CS177: Computer Security Prof. Stefano Tessaro UC Santa Barbara Fall 2018

Homework 6

Posted: Wednesday, November 28, 2018 – 11:59pm **Due:** Friday, December 7, 2018 – 11:59pm (on Gradescope)

Task 1 – Denial-of-Service Attacks

You want to perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against some host with a known IP address. You have become aware that a mis-configured sub-network, corresponding to the range w.x.y.z/24, allows for external access to its *broadcast address*, i.e., traffic sent to w.x.y.255 reaches *all* hosts simultaneously on that sub-network. Note that neither you nor your target are on this sub-network.

Describe as clearly as possible how you can take advantage of the sub-network to perform a denial-of-service attack on the target.

Task 2 – TCP SYN Floods

The main idea behind a "SYN flood" DoS-attack is that every TCP connection initiated with a SYN message makes the server allocate some memory – containing some information about the connection – while it waits for the client's final ACK message. Typically, while waiting for the client's ACK, the server stores the connection information (client/server IP and ports), as well as the *maximum segment size* (MSS), the maximal size of the data a TCP packet may contain, which is communicated by the client in its initial SYN's message. We assume here that there are only 8 possible values for the MSS.

Consider now the following choice of the server's sequence number for a connection. The server chooses the 32-bit sequence number seq_s defined as follows:

- The first 5-bit are a time-counter *t*, increased every minute, and reduced modulo 32 to fit in 5 bits.
- The middle 3 bits (denote them as *m*) encode 8 possible values for the MSS field.
- The last 24 bits are the output σ of a cryptographic message-authentication code MAC (using a secret key only known to the server) applied to the concatenation of the server IP address and port number, the client IP address and port number, and the values t and m.

In other words, $seq_s = t \parallel m \parallel \sigma$, where \parallel denotes concatenation.

Explain how this choice of seq_s can be used by the server to prevent SYN flooding!

Task 3 – TCP SYN Floods, Second Take

(8 points)

The following countermeasure against SYN flood attacks is widely adopted, and is known as a "SYN cache". For simplicity, we assume that the server only responds on port 80, and only needs to remember the client's sequence number seq_C and its own sequence number seq_S between the

(5 points)

(8 points)

second and third message in the TCP handshake. The server maintains a table with exactly *B* cells (e.g., $B = 2^{16}$), numbered 1, ..., *B*, and each cell in the table can store an entry with form

(ClientIP, ClientPort, seq_S , sec_C).

In particular, the handshake is now modified as follows:

- When a client with IP ClientIP initiates the handshake with the server, sending a SYN message from port ClientPort to the server's port 80 with sequence number seq_C , the server generates its initial sequence number seq_S , and stores $T = (ClientIP, ClientPort, seq_S, sec_C)$ in the table at location i_T , where i_T is a deterministic function of T. (E.g., one applies a MAC to T, and then maps the MAC output to a number between 1 and B.) If cell i_T already stores something, its contents are replaced by T. The server then sends back a SYN/ACK message with sequence number seq_S and ACK number $seq_C + 1$. The server does not remember anything else in its memory.
- When the server receives an ACK message from port ClientPort of a client with IP address ClientIP with sequence number seq_C+1 and ACK number seq_S+1 , the server checks whether $T = (ClientIP, ClientPort, seq_S, sec_C)$ is at location i_T (note that i_T can be recomputed as above). If yes, it continues the TCP connection as usual. If not, it simply aborts the hand-shake.
- a) Why does a SYN cache mitigate the effects of SYN flood attacks?
- b) What is a possible disadvantage of using a SYN cache?

Task 4 – The Network Time Protocol

(5 points)

The network time protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize Internet devices to within a few milliseconds of UTC time. The current version of the protocol, NTPv4, is an evolution of the protocol described in RFC 5905 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905), and is built on top of UDP, i.e., requests to NTP servers are via UDP packets.

Earlier versions of NTP had servers accept a command called "monlist" for monitoring purposes. It returns the addresses of up to the last 600 machines that the NTP server has interacted with.

Why is "monlist" potentially problematic?

Task 5 – NMAP and Port Scanning

- a) Use NMAP to find out which ports are open on our CS177 machine (192.35.222.247)!
- **b**) Which services do these ports run? (Give both the names of these services and their versions!)
- c) John runs his own Linux machine, connected directly to the Internet with a fixed IP address. He explicitly configured his machine to have SSH use the non-standard port 4242. He claims that this is going to confuse attackers, and he therefore does not need to worry about setting strong passwords.
 - (1) Give an example of an attack scenario where John's suggestion is useful.
 - (2) Give an example of an attack scenario where John's suggestion is not useful.

Explain both answers!

Note: You can use NMAP directly from your account on the CS177 machine, using "localhost" as the host to be scanned. Do not scan other machines!