

## Cryptography

The science and study of secret writings

*Cipher* – Is a secret method of writing that transforms *plaintext* into *ciphertext*

The transformation is determined by a *key*

*Cryptographic systems*

- One key
- Two key
- Public key
- Digital signatures

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## Cryptography

- Comes in two flavors: Symmetric and Asymmetric
- Best for protection of “online” communications
- Good for archival data
- So-so for electronic mail
- Not good for active databases


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## Communication Security

Secure communication should provide:

- Privacy
- Authentication
- Integrity
- Nonrepudiation



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
## Terminology

- To lock (encipher): transforms into unintelligible form based on independent data element called a *key*
- To unlock (decipher): transforms back into intelligible form, again using a *key*
- Locked data is called *ciphertext* or *black*
- Unlocked data is called *plaintext*, *cleartext*, or *red*
- Keys are themselves data and can be locked and unlocked

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## Cryptography



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## General Observations

- Cryptography never solves a problem; it transforms a security problem into a key management problem
- It takes a secret to keep a secret

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## Cryptographic System (Cryptosystem)

- A plaintext message space  $M$
- A ciphertext message space  $C$
- A key space  $K$
- A family of enciphering transformations  
 $E_k: M \rightarrow C$
- A family of deciphering transformations  
 $D_k: C \rightarrow M$

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## Crypto Systems Should Guarantee Both

- **Secrecy**
- **Authenticity**

### Secrecy requirements

1. Should be computationally infeasible to systematically determine  $D_k$  from  $c$ , even if corresponding  $m$  is known
2. Should be computationally infeasible to determine  $m$  from intercepted  $c$

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## Crypto Systems Should Guarantee Both

- **Secrecy**
- **Authenticity**

### Authenticity requirements

1. Should be computationally infeasible to systematically determine  $E_k$  from  $c$ , even if corresponding  $m$  is known
2. Should be computationally infeasible to find  $c'$  such that  $D_k(c')$  is valid plaintext in the set  $M$

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## Desirable Properties of Crypto Systems

- Enciphering and deciphering must be efficient for all keys
- System must be easy to use
- The security of the system should depend on the secrecy of the keys and not on the secrecy of the algorithms  $E$  or  $D$

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## Cryptanalysis

- Cryptanalysis attempts to discover the key or the plaintext of an encrypted message
  - Assume analyst knows the algorithm but not the key
- Types of attack:
  - Ciphertext only
    - Given:  $C_1 = E_k(M_1), C_2 = E_k(M_2), \dots, C_i = E_k(M_i)$
    - Obtain: either  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_i$  or  $k$
  - Known plaintext
    - Given:  $M_1, C_1 = E_k(M_1), M_2, C_2 = E_k(M_2), \dots, M_i, C_i = E_k(M_i)$
    - Obtain: either  $k$  or an algorithm to obtain  $M_{i+1}$ , from  $C_{i+1} = E_k(M_{i+1})$

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## Cryptanalysis (continued)

- Types of attack (continued)
  - Chosen plaintext
    - Given:  $M_1, C_1 = E_k(M_1), M_2, C_2 = E_k(M_2), \dots, M_i, C_i = E_k(M_i)$  where the attacker chooses  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_i$
    - Obtain: either  $k$  or an algorithm to obtain  $M_{i+1}$ , from  $C_{i+1} = E_k(M_{i+1})$

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## Basis for Attacks

- Mathematical attacks
  - Based on analysis of underlying mathematics
- Statistical attacks
  - Make assumptions about the distribution of letters, pairs of letters (digrams), triplets of letters (trigrams), etc.
    - Called models of the language
  - Examine ciphertext, correlate properties with the assumptions.

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## Transposition Cipher

- Rearranges bits or characters in the data
- Simple transposition
  - Rail-fence cipher
  - Columnar transposition

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## Simple Transposition

- Ciphers simply break message into blocks and permute each block using some scheme
- Eg. Blocks of five with key (25413)
  - Consider  
CMPS IS FUN FOR ALL

CMPS IS FU N FOR ALL

becomes

M SCP SUFI RONF A L L

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## Rail Fence

- Transposition depends on a figure
- In this case the figure is a rail fence (or picket fence)




- Figure could be a scene, such as a landscape or city skyline

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## Rail Fence




If key is 2-4-3-1

MSURLSPINOLCFA

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## Rail Fence




If key is 1-2-3

CINAMSSUFRLOL

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## Mountain Scene



## Columnar Transposition

- Uses a two dimensional array
- Text is placed in rows
- Columns are transposed
- Columns are read out as ciphered text
- Key is the transposition of the columns
  - e.g., for 4x4 matrix key could be 2-4-3-1

## Columnar Transposition

Example (4x4 matrix and key = 2-4-3-1)

CMPS  
ISFU  
NFOR  
ALLb

becomes

MSFLSURbPFOLCINA

What about (key = 1-2-3-4)?

## Crypto Analysis

- Can detect transposition cipher by checking the character frequencies against the norm

a	0.080	h	0.060	n	0.070	t	0.090
b	0.015	i	0.065	o	0.080	u	0.030
c	0.030	j	0.005	p	0.020	v	0.010
d	0.040	k	0.005	q	0.002	w	0.015
e	0.130	l	0.035	r	0.065	x	0.005
f	0.020	m	0.030	s	0.060	y	0.020
g	0.015					z	0.002

## Crypto Analysis

- Brute force by trying possible permutations and looking for readable text in the result
- Anagramming
  - If 1-gram frequencies match English frequencies, but other  $n$ -gram frequencies do not, probably transposition
  - Rearrange letters to form  $n$ -grams with highest frequencies

## Substitution Ciphers

- Simple substitution
- Polyalphabetic
- Running key
- Vernam

## Alphabet

0 – A	7 – H	14 – O	21 – V
1 – B	8 – I	15 – P	22 – W
2 – C	9 – J	16 – Q	23 – X
3 – D	10 – K	17 – R	24 – Y
4 – E	11 – L	18 – S	25 – Z
5 – F	12 – M	19 – T	
6 – G	13 – N	20 – U	

## Simple Substitution

- Caesar cipher is most common example of simple substitution
  - Julius used shift of 4
  - Augustus used key of 3
- (letter value + key) mod 26
- Example (key = 3)
  - CMPS IS FUN FOR ALL
  - becomes
  - FPSV LV IXQ IRU DOO

## Attacking the Cipher

- Exhaustive search
  - If the key space is small enough, try all possible keys until you find the right one
  - Caesar cipher has 26 possible keys
- Statistical analysis
  - Compare to 1-gram model of English

## Statistical Attack

- Compute frequency of each character in the ciphertext:
  - D .067 F .067 I .133 L .067
  - O .133 P .067 Q .067 R .067
  - S .067 U .067 V .133 X .067
- Apply 1-gram model of English
  - Frequency of characters (1-grams) in English is on next slide

## Character Frequencies

a	0.080	h	0.060	n	0.070	t	0.090
b	0.015	i	0.065	o	0.080	u	0.030
c	0.030	j	0.005	p	0.020	v	0.010
d	0.040	k	0.005	q	0.002	w	0.015
e	0.130	l	0.035	r	0.065	x	0.005
f	0.020	m	0.030	s	0.060	y	0.020
g	0.015					z	0.002

## Statistical Analysis

- $f(c)$  frequency of character  $c$  in ciphertext
  - $\phi(i)$  correlation of frequency of letters in ciphertext with corresponding letters in English, assuming key is  $i$ 
    - $\phi(i) = \sum_{0 \leq c \leq 25} f(c)p(c-i)$
- $p(x)$  is frequency of character  $x$  in English

## Example Analysis from Text

- Caesar cipher
  - Plaintext is HELLO WORLD
  - Key is 3
  - Ciphertext is KHOOR ZRUOG
- Frequency of each letter in ciphertext:
 

G	0.1	H	0.1	K	0.1	O	0.3
R	0.2	U	0.1	Z	0.1		

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## Statistical Analysis

- $\varphi(i)$  correlation of frequency of letters in ciphertext with corresponding letters in English, assuming key is  $i$
- $\varphi(i) = \sum_{0 \leq c \leq 25} f(c)p(c-i)$  so here,
 
$$\varphi(i) = 0.1p(6-i) + 0.1p(7-i) + 0.1p(10-i) + 0.3p(14-i) + 0.2p(17-i) + 0.1p(20-i) + 0.1p(25-i)$$
  - $f(x)$  is frequency of character  $c$  in ciphertext
  - $p(x)$  is frequency of character  $x$  in English

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## Correlation: $\varphi(i)$ for $0 \leq i \leq 25$

$i$	$\varphi(i)$	$i$	$\varphi(i)$	$i$	$\varphi(i)$	$i$	$\varphi(i)$
0	0.0482	7	0.0442	13	0.0520	19	0.0315
1	0.0364	8	0.0202	14	0.0535	20	0.0302
2	0.0410	9	0.0267	15	0.0226	21	0.0517
3	0.0575	10	0.0635	16	0.0322	22	0.0380
4	0.0252	11	0.0262	17	0.0392	23	0.0370
5	0.0190	12	0.0325	18	0.0299	24	0.0316
6	0.0660					25	0.0430

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## The Result

- Most probable keys, based on  $\varphi$ :
  - $i = 6$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0660$ 
    - plaintext EBIL TLOLA
  - $i = 10$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0635$ 
    - plaintext AXEEH PHKEW
  - $i = 3$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0575$ 
    - plaintext HELLO WORLD
  - $i = 14$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0535$ 
    - plaintext WTAAD LDGAS
- Only English phrase is for  $i = 3$ 
  - That's the key (3 or 'D')

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## Caesar's Problem

- Key is too short
  - Can be found by exhaustive search
  - Statistical frequencies not concealed well
    - They look too much like regular English letters
- So make it longer
  - Multiple letters in key
  - Idea is to smooth the statistical frequencies to make cryptanalysis harder

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## Polyalphabetic Ciphers

- Use multiple substitutions
- Most are periodic
  - These are essentially multiple Caesar ciphers
- Instead of adding the same key each time, each successive letter gets a different key added, but the keys repeat themselves
- When period is 1, this is equivalent to simple substitution

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## Polyalphabetic Ciphers

Example (key = SECUR)

CMPS IS FUN FOR ALL  
 SECU RS ECU RSE CUR

becomes

UQRN ZK ....

## Attacking the Cipher

- Approach
  - Establish period; call it  $n$
  - Break message into  $n$  parts, each part being enciphered using the same key letter
  - Solve each part
    - You can leverage one part from another

## Establish Period

- Kasiski: repetitions in the ciphertext occur when characters of the key appear over the same characters in the plaintext
- Example:

key VIGVIGVIGVIGVIGV  
 plain THEBOYHASTHEBALL  
 cipher OPKWWECIYOPKWIRG

Note the key and plaintext line up over the repetitions (underlined). As distance between repetitions is 9, the period is a factor of 9 (that is, 1, 3, or 9)

## Sample Cipher from Bishop

ADQYS MIUSB OXKKT MIBHK IZOOO  
 EQOOG IFBAG KAUMF VVTAA CIDTW  
 MOCIO EQOOG BMBFV ZGGWP CIEKQ  
 HSNEW VECNE DLA AV RWKXS VNSVP  
 HCEUT QOIOF MEGJS WTPCH AJMOC  
 HIUIX

## Repetitions in Example

Letters	Start	Repeats	Distance	Factors
MI	5	15	10	2, 5
OO	22	27	5	5
OEQOOG	24	54	30	2, 3, 5
FV	39	63	24	2, 2, 2, 3
AA	43	87	44	2, 2, 11
MOC	50	122	72	2, 2, 2, 3, 3
OO	56	105	49	7, 7
PC	69	117	48	2, 2, 2, 2, 3
NE	77	83	6	2, 3
SV	94	97	3	3
GH	118	124	6	2, 3

## Estimate of Period

- OEQOOG is probably not a coincidence
  - It's too long for that
  - Period may be 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 15, or 30
- Most others (8/11) have 2 in their factors
- Almost as many (7/11) have 3 in their factors
- Six of eleven have 6 in their factors
- Begin with period of  $2 \times 3 = 6$

## Index of Coincidence (IC)

- Index of coincidence is probability that two randomly chosen letters from ciphertext will be the same

$$IC = [n(n-1)]^{-1} \sum_{0 \leq i < j < 25} [F_i(F_j - 1)]$$

- where  $n$  is length of ciphertext and  $F_i$  the number of times character  $i$  occurs in ciphertext

## Compute IC

- Tabulated for different periods:

1	0.066	3	0.047	5	0.044
2	0.052	4	0.045	10	0.041
Large			0.038		
- For sample cipher IC = 0.043
  - Indicates a key of slightly more than 5
  - A statistical measure, so it can be in error, but it agrees with the previous estimate (which was 6)

## Splitting Into Alphabets

alphabet 1: AIKHOIATTOBGEEERNEOSAI  
alphabet 2: DUKKEFUAWEMGKWDWSUFWJU  
alphabet 3: QSTIQBMAMQBWQVLKVTMTMI  
alphabet 4: YBMZOAFCOOPFHEAXPQPEOX  
alphabet 5: SOIOGVICOVCSVASHOGCC  
alphabet 6: MXBOGKVDIGZINNVVCIJHH

Use same approach as for monoalphabet on each of the six alphabets

## Running Key Ciphers

- Cipher has key as long as the text
- Since security of substitution cipher increases with key length, this is more secure
- Uses nonrepeating text, such as a book
  - key specified by page and paragraph number

## Consider Bishop Section 8.2.2.2 (p. 107)

Example (key = The one time pad is ...)

CMPS IS FUN FOR ALL  
THEO NE TIM EPA DIS

becomes

VTTG VW YCZ ....

## Vernam Cipher

- Uses random characters as the key
- One time pads
  - Provably unbreakable
  - Why? Look at ciphertext DXQR. Equally likely to correspond to plaintext DOIT (key AJIY) and to plaintext DONT (key AJDY) and any other 4 letters
- Warning: keys *must* be random, or you can attack the cipher by trying to regenerate the key
  - Approximations, such as using pseudorandom number generators to generate keys, are *not* random



## Product Ciphers

- Compose substitution and transposition ciphers
  - Lucifer
  - DES
  - AES

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## Conventional Cryptosystems

- One key
- Encipher and decipher with same key

## Asymmetric Cryptosystems

- Two keys
- Encipher and decipher with different keys
- Computationally infeasible to determine one key from the other

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## Public-key Cryptosystems

- Each user has both a public and a private key
- Two users can communicate knowing only each other's public key
- It must be computationally infeasible to determine a user's private key from their public key


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## Secrecy

Assume Public Key for User K =  $E_K$

Assume Private Key for User K =  $D_K$



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## Digital Signature

A property private to a user that is used for signing messages

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## Digital Signature

For A to sign a message sent to B the following properties must be satisfied by A's signature:

- B must be able to validate A's signature on the message
- It must be impossible for anyone, including B, to forge A's signature
- It must be possible for a judge or third party to settle a dispute between A and B


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## Authentication

Assume Public Key for User K = Ek

Assume Private Key for User K = Dk




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## Secrecy and Authentication

Assume Public Key for User K = Ek

Assume Private Key for User K = Dk



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## Public Key Encryption

Based on problems that are known to be hard to solve

Merkle-Hellman Knapsack

RSA

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## Facts About Numbers

- Prime number  $p$ :
    - $p$  is an integer
    - $p \geq 2$
    - The only divisors of  $p$  are 1 and  $p$
  - Examples
    - 2, 7, 19 are primes
    - -3, 0, 1, 6 are not primes
  - Prime decomposition of a positive integer  $n$ :
 
$$n = p_1^{e_1} \times \dots \times p_k^{e_k}$$
  - Example:
    - $200 = 2^3 \times 5^2$
- Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic  
The prime decomposition of a positive integer is unique

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Goodrich + Tamassia

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## Greatest Common Divisor

- The **greatest common divisor** (GCD) of two positive integers  $a$  and  $b$ , denoted  $\gcd(a, b)$ , is the largest positive integer that divides both  $a$  and  $b$
- The above definition is extended to arbitrary integers
- Examples:
 

$\gcd(18, 30) = 6$	$\gcd(0, 20) = 20$
$\gcd(-21, 49) = 7$	
- Two integers  $a$  and  $b$  are said to be **relatively prime** if  $\gcd(a, b) = 1$
- Example:
  - Integers 15 and 28 are relatively prime

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## Modular Arithmetic

- Modulo operator for a positive integer  $n$ 

$$r = a \bmod n$$
 equivalent to
 
$$a = r + kn$$
- Example:
 

$29 \bmod 13 = 3$	$13 \bmod 13 = 0$	$-1 \bmod 13 = 12$
$29 = 3 + 2 \times 13$	$13 = 0 + 1 \times 13$	$12 = -1 + 1 \times 13$
- Modulo and GCD:
 
$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a \bmod b)$$
- Example:
 
$$\gcd(21, 12) = 3 \quad \gcd(12, 21 \bmod 12) = \gcd(12, 9) = 3$$

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## Euclid's GCD Algorithm

- Euclid's algorithm for computing the GCD repeatedly applies the formula  $\text{gcd}(a, b) = \text{gcd}(b, a \bmod b)$
- Example
  - $\text{gcd}(412, 260) = 4$

```

Algorithm EuclidGCD(a, b)
Input integers a and b
Output gcd(a, b)

if b = 0
    return a
else
    return EuclidGCD(b, a mod b)
    
```

a	412	260	152	108	44	20	4
b	260	152	108	44	20	4	0

## Multiplicative Inverses (1)

- The residues modulo a positive integer  $n$  are the set  $Z_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, (n - 1)\}$
- Let  $x$  and  $y$  be two elements of  $Z_n$  such that  $xy \bmod n = 1$ . We say that  $y$  is the multiplicative inverse of  $x$  in  $Z_n$  and we write  $y = x^{-1}$
- Example:
  - Multiplicative inverses of the residues modulo 11

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$x^{-1}$		1	6	4	3	9	2	8	7	5	10

## Multiplicative Inverses (2)

### Theorem

An element  $x$  of  $Z_n$  has a multiplicative inverse if and only if  $x$  and  $n$  are relatively prime

### Example

- The elements of  $Z_{10}$  with a multiplicative inverse are 1, 3, 7, 9

### Corollary

If  $p$  is prime, every nonzero residue in  $Z_p$  has a multiplicative inverse

### Theorem

A variation of Euclid's GCD algorithm computes the multiplicative inverse of an element  $x$  of  $Z_n$  or determines that it does not exist

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
$x^{-1}$		1		7				3		9

## Merkle-Hellman Knapsack

- Superincreasing sequence is a sequence of positive integers where each element is greater than the sum of the previous elements
- Merkle-Hellman uses two knapsacks
  - Easy knapsack - superincreasing sequence
  - Hard knapsack - derived by modifying elements of the easy one
- Modification is such that any solution of one knapsack is a solution of the other

## Merkle-Hellman Key Selection

- Choose superincreasing sequence  $S$  of  $m$  integers
- Choose a modulus  $n$  greater than the sum of the elements of  $S$
- Choose multiplier  $w$  that is relatively prime to  $n$
- Construct  $H$  by replacing each integer in  $S$  by  $H_i = w * S_i \bmod n$

- Encryption

$$C = H * M$$

- Decryption

$$\begin{aligned}
 w^{-1} * C &= w^{-1} * H * M \\
 &= w^{-1} * w * S * M \\
 &= S * M
 \end{aligned}$$



Knapsack with 100 numbers, largest  $\sim 10^{38}$   
 Sum: 63382538753555854942653739257859936077  
 N: 63382538753555854942653739257859936127

```
10000000, 10000018, 20000020, 400000056, 800000113, 1600000225, 6400000443, 6400000878, 12800001759,
25600003518, 5120000702, 102400014126, 204800028251, 409600056496, 819200112994, 1638400223985,
3276800451953, 6553600903910, 13107201807838, 26214403615675, 5242880733131, 104857614462662,
209715228252529, 419430417850556, 838860915701322, 167771831402638, 3355443662803268,
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844474268203170184477970050, 168894983684063039435940057, 337789707368126806178911860129,
7355787447962561232782780256, 151117482947250722471564730514, 30223148048450144494831290041054,
6044629917900289886290082032, 1208925983578007779728180164073,
241781972136011558454036329145, 4835709443120231109007206258,
9071407898624042381801441312557, 18142815781724809476306282625120,
3636519348918495725075825238, 727126312089236990641152050484,
15474326252379847298108823061000960, 3094850520759644792174601290154,
61897010011038992423292400384, 1237942100387915487058448807990,
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99032188024310233478948790401501, 198074330486204665782935180812002,
396140872097240033588795616246004, 792917445194818678317740722462003,
1584583468838893735663434814464984016, 316912693787797274713268692892998036,
63382538753555854942653739257859936077
```

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## Fermat's Little Theorem

Theorem

Let  $p$  be a prime. For each nonzero residue  $x$  of  $Z_p$ , we have  $x^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$

• Example ( $p = 5$ ):

$$1^4 \bmod 5 = 1 \qquad 2^4 \bmod 5 = 16 \bmod 5 = 1$$

$$3^4 \bmod 5 = 81 \bmod 5 = 1 \qquad 4^4 \bmod 5 = 256 \bmod 5 = 1$$

Corollary

Let  $p$  be a prime. For each nonzero residue  $x$  of  $Z_p$ , the multiplicative inverse of  $x$  is  $x^{p-2} \bmod p$

Proof

$$x(x^{p-2} \bmod p) \bmod p = xx^{p-2} \bmod p = x^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$$

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## Totient Function

• The multiplicative group for  $Z_n$ , denoted with  $Z_n^*$ , is the subset of elements of  $Z_n$  relatively prime with  $n$

• The totient function of  $n$ , denoted with  $\phi(n)$ , is the size of  $Z_n^*$

• Example

$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$$

$$\phi(10) = 4$$

$$Z_{21}^* = \{1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20\}$$

$$\phi(21) = 12$$

• If  $p$  is prime, we have

$$Z_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, (p-1)\} \qquad \phi(p) = p-1$$

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## Euler's Theorem

Euler's Theorem

For each element  $x$  of  $Z_n^*$ , we have  $x^{\phi(n)} \bmod n = 1$

• Example ( $n = 10$ )

$$3^{\phi(10)} \bmod 10 = 3^4 \bmod 10 = 81 \bmod 10 = 1$$

$$7^{\phi(10)} \bmod 10 = 7^4 \bmod 10 = 2401 \bmod 10 = 1$$

$$9^{\phi(10)} \bmod 10 = 9^4 \bmod 10 = 6561 \bmod 10 = 1$$

• Uses multiplication of large primes to produce keys

• Relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers for secrecy

## RSA Algorithm

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## RSA Key Selection

- Select two large primes  $p$  and  $q$
- Compute  $n = p \cdot q$
- Compute  $\phi(n) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$
- Choose an integer  $e$  between 3 and  $\phi(n)$  that has no common factor with  $\phi(n)$
- Select an integer  $d$  such that  $d \cdot e \bmod \phi(n) = 1$
- $e, n$  are made public
- $p, q, d, \phi(n)$  are kept secret

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## • Encryption

$$C = M^e \bmod n$$

## • Decryption

$$M = C^d \bmod n$$

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## Example

$p = 5$   
 $q = 7$   
 $n = p \cdot q = 5 \cdot 7 = 35$   
 $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 4 \cdot 6 = 24$   
 $e = 11$   
 $d = 11$

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## Example

$p = 53$   
 $q = 61$   
 $n = p \cdot q = 53 \cdot 61 = 3233$   
 $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 52 \cdot 60 = 3120$   
 $e = 71$   
 $d = 791$

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## Security

- Security of RSA based on difficulty of factoring
  - Widely believed
  - Best known algorithm takes exponential time
- RSA Security factoring challenge (discontinued)
- In 1999, 512-bit challenge factored in 4 months using 35.7 CPU-years
  - 160 175-400 MHz SGI and Sun
  - 8 250 MHz SGI Origin
  - 120 300-450 MHz Pentium II
  - 4 500 MHz Digital/Compaq
- In 2005, a team of researchers factored the RSA-640 challenge number using 30 2.2GHz CPU years
- In 2004, the prize for factoring RSA-2048 was \$200,000
- Current practice is 2,048-bit keys
- Estimated resources needed to factor a number within one year

Length (bits)	PCs	Memory
430	1	128MB
760	215,000	4GB
1,020	342 × 10 <sup>6</sup>	170GB
1,620	1.6 × 10 <sup>15</sup>	120TB

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## Algorithmic Issues

- The implementation of the RSA cryptosystem requires various algorithms
- Overall
  - Representation of integers of arbitrarily large size and arithmetic operations on them
- Encryption
  - Modular power
- Decryption
  - Modular power
- Setup
  - Generation of random numbers with a given number of bits (to generate candidates  $p$  and  $q$ )
  - Primality testing (to check that candidates  $p$  and  $q$  are prime)
  - Computation of the GCD (to verify that  $e$  and  $\phi(n)$  are relatively prime)
  - Computation of the multiplicative inverse (to compute  $d$  from  $e$ )

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## Product Ciphers

- Compose substitution and transposition ciphers
  - Lucifer
  - DES
  - AES

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## Lucifer

- Developed by IBM in 1974
- S Boxes - Nonlinear Substitution Boxes
  - 4
- P Boxes - Permutation Boxes
  - 128
- 128 bit key

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## DES - Data Encryption Standard

- Enciphers 64-bit blocks
- Outputs 64 bits of ciphertext
- Uses 56-bit key
- Adapted by NBS(NIST) for unclassified US government applications
- Initial and final permutation
- 16 rounds (iterations)
  - S boxes and P boxes

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## Controversy

- Considered too weak
  - Diffie, Hellman said in a few years technology would allow DES to be broken in days
    - Design using 1999 technology published
  - Design decisions not public
    - S-boxes may have backdoors

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## Strength of DES

- Undesirable properties
- Special purpose machine attacks
- Double DES
- Triple DES

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## Undesirable Properties

- 4 weak keys
  - They are their own inverses
- 12 semi-weak keys
  - Each has another semi-weak key as inverse
- S-boxes exhibit irregular properties
  - Distribution of odd, even numbers non-random
  - Outputs of fourth box depends on input to third box

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## Electronic Frontier Foundation

- Built a special purpose machine
- Cost budget \$210,000
  - \$80,000 design
  - \$130,000 material
- Crack DES key in 4.5 days
- Design and algorithms published in scannable form

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## Double DES

- Encrypt (k1) Encrypt(k2)
- Susceptible to “meet-in-the-middle” attack
  - Plaintext attack
  - Reduces the number of keys to check from  $2^{112}$  to  $2^{57}$

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## Triple DES

- Encrypt(k1) Decrypt(k2) Encrypt(k3)
- By using same key for all three it is identical to DES
- Having all three keys unique is referred to as “triple key triple DES”

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## Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- NIST initiated a competition for AES in 1999
- Rijndael was selected in October 2000
  - Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen
- Became a Federal Information Processing standard (FIPS 197) in November 2001
- NSA approved for classified information in June 2003

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## AES


- Encrypts 128 word blocks
- Various key lengths
  - 128 uses 10 rounds
  - 192 uses 12 rounds
  - 256 uses 14 rounds
- Single S box - one byte in one byte out
- P box based on square of bytes
- 16 bytes of key per round

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## AES Round Structure

- The 128-bit version of the AES encryption algorithm proceeds in ten rounds.
- Each round performs an invertible transformation on a 128-bit array, called **state**.
- The initial state  $X_0$  is the XOR of the plaintext  $P$  with the key  $K$ :
  - $X_0 = P \text{ XOR } K$ .
- Round  $i$  ( $i = 1, \dots, 10$ ) receives state  $X_{i-1}$  as input and produces state  $X_i$ .
- The ciphertext  $C$  is the output of the final round:  $C = X_{10}$ .



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
## AES Rounds

- Each round is built from four basic steps:
  - SubBytes step:** an S-box substitution step
  - ShiftRows step:** a permutation step
  - MixColumns step:** a matrix multiplication step
  - AddRoundKey step:** an XOR step with a **round key** derived from the 128-bit encryption key

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## Structure of Each Round



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## Changing Text to State

Text	A	E	S	U	S	E	S	A	M	A	T	R	I	X	Z	Z
Hexadecimal	00	04	12	14	12	04	12	00	0C	00	13	11	08	23	19	19


  

	00	12	0C	08	State
	04	04	00	23	
	12	12	13	19	
	14	00	11	19	

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## SubBytes Substitution Step



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## Shift Rows Step


**ShiftRows step:** a permutation step

- Row 1 no shift
- Row 2 left shift 1
- Row 3 left shift 2
- Row 4 left shift 3

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## Shift Rows Step



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## MixColumns Step

**MixColumns step:** a matrix multiplication step

Each column multiplied by known matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$


where

- 1 means no change
- 2 means shifting to the left
- 3 means shifting to the left and then performing XOR with initial unshifted value

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## MixColumns Step




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## AddRoundKey Step

- Each byte of the state is combined with a byte of the round subkey using the XOR operation



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## Round Subkeys

- Each round key subkey is derived from the main key using Rijndael's key schedule
- Each subkey is the same size as the state
- Subkey for each round plus one more

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## Block Ciphers

- Break message M into successive blocks M<sub>1</sub>, M<sub>2</sub>, ...
- Encipher each M<sub>i</sub> with the same key k

$$Ek(M) = Ek(M_1)Ek(M_2) \dots$$

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## Block Ciphers

- Advantages
  - Only one execution of the encryption algorithm per n characters
  - Errors in one ciphertext block have no effect on other blocks
- Disadvantages
  - More susceptible to cryptanalysis
    - Identical blocks of plaintext yield identical blocks of ciphertext
    - Vulnerable to ciphertext searching
    - More susceptible to replay

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## Block Chaining

- Inserts some bits of the previous ciphertext block into unused portions of the current plaintext block before encrypting it
- Reduces the number of available message bits per block

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## Cipher Block Chaining

- Exclusive ORs previous ciphertext block with the current plaintext block then encrypts the result


$$C_i = E_k(M_i \oplus C_{i-1})$$

- $C_i$  is functionally dependent on all previous blocks
- Useful for checksumming and digital signatures

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## CBC Mode Decryption



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## Cipher Feedback

- Part of previous ciphertext is shifted into a shift register
- Shift register is encrypted with the user's key and the result is XOR'd with the plaintext block

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## One-way Hash Function

- Takes a variable length input and produces a fixed length output
  - input is called the *preimage*
  - output is called the *hash value* or *message digest*
- Transformation is irreversible
- Called digest function, cryptographic checksum, message integrity check

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## Where to Encrypt and Decrypt

Link encryption

End-to-End encryption

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## Link Encryption

- Enciphers and deciphers a message  $M$  at each node between the source and destination
  - Each host need only know the keys for its immediate neighbors
  - Data is exposed at each intermediate node

## End-to-End Encryption

- Encipher the message at the source and decipher it at the destination
  - User needs a separate key for each correspondent
  - More susceptible to traffic flow analysis because the destination is always exposed

## Two Approaches Can Be Combined

Source sends a message that is the encrypted version of the original message over link encrypted communication system