

# Binary Obfuscation Using Signals\*

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## Abstract

Reverse engineering of software is the process of recovering higher-level structure and meaning from a lower-level program representation. It can be used for legitimate purposes—e.g., to recover source code that has been lost—but it is often used for nefarious purposes, e.g., to search for security vulnerabilities in binaries or to steal intellectual property. This paper addresses the problem of making it hard to reverse engineer binary programs by making it difficult to disassemble machine code statically. Binaries are obfuscated by changing many control transfers into signals (traps) and inserting dummy control transfers and “junk” instructions after the signals. The resulting code is still a correct program, but even the best current disassemblers are unable to disassemble 40%–60% of the instructions in the program. Furthermore, the disassemblers have a mistaken understanding of over half of the control flow edges. However, the obfuscated program necessarily executes more slowly than the original. Experimental results quantify the degree of obfuscation, stealth of the code, and effects on execution time and code size.

## 1 Introduction

Software is often distributed in binary form, without source code. Many groups have developed technology that enables one to reverse engineer binary programs and thereby reconstruct the actions and structure of the program. This is accomplished by disassembling machine code into assembly code and then possibly decompiling the assembly code into higher level representations [5, 6, 13]. While reverse-engineering technology has many legitimate uses (in particular, an important application of binary-level reverse engineering is to analyse malware in order to understand its behavior [4, 16–18, 25, 27, 33]), it can also be used to discover vulnerabilities, make unauthorized modifications, or steal intellectual property.

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Since the first step in reverse engineering a binary is disassembly, many approaches to binary obfuscation focus on disrupting this step. This is typically done by identifying assumptions made by disassemblers, then transforming the program systematically so as to violate these assumptions without altering program functionality. Two fundamental assumptions made by disassemblers are that (1) the address where each instruction begins can be determined; and (2) control transfer instructions can be identified and their targets determined. The first assumption is used to identify the actual instructions to disassemble; most modern disassemblers use the second assumption to determine which memory regions get disassembled (see Section 2). In this context, this paper makes the following contributions:

1. It shows how the second of these assumptions can be violated, such that actual control transfers in the program cannot be identified by a static disassembler. This is done by replacing control transfer instructions—jumps, calls, and returns—by “ordinary” instructions whose execution raises traps at runtime; these traps are then fielded by signal handling code that carries out the appropriate control transfer. The effect is to replace control transfer instructions either with apparently innocuous arithmetic or memory operations or with what appear to be illegal instructions that suggest an erroneous disassembly.
2. It shows how the code resulting from this first transformation can be further obfuscated to additionally violate the first assumption stated above. This is done using a secondary transformation that inserts (unreachable) code, containing fake control transfers, after these trap-raising instructions, in order to make it hard to find the beginning of the true next instructions.

In earlier work, we showed how disassembly could be disrupted by violating the first assumption [20]; this paper extends that work by showing a different way to obfuscate binaries by replacing control transfer instructions

with apparently-innocuous non-control-transfer instructions. It is also very different from our earlier work on intrusion detection [21], which proposed a way to hinder certain kinds of mimicry attacks by obfuscating system call instructions. That work sought simply to disguise the instruction (`int $0x80` in Intel x86 processors) used by applications to trap into the OS kernel; more importantly, it required kernel modifications in order to work. By contrast, the work described in this paper applies to arbitrary control transfers in programs and requires no kernel modifications. Taken together, these two differences lead to significant differences between the two approaches in terms of goals, techniques, and effects.

It is important to note that code obfuscation is merely a technique: just as it can be used to protect software against attackers, so too it can be used to hide malicious content. The work presented here can therefore be seen from two perspectives: as a “defense model” of a new approach for protecting intellectual property, or as an “attack model” of a new approach for hiding malicious content. In either case, it goes well beyond current approaches to hiding the content of executable code. In particular, the obfuscations cause the best existing disassemblers to miss 40%–60% of the instructions in test programs and to make mistakes on over half of the control flow edges.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on static disassembly algorithms. Section 3 describes the new techniques for thwarting disassembly and explains how they are implemented. Section 4 describes how we evaluate the efficacy of our approach. Section 5 gives experimental results for programs in the SPECint-2000 benchmark suite. Section 6 describes related work, and Section 7 contains concluding remarks.

## 2 Disassembly Algorithms

This section summarizes the operation of disassemblers in order to provide the context needed to understand how our obfuscation techniques work. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to disassembly: *static* and *dynamic*, the difference between them being that the former examines the program without execution, while the latter monitors the program’s execution (e.g., through a debugger) as part of the disassembly process. Static disassembly processes the entire input program all at once, while dynamic disassembly only disassembles those instructions that were executed for the particular input that was used. Moreover, with static disassembly it is easier to apply offline program analyses to reason about semantic aspects of the program under consideration. Finally, programs being disassembled statically are not

able to defend themselves against reverse engineering using anti-debugging techniques (see, for example, [2, 3]). For these reasons, static disassembly is a popular choice for low level reverse engineering. This paper focuses on static disassembly: its goal is to render static disassembly of programs sufficiently difficult and expensive as to force attackers to resort to dynamic approaches (which, in principle, can then be defended against).

There are two generally used techniques for static disassembly: *linear sweep* and *recursive traversal* [26]. The linear sweep algorithm begins disassembly at the input program’s first executable location, and simply sweeps through the entire text section disassembling each instruction as it is encountered. This method is used by programs such as the GNU utility `objdump` [24] as well as a number of link-time optimization tools [8, 23, 29]. The main weakness of linear sweep is that it is prone to disassembly errors resulting from the misinterpretation of data, such as jump tables, embedded in the instruction stream.

The recursive traversal algorithm uses the control flow instructions of the program being disassembled in order to determine what to disassemble. It starts with the program’s entry point, and disassembles the first basic block. When the algorithm encounters a control flow instruction, it determines the possible successors of that instruction—i.e., addresses where execution could continue—and proceeds with disassembly at those addresses. Variations on this basic approach to disassembly are used by a number of binary translation and optimization systems [6, 28, 30]. The main virtue of recursive traversal is that by following the control flow of a program, it is able to “go around” and thus avoid disassembly of data embedded in the text section. Its main weakness is that it depends on being able to determine the possible successors of each such instruction, which is difficult for indirect jumps and calls. The algorithm also depends on being able to find all the instructions that affect control flow.

A recently proposed generalization of recursive traversal is that of exhaustive disassembly [14, 15], which is the most sophisticated disassembly algorithm we are aware of. This approach aims to work around certain kinds of binary obfuscations by considering all possible disassemblies of each function. It examines the control transfer instructions in these alternative disassemblies to identify basic block boundaries, then uses a variety of heuristic and statistical reasoning to rule out alternatives that are unlikely or impossible. Like the recursive traversal algorithm it generalizes, the exhaustive algorithm thus also relies fundamentally on identifying and analyzing the behavior of control transfer instructions.

## 3 Signal-Based Obfuscation

### 3.1 Overview

In order to confuse a disassembler, we have to disrupt its notion of where the instructions are, what they are doing, and what the control flow is. The choices we have for altering the program are (1) changing instructions to others that produce the same result, and (2) adding instructions that do not have visible effects. Simple, local changes will obviously not confuse a disassembler or a human. More global and drastic changes are required.

The essential intuition of our approach can be illustrated via a simple example, given in Figure 1. The original code fragment on the left-hand side of the figure contains an unconditional jump to a location  $L$ ; the jump is preceded by *Code-before* and followed by *Code-after*. This code is obfuscated by replacing the jump by code that attempts to access an illegal memory location  $\ell$  and thereby generates a trap, which raises a signal. This is fielded by a handler that uses the address of the instruction that caused the trap to determine the target address  $L$  of the original jump instruction and to cause control to branch to  $L$ . In addition, *Bogus Code* is inserted after the trap point; this code appears to be reachable, but in fact it is not. Judicious choice of bogus code can throw off the disassembly even further.

This example illustrates a number of key aspects of our approach that increases the difficulty of statically de-obfuscating programs:

- A variety of different instructions and addresses can be used to raise a signal at runtime. The example uses a `load` from an illegal address, but we could have used many other alternatives, e.g., a `store` to a write-protected location, or a `load` from a read-protected location. Indeed, on an architecture such as the Intel x86, any instruction that can take a memory operand, including all the familiar arithmetic instructions, can be used for this purpose. Moreover, the address  $\ell$  used to generate the trap can be a legal address, albeit one that does not (at runtime) permit a particular kind of memory access. We can further hamper static reverse engineering by using something like an `mprotect()` system call to (possibly temporarily) change the protection of the address  $\ell$  being used to generate the trap at runtime, so that it is not statically obvious that attempting a particular kind of memory access at address  $\ell$  will raise a trap.
- The address  $\ell$  used to generate the trap need not be a determinate value. For example, suppose that, as in typical 32-bit Linux systems, the top 1 GB of the virtual address space (i.e., addresses `0xC0000000`

to `0xFFFFFFFF`) is reserved for the kernel, and is inaccessible to user processes. Then, any value of  $\ell$  in that address range will serve to generate the desired trap. Such values can be computed by starting with an arbitrary value and then using bit manipulations to obtain a value in the appropriate range, as shown below (one can imagine many variations on this theme), where  $A$  and  $B$  are arbitrary legal memory locations:

```
 $r_0 := \text{contents of } A$   
 $r_1 := \text{contents of } B$   
 $r_1 := r_1 \mid 0xC0$  /*  $r_1$ 's low byte  $\geq 0xC0$  */  
 $r_1 := r_1 \ll 24$  /*  $r_1 \geq 0xC0000000$  */  
 $r_0 := r_0 \mid r_1$ 
```

The actual runtime contents of memory locations  $A$  and  $B$  are unimportant here: the value computed into  $r_0$ —which may be different on different executions of this code—will nevertheless always point into protected kernel address space, causing memory accesses through  $r_0$  to generate a trap. Such indeterminacy can further complicate the task of reverse engineering the obfuscated code. Note that such indeterminate address computations can also be applied to generate an arbitrary address within a page (or pages) protected using `mprotect()` as discussed above.

- A variety of different traps can be used. For example, in addition to the memory access traps mentioned above, we can use arithmetic exceptions, e.g., divide-by-zero. In fact, the “instruction” generating a trap need not be a legal instruction at all—i.e., we can use a byte pattern that does not correspond to any legal instruction to effect a control transfer via an illegal instruction trap. Such illegal byte sequences—which in general are indistinguishable from data legitimately embedded in the instruction stream—can be very effective in confusing disassemblers.
- The location following the trap-generating instruction is unreachable, but this is not evident from standard control flow analyses. We can exploit this by inserting additional “bogus” code after the trap-generating instruction to further confuse disassembly. Section 3.2 discusses this in more detail.

We could conceivably obfuscate every jump, call, or return in the source code. However, this would cause the program to execute *much* more slowly because of signal-processing overhead. We allow the user to specify a hot-code threshold, and we only obfuscate control transfers that are not in hot parts of the original program (see Section 5 for details). Even so, we are able to obfuscate about a third of the instructions in hot code blocks.




Figure 1: A Simple Example of our Approach to Obfuscation

Before obfuscating a program, we first instrument the program to gather edge profiles, and then we run the instrumented version on a training input. The obfuscation process itself has several steps. First, using the profile data and hot-cold threshold, determine which control transfers should be obfuscated and modify each such instruction as shown in Figure 1. Second, insert bogus code at unreachable code locations such as after trap-generating instructions. Third, intersperse signal handling and restore (return from signal) code with the original program code. Fourth, compute the new memory layout, construct a table of mappings from trap instructions to target addresses, and patch the restore code to use this table via a perfect hash function. Finally, assemble a new, obfuscated binary.

### 3.2 Program Obfuscations

Within our obfuscator, the original program is represented as an interprocedural control-flow graph (ICFG). The nodes are basic blocks of machine instructions; the edges represent the control flow in the program.

#### Obfuscating Control Transfers

After some initialization actions, our obfuscator makes one pass through the original program to *flip* conditional branches—i.e., reverse the sense of the branch condition and insert an explicit unconditional jump after it to maintain the program’s semantics. This transformation has the effect of increasing the set of candidate locations where our obfuscation can be applied. Our obfuscator then makes a second pass through the program to find and modify all control transfer instructions that are to be obfuscated.

To obfuscate a control transfer instruction, we insert Setup code that prepares for raising a signal and then Trap code that causes a signal. The Setup code (1) allocates space on the stack for use by the signal handler to store the address of the trap instruction, and (2) sets a flag that indicate to the signal handler that the coming signal is from obfuscated code, not the original pro-

gram itself. To set a flag, we use a pre-allocated array (initialized to zero), and the Setup code moves a random non-zero value into a randomly chosen element of the array. Jump, return, and call instructions are obfuscated in nearly identical ways; the only essential difference is the amount of stack space that we need to allocate in order to effect the intended control transfer. The Trap code generates a trap, which in turn raises a signal. In order not to interfere with signal handlers that might be installed in the original program, we only raise signals for which the default action is to dump core and terminate the program. In particular we use illegal instruction (SIGILL), floating point exception (SIGFPE), and segmentation violation (SIGSEGV).

To determine which kind of trap to raise—and to avoid the need to save and later restore program registers—we first do liveness analysis to determine which registers are live at the trap point and which are available for us to use. If no register is available, we randomly generate an illegal instruction from among several possible choices. Otherwise, we generate code to load a zero into a free register  $r$ , then either dereference  $r$  (to cause a segmentation fault), or divide by  $r$  (to cause a floating point exception). Since indirect loads are far more frequent than divides in real programs, most of the time we choose the former.

If we simply moved a zero into a register each time that we wanted to trigger a floating point exception or segmentation fault, there would be dozens of such instructions that would be a signature for our obfuscation. To avoid this, we generate a sequence of instructions by using multiple, randomly chosen rewriting rules that perform value-preserving transformations on the registers that are free at each obfuscation point. Appendix A describes how we randomize the computation of values.

#### Inserting Bogus Code

After obfuscating a control transfer instruction, we next insert bogus code—a conditional branch and some junk bytes—to further confuse disassemblers. This is shown in Figure 2. Since the trap instruction has the effect of




Figure 2: Bogus code insertion

an unconditional control transfer, the conditional branch immediately following the trap is “bogus code” that will not be reachable in the obfuscated program, and hence it will not be executed. The purpose of adding this instruction is to confuse the control flow analysis of the program by misleading the disassembler into identifying a spurious edge in the control flow graph; the control flow edge so introduced can also lead to further disassembly errors at the target of this control transfer. A secondary benefit of such bogus conditional branches is that they help improve the stealthiness of the obfuscation, since otherwise the disassembly would produce what appeared to be long sequences of straight-line code without any branches, which would not resemble code commonly encountered in practice. We randomly select an unconditional branch—based on how frequently the different kinds occur in normal programs—and use a random PC-relative displacement.

The junk bytes are a proper prefix of a legal instruction. The goal is to cause a disassembler to consume the first few bytes of *Code-after* when it completes the instruction that starts with the junk bytes. This will ideally cause it to continue to misidentify the true instruction boundaries for at least a while.<sup>1</sup> We determine the prefix length  $n$  that maximizes the disassembly error for subsequent instructions ( $n$  depends only on the instructions in *Code-after*), and insert the first  $n$  bytes of an instruction chosen randomly from a number of different alternatives.

### Building the Mapping Table

After obfuscating control flow and inserting bogus code, our obfuscator computes a memory layout for the obfuscated program and determines final memory addresses.

<sup>1</sup>This technique only works on variable-instruction-length architectures such as the IA-32. Moreover, disassemblers tend to resynchronize relatively quickly, so that on average they are confused for only three or four instructions before again finding the true instruction boundaries.

Among these are the addresses of all the trap instructions that have been inserted. The obfuscator then goes through the control flow graph and gathers the information it needs to build a table that maps trap locations to original targets.

Suppose that  $N$  control transfer instructions have been obfuscated. Then there are  $N$  rows in the mapping table, one for each trap point. Each row contains a flag that indicates the type of transfer that was replaced, and zero, one, or two target addresses, depending on the value of the flag. To make it hard to reverse engineer the contents and use of this table, we use two techniques. First, we generate a perfect hash function that maps the  $N$  trap addresses to distinct integers from 0 to  $N - 1$  [12], and we use this function to get indices into the mapping table; this machine code is quite inscrutable and hence hard to reverse engineer. Second, to make it hard to discover the target addresses in the mapping table, in place of each target address  $T$  we store a value  $XT$  that is the XOR of  $T$  and the corresponding trap address  $S$ .

### 3.3 Signal Handling

When an instruction raises a signal, the processor stores its address  $S$  on the stack, then traps into the kernel. Figure 3(a) shows the components and control transfers that normally occur when a program raises a signal at address  $S$  and has installed a signal handler that returns back to the program at the same address. (If no handler has been installed, the kernel takes the default action for the signal.) Figure 3(b) shows the components and control transfers that occur in our implementation. The essential differences are that we return control to a different target address  $T$ , and we do so by causing the kernel to transfer control to our restore code rather than back to the trap address. We allow obfuscated programs to install their own signal handlers, as described below.




Figure 3: Signal Handling: Normal and Obfuscated Cases

### Handler and Restore Code Actions

We trigger the path shown in Figure 3(b) when a signal is raised from a trap location that we inserted in the binary. However, other instructions in the original program might raise the illegal instruction, floating point exception, or segmentation fault signals. To tell the difference, we use a global array that is initialized to zero. In the Setup code before each of the traps we insert in the program, we set a random element of this array to a non-zero value. In our signal handler, we loop through this array to see if any value is nonzero (and we then reset it to zero).

In the normal case where our signal handler is processing one of the traps we inserted in the program, it overwrites the kernel restore function’s return address with the address of our restoration code. That code (1) invokes the perfect hash function on the trap address *S* (which was put in the stack space allocated by our signal handler), (2) looks up the original target address, (3) resets the stack frame as appropriate for the type of control transfer and (4) transfers control (via a *return* instruction) to the original target address.

To make it harder for an attacker to find and reverse engineer the signal handler, we disperse our handler and restore code over the program, i.e., we split the code into multiple basic blocks and interleave these in with the original program code. We also make multiple slightly different copies of each code block so that we are not always using the same locations each time we handle a signal. As will be shown in Section 5, we are able to obfuscate many hot instructions as a side effect of obfuscating cold code. These include some of the code we introduce to handle signals.

### Interaction With Other Signals

We allow the original program to install signal handlers and dynamically to change signal handling semantics. By analyzing the binary, we determine whether it in-

stalls signal handlers: this is done by checking to see whether there are any calls to system library routines (e.g., `signal()`) that install signal handlers. We transform the code to intercept these calls at runtime and record, in a table, the signals that are being handled and the address of the corresponding signal handler. When our signal handler determines that a signal did not get raised by one of our obfuscations (by examining the array of flags), it consults this table. If the user installed a handler, we call that handler then return to the original program. Otherwise, we take the default action for that kind of signal.

Although in general we are able to handle interactions between signal handling in our code and the original program, we discovered one instance of a race condition. In particular, one of the SPECint-95 benchmark programs, *m88ksim*, installs a handler for SIGINT, the interrupt signal. If we obfuscate that program, run the code, and interrupt the program while it happens to be in our handler, the program will cause a segmentation fault and crash. To solve this type of problem, our signal handler needs to delay the processing of other signals that might be raised. (On Unix this can be done by having the signal handler call the `sigprocmask` function, or by using `sigaction` when we (re)install the handler.) Once our trap processing code gets back to the restore code block of the obfuscated program, it can safely be interrupted because it is through manipulating kernel addresses. However, our current implementation does not yet block other signals.

An even worse problem would occur in a multi-threaded program, because multiple traps could occur and have to be handled at the same time. Signal handling is not thread safe in general in Unix systems, so our obfuscation method cannot be used in an arbitrary multithreaded program. However, this is a limitation of Unix, not our method.

### 3.4 Attack Scenarios

Recall that our goal is to make static disassembly difficult enough to force any adversary to resort to dynamic techniques. Here we discuss why we believe our scheme is able to attain this goal.

We assume that our approach is known to the adversary. As discussed in Section 3.2, the specifics of the obfuscation as applied to a particular program—the setup code, the kind of trap used for any particular control transfer, the code sequence used to generate traps, as well as the bogus control transfers inserted after the trap instruction—are chosen randomly. This makes it difficult for an adversary to identify the location of trap instructions and bogus control transfers simply by inspecting the obfuscated code.

Since locating the obfuscation code by simple inspection is not feasible, the only other possibility to consider, for statically identifying the obfuscation instructions, is static analysis. This is difficult for two reasons. The first is the sheer number of candidates: for example, in principle any memory operation can raise an exception and is therefore potentially a candidate for analysis. Secondly, the problem of statically determining the values of the operands of such candidate instructions is difficult, both theoretically [22] and in practice, especially because, as discussed in Section 3.1, such operands need not be fixed constant values. Furthermore, if a byte sequence is encountered in the disassembly that does not encode a legal instruction (and therefore cannot be subjected to static analysis), it can be either a part of the obfuscation (i.e., is “executed” and causes a trap), or it can be data embedded in the instruction stream: determining which of these is the case is in general an undecidable problem.

## 4 Evaluation

We measure the efficacy of obfuscation in two ways: by the extent of incorrect disassembly of the input, and by the extent of errors in control flow analysis of the disassembled input. These quantities are related, in the sense that an incorrect disassembly of a control transfer instruction will result in a corresponding error in the control flow graph obtained for the program. However, it is possible, in principle, to have a perfect disassembly and yet have errors in control flow analysis because control transfer instructions have been disguised as innocuous arithmetic instructions or bogus control transfers have been inserted.

### 4.1 Evaluating Disassembly Errors

We measure the extent of disassembly errors using a measure we call the *confusion factor* for the instructions, basic blocks, and functions. Intuitively, the confusion factor measures the fraction of program units (instructions, basic blocks, or functions) in the obfuscated code that were incorrectly identified by a disassembler. More formally, let  $A$  be the set of all *actual* instruction addresses, i.e., those that would be encountered when the program is executed, and let  $P$  be the set of all *perceived* instruction addresses, i.e., those addresses produced by a static disassembly. Then  $A - P$  is the set of addresses that are not correctly identified as instruction addresses by the disassembler. We define the *confusion factor*  $CF$  to be the fraction of instruction addresses that the disassembler fails to identify correctly:<sup>2</sup>

$$CF = |A - P|/|A|.$$

Confusion factors for functions and basic blocks are calculated analogously: a basic block or function is counted as being “incorrectly disassembled” if any of the instructions in it is incorrectly disassembled. The reason for computing confusion factors for basic blocks and functions as well as for instructions is to determine whether the errors in disassembling instructions are clustered in a small region of the code, or whether they are distributed over significant portions of the program.

### 4.2 Evaluating Control Flow Errors

Two kinds of errors can occur when comparing the control flow structure of the disassembled program  $P_{disasm}$  with that of the original program  $P_{orig}$ . First,  $P_{disasm}$  may contain some edge that does not appear in  $P_{orig}$ , i.e., the disassembler may mistakenly find a control flow edge where the original program did not have one. Second,  $P_{disasm}$  may not contain some edge that appears in  $P_{orig}$ , i.e., the disassembler may fail to find an edge that was present in the original program. We term the first kind of error *overestimation errors* (written  $\Delta_{over}$ ) and the second kind *underestimation errors* (written  $\Delta_{under}$ ), and express them relative to the number of edges in the original program. Let  $E_{orig}$  be the set of control flow edges in the original program and  $E_{disasm}$  the set of control flow edges identified by the disassembler, then:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_{over} &= |E_{disasm} - E_{orig}|/|E_{orig}| \\ \Delta_{under} &= |E_{orig} - E_{disasm}|/|E_{orig}|\end{aligned}$$

<sup>2</sup>We also considered taking into account the set  $P - A$  of addresses that are erroneously identified as instruction addresses by the disassembler, but we rejected this approach because it “double counts” the effects of disassembly errors.

Even if we assume a perfect “attack disassembler” that does not incur any disassembly errors, its output will nevertheless contain control flow errors arising from two sources. First, it will fail to identify control transfers that have been transformed to trap-raising instructions. Second, it will erroneously identify bogus control transfers introduced by the obfuscator. We can use this to bound the control flow errors even for a perfect disassembly. Suppose that  $n_{trap}$  control flow edges are lost from a program due to control transfer instructions being converted to traps, and  $n_{bogus}$  bogus control flow edges are added by the obfuscator. Then, a lower bound on underestimation errors,  $\min \Delta_{under}$ , is obtained when the only control transfers that the attack disassembler fails to find are those that were lost due to conversion to trap instructions:  $\min \Delta_{under} = n_{trap}/E_{orig}$ . An upper bound on overestimation errors,  $\max \Delta_{over}$ , is obtained when every bogus conditional branch inserted by the obfuscator is reported by the disassembler:  $\max \Delta_{over} = n_{bogus}/E_{orig}$ .

## 5 Experimental Results

We evaluated the efficacy of our techniques using eleven programs from the SPECint-2000 benchmark suite.<sup>3</sup> Our experiments were run on an otherwise unloaded 2.4 GHz Pentium IV system with 1 GB of main memory running RedHat Linux (Fedora Core 3). The programs were compiled with *gcc* version 3.4.4 at optimization level `-O3`. The programs were profiled using the SPEC training inputs and these profiles were used to identify any hot spots during our transformations. The final performance of the transformed programs was then evaluated using the SPEC reference inputs. Each execution time reported was derived by running seven trials, removing the highest and lowest times from the sampling, and averaging the remaining five.

We experimented with three different “attack disassemblers” to evaluate our techniques: GNU `objdump` [24]; IDA Pro [11], a commercially available disassembly tool that is generally regarded to be among the best disassemblers available;<sup>4</sup> and an exhaustive disassembler by Kruegel *et al.* that was engineered to handle obfuscated binaries [15]. `Objdump` uses a straightforward linear sweep algorithm, while IDA Pro uses recursive traversal. The exhaustive disassembler of Kruegel *et al.* takes into account the possibility that the input binary may be obfuscated by not making any assumptions about instruction boundaries. Instead, it considers alternative disassemblies starting at every byte in the code region of the program, then examines these alternatives

<sup>3</sup>We did not use the *eon* programs from this benchmark suite because we were not able to build it.

<sup>4</sup>We used IDA Pro version 4.3 for the results reported here.

using a variety of statistical and heuristic analyses to discard those that are unlikely or impossible. Kruegel *et al.* report that this approach yields significantly better disassemblies on obfuscated inputs than other existing disassemblers [15]; to our knowledge, the exhaustive disassembler is the most sophisticated disassembler currently available.

In order to maintain a reasonable balance between the extent of obfuscation and the concomitant runtime overhead, we obfuscated only the “cold code” in the program—where a basic block is considered “cold” if, according to the execution profiles used, it is not executed. We evaluated a number of different combinations of obfuscations. The data presented below correspond to the combination that gave the highest confusion factors without excessive performance overhead: flip branches to increase the number of unconditional jumps in the code (see Section 3.2); convert all unconditional control transfers (jumps, calls, and function returns) in cold code to traps; insert bogus code after traps; and insert junk bytes after *jmp*, *ret*, and *halt* instructions.

### Disassembly Error

The extent of disassembly error, as measured by confusion factors (Section 4.1) is shown in Figure 4(a). The results differ depending on the attack disassembler, but the results for each disassembler are remarkably consistent across the benchmark programs. Because we have focused primarily on disguising control transfer instructions by transforming them into signal-raising instructions, it does not come as a surprise that the straightforward linear sweep algorithm used by the `objdump` disassembler has the least confusion at 43% of the instructions on average. However, these are spread across 68% of the basic blocks and 90% of the functions. The other disassemblers are confused to a much greater extent—55% for the exhaustive disassembler and 57% for IDA Pro, on average—but these are more somewhat more clustered as they cover only about 60% of the basic blocks and slightly fewer functions (89% and 85%, respectively).

Overall, the instruction confusion factors show that a significant portion of each binary is disassembled incorrectly; the basic block and function confusion factors show that the errors in disassembly are distributed over most of the program. Taken together, these data show that our techniques are effective even against state-of-the-art disassembly tools.

We have also measured the relative confusion factors for hot and cold instructions, i.e., those in hot versus cold basic blocks. For `objdump`, the confusion factors are nearly identical at 42% of the hot instructions and 44% of



the cold instructions (again on average). The exhaustive disassembler was confused by fewer of the hot instructions (35%) but more of the cold instructions (59%). IDA Pro did the best on hot instructions at 28% confusion, on average, but worst on cold instructions at 62% confusion. It is not surprising that Kruegel and IDA Pro did better with hot code, because we did not obfuscate it except to insert junk after hot unconditional jumps, and junk by itself should not confuse an exhaustive or recursive descent disassembler. Then again, these disassemblers still failed to disassemble about a third of the hot code.

As an aside, we had thought that interleaving hot and cold basic blocks would cause more of the obfuscations in cold code to cause disassembly errors to “spill over” into succeeding hot code and increase the confusion there. This turns out to be the case for `objdump`, which is especially confused by junk byte insertion. However, IDA Pro and the exhaustive disassembler are still able to find most hot code blocks. In fact, such interleaving introduces additional unconditional jumps in the code, e.g., from one hot block to the next one, jumping around the intervening cold code. The exhaustive disassembler and IDA Pro are able to find these jumps and use them to improve disassembly, resulting in less confusion when hot and cold code are interleaved. Moreover, programs run more slowly when hot and cold blocks are interleaved due to poorer cache utilization.

### Control Flow Obfuscation

Figure 4(b) shows the effect of our transformations in obfuscating the control flow graph of the program. The second column gives, for each program, the actual number of control flow edges in the original program. These are counted as follows: each conditional branch gives rise to two control flow edges; each unconditional branch (direct or indirect) gives rise to a single edge; and each function call gives two control flow edges—one corresponding to a “call edge” to the callee’s entry point, the other to a “return edge” from the callee back to the caller. Column 3 gives the number of control flow edges removed due to the conversion of control flow instructions to traps, while column 4 gives the number of bogus control flow edges added by the obfuscator. Columns 5 and 6 give, respectively, an upper bound on the overestimation error and a lower bound on the underestimation error. The remaining columns give, for each attack disassembler, the extent to which it incurs errors in constructing the control flow graph of the program, as discussed in Section 4.2.

It can be seen from Figure 4(b) that none of the three attack disassemblers tested fares very well at constructing the control flow graph of the program. `objdump` fails to find over 63% of the control flow edges in the

PROGRAM	EXECUTION TIME (SECS)		
	Original ( $T_0$ )	Obfuscated ( $T_1$ )	Slowdown ( $T_1/T_0$ )
<i>bzip2</i>	283.011	377.620	1.334
<i>crafty</i>	140.741	1222.992	1.584
<i>gap</i>	146.367	152.673	1.043
<i>gcc</i>	151.624	247.552	1.633
<i>gzip</i>	210.036	209.502	0.997
<i>mcf</i>	425.971	427.132	1.003
<i>parser</i>	301.079	302.040	1.003
<i>perlbmk</i>	220.851	461.828	2.091
<i>twolf</i>	569.163	586.259	1.030
<i>vortex</i>	235.649	240.648	1.021
<i>vpr</i>	319.475	328.563	1.028
GEOM. MEAN			1.210

Figure 5: Effect of Obfuscation on Execution Speed

original program; at the same time, it reports over 71% spurious edges (relative to the number of original edges in the program) that are not actually present in the program. The exhaustive disassembler fails to find over 60% of the edges in the original program, and reports over 27% spurious edges. IDA Pro fails to find over 63% of the control flow edges in the original program and reports over 41% spurious edges. Again the results for each disassembler are very consistent across the benchmark programs.

Also significant are the error bounds reported in columns 5 and 6 of Figure 4(b). These numbers indicate that, even if we suppose perfect disassembly, the result would incur up to 85.5% overestimation error and at least 28.93% underestimation error.

### Execution Speed

Figure 5 shows the effect of obfuscation on execution speed. For some programs—such as *gap*, *gzip*, *mcf*, *parser*, *twolf*, *vortex*, and *vpr*—the execution characteristics on profiling input(s) closely match those on the reference input, so there is essentially no slowdown. (In fact, *gzip* ran faster after obfuscation; we believe this is due to a combination of cache effects and experimental errors resulting from clock granularity.) For other programs—such as *crafty*, *gcc* and *perlbmk*—the profiling inputs are not as good predictors of the runtime characteristics of the program on the reference inputs, and this results in significant slowdowns: a factor of 1.6 for *crafty* and *gcc* and 2.1 for *perlbmk*. The mean slowdown seen for all eleven benchmarks is 21%.

We also measured the effect on execution speed of obfuscating a portion of the hot code blocks. Let  $\theta$  specify the fraction of the total number of instructions ex-

PROGRAM	OBJDUMP			EXHAUSTIVE			IDA PRO		
	<i>Instrs</i>	<i>Blocks</i>	<i>Funcs</i>	<i>Instrs</i>	<i>Blocks</i>	<i>Funcs</i>	<i>Instrs</i>	<i>Blocks</i>	<i>Funcs</i>
<i>bzip2</i>	44.19	69.62	89.59	55.57	60.29	89.33	59.88	62.94	85.99
<i>crafty</i>	41.09	68.70	90.26	55.94	61.04	87.92	54.22	59.26	84.71
<i>gap</i>	42.98	66.78	90.19	52.64	56.13	87.04	55.70	57.92	83.77
<i>gcc</i>	46.32	68.67	89.26	55.89	58.24	87.58	54.67	55.49	82.28
<i>gzip</i>	44.26	69.56	90.25	53.61	58.91	87.13	61.65	63.45	85.18
<i>mcf</i>	44.85	69.91	89.20	57.32	60.53	87.80	58.68	61.27	84.85
<i>parser</i>	44.28	68.83	91.70	55.19	59.40	88.87	57.85	61.27	85.06
<i>perlbmk</i>	45.34	69.08	89.80	55.62	58.82	90.09	55.16	56.14	85.89
<i>twolf</i>	41.90	68.32	89.03	56.29	61.63	88.80	57.77	61.74	84.77
<i>vortex</i>	39.80	69.40	93.28	58.05	65.77	93.10	55.96	64.04	90.98
<i>vpr</i>	42.31	68.19	86.67	54.20	59.91	87.49	59.01	63.27	82.16
GEOM. MEAN:	43.35	68.82	89.92	55.46	60.02	88.63	57.28	60.55	85.03

(a) Disassembly Errors (Confusion Factor, %)

PROGRAM	$E_{orig}$	$n_{trap}$	$n_{bogus}$	max $\Delta_{over}$	min $\Delta_{under}$	OBJDUMP		EXHAUSTIVE		IDA PRO	
						$\Delta_{over}$	$\Delta_{under}$	$\Delta_{over}$	$\Delta_{under}$	$\Delta_{over}$	$\Delta_{under}$
<i>bzip2</i>	47933	13933	42236	88.11	29.07	72.60	64.82	28.31	61.40	40.44	65.66
<i>crafty</i>	59507	17243	50868	85.48	28.98	72.26	62.17	25.28	60.71	43.12	62.20
<i>gap</i>	98793	26603	82374	83.38	26.93	69.94	60.90	25.35	57.20	41.49	60.84
<i>gcc</i>	237491	67818	193570	81.51	28.56	67.18	63.98	25.41	58.36	41.93	59.32
<i>gzip</i>	48467	13931	42722	88.15	28.74	72.56	64.56	29.64	59.64	38.34	66.09
<i>mcf</i>	43376	12329	38220	88.11	28.42	72.57	65.32	26.13	61.46	42.79	63.74
<i>parser</i>	59823	16688	50858	85.01	27.90	70.65	63.94	27.77	59.78	40.87	63.46
<i>perlbmk</i>	116711	33748	100298	85.94	28.92	70.67	64.75	26.99	59.31	43.27	59.66
<i>twolf</i>	62210	18061	52916	85.06	29.03	71.90	62.27	28.55	61.48	40.85	63.94
<i>vortex</i>	97242	32507	81734	84.05	33.43	72.37	63.29	30.28	65.25	41.62	66.18
<i>vpr</i>	55187	15811	47414	85.92	28.65	71.76	61.92	27.92	59.76	38.60	65.56
GEOM. MEAN:				85.50	28.93	71.30	63.43	27.37	60.36	41.18	63.28

(b) Control Flow Errors (%)

**Key:**  $E_{orig}$ : edges in original program  
 $n_{trap}$ : control flow edges lost due to trap conversion  
 $n_{bogus}$ : bogus control flow edges added  
max  $\Delta_{over}$ : upper bound on overestimation errors  
min  $\Delta_{under}$ : lower bound on underestimation errors

Figure 4: Efficacy of obfuscation

executed at runtime that should be accounted for by hot basic blocks. (The execution times in Figure 5 are for  $\theta = 1.0$ , i.e., all basic blocks with an execution count greater than 0 are considered hot.) If we run our obfuscator with  $\theta = 0.999$ —which means that, in addition to cold basic blocks, we obfuscate the hot basic blocks that account for just a tenth of a percent of the dynamic execution count—then the mean slowdown for the eleven benchmarks increases to 2.38. For smaller values of  $\theta$ , the situation is far worse: at  $\theta = 0.99$  the mean slowdown is 6.79, and at  $\theta = 0.9$  the mean slowdown climbs to 43.39. The confusion factor increases somewhat when  $\theta$  is decreased, but even at  $\theta = 0.9$  the increase in confusion is less than 10% relative to the confusion at  $\theta = 1.0$ .

### Program Size

Figure 6 shows the impact of obfuscation on the size of the text and initialized data sections. It can be seen that the size of the text section increases by factors ranging from 1.90 (*crafty*) to almost 2.1 (*vortex*), with a mean increase of a factor of 2.01. The relative growth in the size of the initialized data section is considerably larger, ranging from a factor of about 10 (*crafty*) to a factor of over 58 (*twolf*), with a mean growth of a factor of 26.46. The growth in the size of the initialized data is due to the addition of the mapping tables used to compute the type of each branch as well as its target address. However, this large relative growth in the data section size is due mainly to the fact that the initial size of this section is

PROGRAM	TEXT SECTION (KB)			INITIALIZED DATA SECTION (KB)			COMBINED: TEXT+DATA (KB)		
	Original ( $T_0$ )	Obfusc. ( $T_1$ )	Change ( $T_1/T_0$ )	Original ( $D_0$ )	Obfusc. ( $D_1$ )	Change ( $D_1/D_0$ )	Original ( $C_0$ )	Obfusc. ( $C_1$ )	Change ( $C_1/C_0$ )
<i>bzip2</i>	343.6	694.2	2.02	6.4	145.4	22.64	350.0	840.0	2.40
<i>crafty</i>	474.5	903.1	1.90	19.7	192.4	9.78	494.2	1,095.5	2.22
<i>gap</i>	690.9	1,351.6	1.96	6.8	273.1	39.95	697.8	1,624.7	2.33
<i>gcc</i>	1,494.4	3,051.8	2.04	21.9	675.5	30.88	1,516.3	3,727.3	2.46
<i>gzip</i>	344.9	699.8	2.03	5.8	145.0	24.94	350.7	844.8	2.41
<i>mcf</i>	301.6	618.8	2.05	3.3	128.2	39.03	304.9	747.0	2.45
<i>parser</i>	402.6	833.1	2.07	5.7	180.0	31.32	408.3	1,013.f	2.48
<i>perlbmk</i>	808.6	1,612.2	1.99	32.8	359.0	10.95	841.4	1,971.3	2.34
<i>twolf</i>	472.f	930.9	1.97	3.3	192.2	58.46	475.7	1,123.2	2.36
<i>vortex</i>	725.3	1,513.5	2.09	19.8	340.7	17.23	745.1	1,854.2	2.49
<i>vpr</i>	407.1	800.7	1.97	3.4	165.5	48.45	410.5	966.2	2.35
GEOM. MEAN			2.01			26.46			2.39

Figure 6: Effect of Obfuscation on Text and Data Section Sizes

not very large. When we consider the total increase in memory requirements due to our technique, obtained as the sum of the text and initialized data sections, we see that it ranges from a factor of 2.22 (*crafty*) to about 2.5 (*parser* and *vortex*), with a mean growth of a factor of about 2.4.

The increase in the size of the text section arises from three sources. The first of these is the code required to set up and raise the trap for each obfuscated control transfer instruction. The second is the junk bytes and bogus conditional branch inserted after a trap instruction. Finally, there is the signal handler and restore code. In our current implementation, the first two of these sources—the setup code for a trap and bogus code inserted after a trap—introduces on average an additional 30 bytes of memory for each obfuscated control transfer instruction. This accounts for over 95% of the total increase in the text section size. Each obfuscated control transfer also adds three memory words (12 bytes) to the initialized data section, accounting for the increase in the size of this section.

### Stealth

The *stealth* of an obfuscation refers to the difficulty of distinguishing code introduced by an obfuscator from the original program code. We estimate the stealth of our obfuscations by comparing the distributions of (i) opcodes and (ii) opcode pairs from adjacent instructions. The points of comparison are the original program, the obfuscated program (for which we know the actual instructions), and the instructions observed by the different attack disassemblers we tested. The idea is to see whether the obfuscation process introduces any atypical instruction sequence signatures that could be used to identify the obfuscation code statically.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of individual opcodes. Because of the large number of opcodes in the x86 architecture, we have grouped the commonly used opcodes into 27 sets—moves, conditional jumps, and so on—and also added sets for illegal instructions and all other instructions. The 29 different sets of opcodes are given along the x-axis (“jc” denotes conditional jumps), while the y-axis shows the percentage of instructions in any program accounted for by that opcode. The y-axis uses a logarithmic scale to in order to magnify the data ranges for small percentage values. Each data point was obtained by computing the opcode distribution for each of the SPECint-2000 benchmarks in our test suite: the original binary, the distribution in the obfuscated program obtained from the obfuscator, and the distributions for the disassemblies produced by each of the attack disassemblers. We then used these data to compute the arithmetic mean, minimum, and maximum values of instruction percentages for that opcode across all of our test programs. For each opcode, the dark line in Figure 7 shows the mean instruction percentage for each opcode, together with the range of its values. This line is then followed immediately to the right by a set of lighter lines that show the values for the obfuscated programs as well as those in the disassemblies obtained from the attack disassemblers.

Figure 7 illustrates that, in most cases, the mean value of each opcode’s range in the obfuscated code is within the range of values in the unobfuscated benchmark code. Calls, returns, and jumps are somewhat less frequent for the obvious reason that we obfuscated many of those instructions. Conditional jumps are somewhat more frequent because we added these to bogus code. On balance, however, there are no obvious outliers that an attacker could use to use as a signature for where obfuscations occur.




Figure 7: Obfuscation Stealth I: Distribution of Individual Opcodes

Figure 8 shows the distribution of pairs of adjacent opcodes, not including pairs involving illegal opcodes. Due to space constraints, we show the data for just one attack disassembler, IDA Pro; the data are generally similar for the other attack disassemblers. Figure 8(a) shows the actual distribution of opcode pairs in the obfuscated code, while Figure 8(b) shows the distribution for the disassembly obtained from IDA Pro. To reduce visual clutter in these figures, we plot the ranges of values for each opcode pair in the unobfuscated code (the dark band running down the graph), but only the mean values for the obfuscated code.

There are two broad conclusions to be drawn from Figure 8. First, as can be seen from Figure 8(a), the actual distribution of adjacent opcode pairs in the obfuscated code is, by and large, reasonably close to that of the original code; however, there are a few opcode pairs, very often involving conditional jumps, that occur with disproportionate frequency. The selection of obfuscation code to eliminate such atypical situations is an area of future work. The second conclusion is that, as indicated by Figure 8(b), the opcode-pairs in the obfuscated code are significantly more random than in the unobfuscated code, partly because of disassembly errors caused by “junk bytes” inserted by our obfuscator. The outliers in this figure might serve as starting points for an attacker, but there are dozens of such points, they correspond to thousands of actual opcode pairs in the program, and there is no obvious pattern.

In summary, the individual opcodes and pairs of adjacent opcodes have approximately similar distributions in both unobfuscated and obfuscated programs. Thus, our obfuscation method is on balance quite stealthy.

## 6 Related Work

The earliest work on the topic of binary obfuscation that we are aware of is by Cohen, who proposes overlapping adjacent instructions to fool a disassembler [7]. We are not aware of any actual implementations of this proposal, and our own experiments with this idea proved to be disappointing. More recently, we described an approach to make binaries harder to disassemble using a combination of two techniques: the judicious insertion of “junk bytes” to throw off disassembly; and the use of a device called “branch functions” to make it harder to identify branch targets [20]. These techniques proved effective at thwarting most disassemblers, including the commercial IDA Pro system. Conceptually, this paper can be seen as extending this work by disguising control transfer instructions and inserting misleading control transfers. More recently, we described a way to use signals to disguise the instruction used to make system calls (`int $0x80` in Intel x86 processors), with the goal of preventing injected malware code from finding and executing system calls; this work required kernel modifications. By contrast, the work described in this paper is applicable to arbitrary control transfers in programs and does not require any changes to the kernel. These two differences lead to significant differences between the two approaches in terms of goals, techniques, and effects.

There has been some recent work by Kapoor [14] and Kruegel *et al.* [15] focusing on disassembly techniques aimed specifically at obfuscated binaries. They work around the possibility of “junk bytes” inserted in the instruction stream by producing an *exhaustive disassembly* for each function, i.e., where a recursive disassem-




Figure 8: Obfuscation Stealth II: Distribution of Opcode Pairs

bly is produced starting at every byte in the code for that function. This results in a set of alternative disassemblies, not all of which are viable. The disassembler then uses a variety of heuristic and statistical reasoning to rule out alternatives that are unlikely or impossible. To our knowledge, these exhaustive disassemblers are the most sophisticated disassemblers currently available. One of the “attack disassemblers” used for our experiments is an implementation of Kruegel *et al.*’s exhaustive disassembler.

There is a considerable body of work on code obfuscation that focuses on making it harder for an attacker to decompile a program and extract high level semantic information from it [9, 10, 31, 32]. Typically, these authors rely on the use of computationally difficult static analysis problems—e.g., involving complex Boolean expressions, pointers, or indirect control flow—to make it harder to construct a precise control flow graph for a program. Our work is orthogonal to these proposals, and complementary to them. We aim to make a program harder to disassemble correctly, and to thereby sow uncertainty in an attacker’s mind about which portions of a disassembled program have been correctly disassembled and which parts may contain disassembly errors. If the program has already been obfuscated using any of these higher-level obfuscation techniques, our techniques add an additional layer of protection that makes it even harder to decipher the actual structure of the program.

Even greater security may be obtained by maintaining the software in encrypted form and decrypting it as needed during execution, as suggested by Aucsmith [1];

or by using specialized hardware, as discussed by Lie *et al.* [19]. Such approaches have the disadvantages of high performance overhead (in the case of runtime decryption in the absence of specialized hardware support) or a loss of flexibility because the software can no longer be run on stock hardware.

## 7 Conclusions

This paper has described a new approach to obfuscating executable binary programs and evaluated its effectiveness on programs in the SPECint-2000 benchmark suite. Our goals are to make it hard for disassemblers (and humans) to find the real instructions in a binary and to give them a mistaken notion of the actual control flow in the program. To accomplish these goals, we replace many control transfer instructions by traps that cause signals, inject signal handling code that actually effects the original transfers of control, and insert bogus code that further confuses disassemblers. We also use randomization to vary the code we insert so it does not stand out.

These obfuscations confuse even the best disassemblers. On average, the GNU `objdump` program [24] misunderstands over 43% of the original instructions, over-reports the control flow edges by 71%, and misses 63% of the original control flow edges. The IDA Pro system [11], which is considered the best commercial disassembler, fails to disassemble 57% of the original instructions, over-reports control flow edges by 41%, and under-reports control flow edges by 85%. A recent dis-

assembler [15] that has been designed to deal with obfuscated programs fails to disassemble over 55% of the instructions, over-reports control flow edges by 27%, and under-reports control flow edges by over 60%.

These results indicate that we successfully make it hard to disassemble programs, even when we only obfuscate code that is in cold code blocks. If we obfuscate more of the code, we can confuse disassemblers even more. However, our obfuscation method slows down program execution, so there is a tradeoff between the degree of obfuscation and execution time. When we obfuscate only cold code blocks, the average slow-down is 21%, and this result is skewed by three benchmarks for which the training input is not a very good predictor for execution on the reference input. On many programs, the slowdown is negligible. An interesting possibility—which we have not explored but could easily add to our obfuscator—would be selectively to obfuscate some of the hot code, e.g., that which the creator of the code especially wants to conceal.

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## Appendix — Randomizing the Computation of Values

The essential idea is to carry out multiple, random, value-preserving rewritings of the syntax tree for an expression. We start with a simple expression, e.g., an integer constant or a variable, and repeatedly rewrite it, using value-preserving transformation rules, to produce an equivalent expression (i.e., one that will always evaluate to the same value).

Figure 9 gives a non-exhaustive list of example rewrite rules. In the rules, we use ‘ $x$ ’ and ‘ $y$ ’ to denote variables, i.e., the values of registers or memory locations; ‘ $k$ ’, ‘ $m$ ’, and ‘ $n$ ’ to denote integer constants; and  $a$  to denote something that is either a variable or a constant. Note that equivalences that hold for integers may not hold at the machine level, e.g.,  $(x + 1) - 1$  need not evaluate to  $x$ . Thus, in general we cannot use associative and distributive laws for rewriting.

The expression being rewritten is maintained as a syntax tree. Initially, the tree consists of a single node, namely, the variable or constant being rewritten. Each node of the tree has an associated label indicating what kind of value is being computed (zero, nonzero, arbitrary, etc.). The rewriting proceeds as follows. We first choose a positive random value as the number of rewriting steps. Each rewriting step consists of the following:

1. Randomly choose a leaf node  $X$  of the tree.
2. Randomly choose a rewrite rule  $R \equiv Y \rightarrow E$  from the set of rules corresponding to the label of the chosen leaf node.
3. Modify the syntax tree by adding the appropriate instance of  $E$  (i.e., with all occurrences of  $Y$  replaced by  $X$ ) as child nodes of  $X$  and update the set of leaf nodes appropriately.

<u>Zero:</u>	$0 \longrightarrow 0 + 0$	
	$0 \longrightarrow a \wedge a$	
	$0 \longrightarrow 0 \& a$	
	$0 \longrightarrow k ? 0 : a$	$k \neq 0$ ; arbitrary $a$
<u>Nonzero <math>k</math>:</u>	$k \longrightarrow \sim 0$	
	$k \longrightarrow m \{ \text{rotl}, \text{rotr} \} n$	$m \neq 0$ , and any $n$ ( $\text{rotr} = \text{rotate right}$ ; $\text{rotl} = \text{rotate left}$ ) $n = w - m$ , where $m$ is the position of the least significant '1' bit in $k$ , and $w$ is the machine word size in bits.
	$k \longrightarrow k \ll n$	$m \neq n$
	$k \longrightarrow m \wedge n$	
<u>Arbitrary <math>x</math>:</u>	$x \longrightarrow 0 + x$	
	$x \longrightarrow x * 1$	
	$x \longrightarrow 0 ? y : x$	$y$ is any value
	$x \longrightarrow m ? x : y$	$y$ is any value; $m \neq 0$

Figure 9: A (non-exhaustive) list of rewriting rules (Operators are as in the C language)

The rewritten expression may contain “free variables,” i.e., variables that are not initialized to any value. The value of the overall expression does not depend on the actual value taken on by such a free variable, so any value will do. In our implementation, we simply use the contents of any arbitrary register or legal memory location for such variables.

Once the rewritten expression has been generated, we generate code for it via a straightforward post-order traversal of the final syntax tree.