Facebook's privacy changes](#)
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg speaks with CNBC's Julia Boorstin.

Data Privacy

- Wealth of sensitive and private information
 - not everything on Facebook is cool
 - so, how do social networks protect this data

- Wait! You need to

- True, but ...

- open profiles
- fake profiles
- profile cloning
- link addicts



[TopLinked.com Home Page](#)
[TopLinked.com Account](#)

[TopLinked.com Top 50 List](#)
[TopLinked.com Top Supporters](#)
[TopLinked.com Invite Me List](#)

[Add Yourself to the Invite Me List](#)
[Add Yourself to the Top Supporter List](#)

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[Happy Members](#)
[Contact TopLinked.com](#)

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The TopLinked 50

The Top 50 most connected people on LinkedIn!

Note: Not all of the people listed below are active TopLinked Members - so please make sure they have TopLinked.com listed on their profile before extending a connection invitation to them.


Rank	Name (linked to profile)	Connections
1	Ron Bates	44,000+
2	Kenneth Warner Weinberg	41,000+
3	Andrew 'Flip' Filipowski	41,000+
4	Steven Burda	38,000+
5	Richard Atkind	32,000+
6	Wei Guan	32,000+
7	Marc Freedman	30,000+
8	William (Bill) Howell	30,000+
9	Stacy Donovan Zapar	30,000+
10	John L. Evans	30,000+
11	Joe Weinstein	30,000+
12	Gerald Haman	30,000+
13	Jan Karel Kleijn	30,000+
14	Pier Paolo Mucelli	30,000+
15	Malcolm Ian Geoffrey Lawrence	30,000+
16	Jan Mulder	30,000+
17	Peter R. Luiks	30,000+
18	Ed Nusbaum	29,000+
19	Jayesh Sampat	29,000+
20	Rawley Martos	29,000+
21	Joe Gillespie	29,000+
22	Shally Steckerl	29,000+

Fake Profile (Ranum Experiment)


The screenshot shows a LinkedIn profile for Marcus J. Ranum, Chief Security Officer at Tenable. The profile is highlighted as a 'Public Profile'. The 'Connections' section is circled in red, showing 51 connections. An 'Inbox' window is open, displaying an invitation from Kristin Franceschi, dated June 15, 2008, to Marcus J. Ranum. The invitation text reads: 'Join my network on LinkedIn', 'From: Kristin Franceschi', 'Date: June 15, 2008', 'To: Marcus J. Ranum', 'Status: Pending'. Below this, it says 'Kristin Franceschi has indicated you are a Classmate at The Johns Hopkins University:' followed by a text box containing 'Whoa! You are there now! Can I be in your network?'. At the bottom of the invitation are buttons for 'Accept', 'I don't know Kristin', and 'Archive', along with 'Reply' and 'Flag as Spam' options.

Source: Shawn Moyer and Nathan Hamiel (BlackHat Talk)


Profile Cloning




Profile Cloning



Profile Cloning




Profile Cloning



De-Anonymization of Third-Party Web Site Visitors

Attack Scenario




Offline Preparation

Learn group memberships of all social network users

- find all groups in social network
 - determine members of each group
- Find groups
 - public group directories (Facebook)
 - predictable group identifiers (LinkedIn)
 - Determine what users are members in a specific group
 - examine public group pages (Facebook)
 - join private group pages (more difficult)
 - examine user profiles (in LinkedIn, via public membership directory)

Finding Groups



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "My Groups | LinkedIn". The address bar contains the URL "http://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=2926807&trk=anet_ug_hm". The browser's tab bar shows several tabs: "CS160", "derStandard", "IJIS", "JCS", and "DIMVA '10". Below the browser window, the LinkedIn navigation bar is visible, including the LinkedIn logo and links for "Home", "Profile", "Contacts", "Groups", "Jobs", "Inbox", and "More...". The "My Groups" section is active, with sub-links for "Following", "Groups Directory", and "Create a Group". A red error message with a white 'X' icon states: "We are sorry, but this group was not found." Below this, the heading "My Groups" is followed by a link "Edit the order of your groups »". The main content area displays the message "You are not a member of any groups" and a paragraph explaining LinkedIn Groups: "LinkedIn now offers LinkedIn Groups, a new way for groups to bring value to their members. Many professionals advance their business goals by counting on professional groups, alumni organizations and work groups to make vital new business contacts which will enhance their trusted connections."

Finding Membership Information

- Is it feasible?
 - we used 80legs service to crawl 3M LinkedIn group IDs for \$7.49
 - randomly crawled 3M user profiles for \$6.57
 - apologizes for wasting your resources
 - fully enumerated group memberships for Xing (8M users)

Online JavaScript Attack

- We now have group membership information, but ...
who cares?

In the online part of the attack


1. We leverage browser history stealing and predictable URLs
to determine the groups that visitor is member of
2. We combine this information with the group membership information
to determine the identity of the visitor

Online Attack

- How does browser history stealing work?
 - well-known browser “problem” (typically considered harmless)
 - put a (hidden) link on a page and check its color (using CSS magic)
 - when link has been visited (i.e., it is in the browser history), then the color is different
 - serves as an **oracle** for presence / absence of **specific URLs**
 - note that you **cannot** simply **read out entire history** of the browser
 - our JavaScript sent to victim performs history stealing, that is, it checks for certain URLs

Online Attack

- Which URLs are checked?
 - those that indicate that a visitor is member of a group
 - this only works when such URLs exist and are predictable
 - fortunately (for the attacker), this is the case for most SNs



Candidate Sets

- In the best of all cases
 1. attacker obtains group memberships from history stealing
 2. intersects the known members in all these groups
 3. only one profile remains, and the person is de-anonymized
- But wait ...
 - group memberships are not always unique, are they?
 - what happens when history stealing attack misses groups?

Candidate Sets

- Candidate sets
 - all users in intersection (or union) of identified groups
 - additional refinement step
- Refinement step



vay,

Gilbert Wondracek


Researcher

Austria

Candidate Set Sizes

- Xing
 - 4.4 million membership relations, 1.8 million unique users in groups
 - 6,277 groups before the entire set of users is covered
 - 42.06% of users have a unique group fingerprint
 - for 90% of all users, the candidate set is < 2,912 users

Candidate Set Sizes



Experimental Evaluation

- Initial, small scale experiment on Xing
 - 15 out of 26 persons de-anonymized (they used Xing groups)
- Our findings got a lot of press, including links to experiment page
 - within a few days, thousands of users participated
- Results
 - 9,969 users finished the experiment
 - for 3,717 we found at least one group hit in browsing history (37,3%)
 - 1,207 (12,1%) regarded themselves as de-anonymized
- Of course, no ground truth about people who visited our site

Mitigation

- Make it hard for attacker to obtain group membership info
- Make it hard for attacker to predict group and user links
 - add random tokens to links (Xing)
 - use POST instead of GET (no parameters in URL)
- Delete browser history
 - users can do this to protect themselves
- Fix history stealing attack

Abusing Friend Finder

Privacy Attacks

- Friend finder feature

The screenshot shows the LinkedIn 'Build your network' interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the LinkedIn logo and links for Home, Profile, Contacts, Groups, Jobs, Inbox, and More... Below this, there are two main sections, both titled 'Build your network (Why?)'. The left section, 'Web email contacts', includes a search bar for email addresses and a password field, with a 'Continue' button. The right section, 'Import your desktop email contacts', features a file upload area with a 'Choose File' button, an 'Upload File' button, and a 'Learn More' link. Both sections include a disclaimer: 'LinkedIn does not store your login information. See our privacy policy.'

Privacy Attacks


- Abuse friend finder feature
 - in many networks, this feature is not protected (rate-limited)
 - allows millions of address queries in a short time (day)
 - oracle to check validity of mail addresses

	Network	Query method method	E-mail list length <i>size efficiency</i>	# queried e-mails <i>speed efficiency</i>	# identified accounts	Percentage
1	Facebook	Direct	5000	10M/day	517,747	4.96%
2	MySpace	GMail	1000	500K/day	209,627	2.01%
3	Twitter	GMail	1000	500K/day	124,398	1.19%
4	LinkedIn	Direct	5000	9M/day	246,093	2.36%
5	Friendster	GMail	1000	400K/day	42,236	0.41%
6	Badoo	Direct	1000	5M/day	12,689	0.12%
7	Netlog	GMail	1000	800K/day	69,971	0.67%
8	XING	Direct	500	3.5M/day	5,883	0.06%
				Total of	1,228,644	11.78%

Privacy Attacks

- Validate mail addresses as service for spammers
 - SMTP daemons have disabled this a long time ago
 - helpful also for spear phishing
- Connect profiles on different networks
 - aggregate information from different networks
 - but also reveals differences between peoples' identities
 - we found striking differences between profiles on professional networks (LinkedIn) and dating sites (Badoo)

Privacy Attacks



Mitigation

- Rate limiting
 - impose hard limits on email resolution –
who is resolving more than X thousand mail addresses?
 - add CAPTCHAs to slow down attacker (Facebook)
- Limit amount of returned information
 - for example, do not link to actual profile
- Require names for each email address, and check for matches

Social Network Security Issues

- Data privacy
 - blackmail
 - identity theft
 - personalized spear-phishing
 - targeted advertisement
- New venue to reach large number of potential victims
 - spam
 - malware / worms
 - links that point to sites with browser exploits (drive-by downloads)

Social Networking Spam

Spam on Social Networks

The screenshot shows a Facebook profile for 'sasistace' in a Mozilla Firefox browser window. The browser's address bar shows 'http://www.facebook.com/sasistace'. The profile page includes a 'Follow' button, a 'Lists' dropdown, and a settings gear. The main content area displays a series of posts, all of which are spammy in nature, featuring repetitive text and video links. The posts include:

- 'You must see this video!' with link <http://alavench.com/250/> (5:48 AM Dec 7th, 2009 via web)
- 'You must see this video!' with link <http://thediplomaticjournal.com/131/> (7:31 PM Dec 4th, 2009 via web)
- 'lol' with link <http://www.dj.formika.pl/878/> (8:53 AM Nov 26th, 2009 via web)
- 'lol' with link <http://pmvideo.net/611/> (2:51 PM Nov 25th, 2009 via web)
- 'I love this video! :)' with link <http://ljmattsee.lj.funpic.de/648/> (11:04 AM Nov 25th, 2009 via web)
- 'OMFG!! You must see this video!! :))' with link <http://pokerne.ws/902/> (6:16 PM Nov 24th, 2009 via web)
- 'Funny video :)' with link <http://piamaria.li/920/> (2:52 PM Nov 24th, 2009 via web)
- 'Funny video :)' with link <http://mcmoos.co.za/660/> (11:59 AM Nov 24th, 2009 via web)

The right sidebar shows the profile owner's information: Name Stacy Jones, Web <http://l unsafe l...>, 1 following, 2 followers, 0 listed. It also shows 32 tweets, a 'Favorites' section, 'Actions' (block sasistace, report for spam), and a 'Following' section with one user. An RSS feed link for 'sasistace's tweets' is also present.

At the bottom of the browser window, a status bar indicates 'Transferring data from profile.ak.facebook.com...'

Spam Study


- Deployment of “honey” profiles
 - profiles that accept all friend requests
 - 300 profiles each on three networks (Facebook, MySpace, Twitter)
 - used different properties (to check for targeted campaigns)
- Findings
 - quite a bit of spam on Facebook and Twitter, little on MySpace

Network	Overall	Spammers
Facebook	4,413	638
MySpace	20	0
Twitter	6,935	6,180

Spam Study

- Spam bots
 - template-based account generation
 - bots aggressively follow (connect to) other users
 - slow versus aggressive spamming (number of messages)
 - random versus targeted campaigns
(we found a Facebook campaign that targeted male users)
 - messages share similarities
 - multiple bots operate in larger-scale campaigns
 - use “simple” interfaces (Twitter, Facebook mobile)


Spam Campaigns



Spam Detection

- Leverage observations to build classifier (for Twitter)
- Features
 - following / followers ratio
 - URLs / message (tweets) ratio
 - message similarity
 - Twitter specific features:
 - retweet ratio, reply ratio, profile description presence
- Detection results
 - 13,258 spammers flagged and reported to Twitter
 - 62 false positives

Spam Detection Service



Malware and Worms

Famous Malware

- Samy (2005)
 - worm that attacked mySpace
 - exploited XSS vulnerability
- Orkut Worm (2007)
 - similar to Samy, but embedded Flash instead of JavaScript
- Secret Crush (2008)
 - leverages social engineering
 - links to download site for Adware
- Koobface (2009)
 - targets Facebook and several other social network sites
 - sends messages to friends of infected user, asks to download malware

Secret Crush (2008)




Figure 5: Zango iFrame

Koobface (2009)




Figure 6. Copycat YouTube site that leads to the KOOFACE downloader

Social Network Security Issues

- Rogue applications
 - developed and under control of third parties
 - access to profile information and those of friends
- Support for regular crime
 - absence notes for burglary opportunities
 - monitor victim's spending habits
- Crawlers
 - obtain large amount of data against will of social networks

Secure Third-Party Applications

Identity 'at risk' on Facebook

permitted peephole

By Spe
Presen

Perso
users
stoler
progr

Malicious Facebook apps can steal your info

by Heather Wood on Aug 20, 2009 at 01:10 PM

 Add a Comment

The pr
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Most people enjoy installing Facebook apps while using the social networking site, but according to a report by Trend Micro, you have to be wary of the apps that you use. Currently, at least six applications have been identified by the Internet security firm including Posts, Your Photos, Stream, and Birthday Invitations.

Once installed onto your computer, these malicious applications can steal your privacy details as well as send spam to your Facebook friends. The following has appeared on affected users' friends pages: "(Your Name) has sent you a message with a hyperlink to a phishing site. These


applications started popping up on the website early this week and led to a phishing site by the name of fucabook.com. Non-designated IP addresses have also been used by the applications. To prevent clicking on the link to these sites,

place your cursor over any links to reveal the URL:


As might now, Facebook is looking into the report and will first post updates when the applications have been removed.



- Privacy proxy
 - shields private information from apps
 - allows for fine-grained access control
 - most significant challenge:
 - how to deploy without support from SN provider (Facebook)



Secure Facebook Applications



Social Network Security Issues

- Rogue applications
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- Support for regular crime
 - absence notes for burglary opportunities
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Location-Based Services

The image shows two overlapping web pages. The background page is a Social Media Examiner article from May 5, 1:36 PM, by Cheryl Phillips. The article title is "Burglars search Twitter, Facebook updates to target homes". It features a profile picture of Cheryl Phillips and a "SPONSOR AN EXAMINER" logo. The article text discusses how social media updates can be used by burglars to target homes. A retweet count of 15 is visible. The article includes a photo of a burglar wearing a black balaclava and gloves, with the caption "Your Facebook and Twitter updates could reveal too much".

The foreground page is a browser window titled "Please Rob Me". The main heading is "PLEASE ROB ME" in large red letters. Below it, the text reads "Awareness for-sharing" and "post on the CDT website." The page features a map graphic with red location pins marked with an 'X'. A "More Info" sidebar on the right lists links for "Home", "Why", and "Made Possible By", along with social media handles for "Forthehack": Foursquare, Twitter (@boyvanamstel, @forthehack, @frankgroeneveld, @barryborsboom), and a "Ads by Google" logo at the bottom.

Broadcast your Purchases

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <http://blippy.com/davidane>. The page title is "Blippy, a Spear Phisher's Dream". The main article is titled "Blippy Users' Credit Card Numbers Exposed in Google Search Results". The article text includes an update: "Update: Blippy has explained how the credit card numbers ended up in Google." It discusses how sharing credit card information on Blippy can be risky and that several transactions have been exposed in Google search results. It also mentions a tipster, Trey Copeland, who found these results by searching for "site:blippy.com +\"from card\"".

Blippy, a Spear Phisher's Dream

This month, a service called **Blippy** was rolled out to the general public. In a CNN article this week, Blippy was described as a "financial version of twitter.com", where users' credit card numbers are shared with friends. It's like tweets that people post to twitter, except they wish to discuss their purchases. On Blippy, a user can share their credit card number and purchase information. In the image below for example, a user named davidane spent \$12.64 at Amazon for a SanDisk

Blippy Users' Credit Card Numbers Exposed in Google Search Results

Update: Blippy has explained how the credit card numbers ended up in Google.

Sharing your credit card and online purchases with friends on the web sounds risky and it is. We've just discovered that several credit card transactions shared on social networking site Blippy have been exposed — with full credit card numbers included — in Google search results.

Tipster Trey Copeland wrote to us with a link to results for the search: `site:blippy.com +\"from card\"`. That search returns results showing detailed purchase information for transactions. Each result highlights that there was a "debit card transaction" or "card transaction," the amount spent, the specific location (address included) and the full card number (as seen below).

davidane spent \$66.95 at Best Buy shared 2 days ago
Comment · Like · What'd you get?

davidane spent \$29.55 at The Home Depot shared 2 days ago
Comment · Like · What'd you get?

12.64 at Amazon for a SanDisk