**SAILFISH: Vetting Smart Contract State-Inconsistency Bugs in Seconds**

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**Abstract**—This paper presents SAILFISH, a scalable system for automatically finding state-inconsistency bugs in smart contracts. To make the analysis tractable, we introduce a hybrid approach that includes (i) a light-weight exploration phase that dramatically reduces the number of instructions to analyze, and (ii) a precise refinement phase based on symbolic evaluation guided by our novel value-summary analysis, which generates extra constraints to over-approximate the side effects of whole-program execution, thereby ensuring the precision of the symbolic evaluation. We developed a prototype of SAILFISH and evaluated its ability to detect two state-inconsistency flows, viz., reentrancy and transaction order dependence (TOD) in Ethereum smart contracts. Our experiments demonstrate the efficiency of our hybrid approach as well as the benefit of the value summary analysis. In particular, we show that SAILFISH outperforms five state-of-the-art smart contract analyzers (SECURIFY, MYTHRIL, OYENTE, SEREUM and VANDAL) in terms of performance, and precision. In total, SAILFISH discovered 47 previously unknown vulnerable smart contracts out of 89,853 smart contracts from Etherscan.

I. INTRODUCTION

Smart contracts are programs running on top of the Ethereum blockchain. Due to the convenience of high-level programming languages like SOLIDITY and the security guarantees from the underlying consensus protocol, smart contracts have seen widespread adoption, with over 45 million instances covering financial products, online gaming, real estate, and logistics. Consequently, a vulnerability in a contract can lead to tremendous losses, as demonstrated by recent attacks [15], [14], [12], [21]. For instance, the notorious “TheDAO” [11] reentrancy attack led to a financial loss of about $50M in 2016. Furthermore, in recent years, several other reentrancy attacks, e.g., Uniswap [17], Burgerswap [1], Lendf.me [8], resulted in multimillion dollar losses. To make things worse, smart contracts are immutable—once deployed, the design of the consensus protocol makes it particularly difficult to fix bugs. Since smart contracts are not easily upgradable, auditing the contract’s source pre-deployment, and deploying a bug-free contract is even more important than in the case of traditional software.

In this paper, we present a scalable technique to detect state-inconsistency (SI) bugs—a class of vulnerabilities that enables an attacker to manipulate the global state, i.e., the storage variables of a contract, by tampering with either the order of execution of multiple transactions (transaction order dependence (TOD)), or the control-flow inside a single transaction (reentrancy). In those attacks, an attacker can tamper with the critical storage variables that transitively have an influence on money transactions through data or control dependency. Though “TheDAO” [11] is the most well-known attack of this kind, through an offline analysis [59], [50] of the historical on-chain data, researchers have uncovered several instances of past attacks that leveraged state-inconsistency vulnerabilities.

While there are existing tools for detecting vulnerabilities due to state-inconsistency bugs, they either aggressively over-approximate the execution of a smart contract, and report false alarms [54], [36], or they precisely enumerate [3], [46] concrete or symbolic traces of the entire smart contract, and hence, cannot scale to large contracts with many paths. Dynamic tools [50], [59] scale well, but can detect a state-inconsistency bug only when the evidence of an active attack is present. Moreover, existing tools adopt a syntax-directed pattern matching that may miss bugs due to incomplete support for potential attack patterns [54].

A static analyzer for state-inconsistency bugs is crucial for pre-deployment auditing of smart contracts, but designing such a tool comes with its unique set of challenges. For example, a smart contract exposes public methods as interfaces to interact with the outside world. Each of these methods is an entry point to the contract code, and can potentially alter the persistent state of the contract by writing to the storage variables. An attacker can invoke any method(s), any number of times, in any arbitrary order—each invocation potentially impacting the overall contract state. Since different contracts can communicate with each other through public methods, it is even harder to detect a cross-function attack where the attacker can stitch calls to multiple public methods to launch an attack. Though SEREUM [50] and ECFCHECKER [37] detect cross-function attacks, they are dynamic tools that reason about one single execution. However, statically detecting state-inconsistency bugs boils down to reasoning about the entire contract control and data flows, over multiple executions. This presents significant scalability challenges, as mentioned in prior work [50].

This paper presents SAILFISH, a highly scalable tool that is aimed at automatically identifying state-inconsistency bugs in smart contracts. To tackle the scalability issue associated with statically analyzing a contract, SAILFISH adopts a hybrid approach that combines a light-weight EXPLORE phase, followed by a REFINER phase guided by our novel value-summary analysis, which constrains the scope of storage variables. Our EXPLORE phase dramatically reduces the number of relevant instructions to reason about, while the value-summary analysis in the REFINER phase further improves performance while maintaining the precision of symbolic evaluation. Given a smart contract, SAILFISH first introduces an EXPLORE phase that converts the contract into a
storage dependency graph (SDG) $G$. This graph summarizes the side effects of the execution of a contract on storage variables in terms of read-write dependencies. State-inconsistency vulnerabilities are modeled as graph queries over the SDG structure. A vulnerability query returns either an empty result—meaning that the contract is not vulnerable, or a potentially vulnerable subgraph $g$ inside $G$ that matches the query. In the second case, there are two possibilities: either the contract is indeed vulnerable, or $g$ is a false alarm due to the over-approximation of the static analysis.

To prune potential false alarms,AILFISH leverages a Refine phase based on symbolic evaluation. However, a conservative symbolic executor would initialize the storage variables as unconstrained, which would, in turn, hurt the tool’s ability to prune many infeasible paths. To address this issue,AILFISH incorporates a light-weight value-summary analysis (VSA) that summarizes the value constraints of the storage variables, which are used as the pre-conditions of the symbolic evaluation. Unlike prior summary-based approaches that compute summaries path-by-path, which results in full summaries (that encode all bounded paths through a procedure), leading to scalability problems due to the exponential growth with procedure size, our VSA summarizes all paths through a finite (loop-free) procedure, and it produces compact (polynomially-sized) summaries. As our evaluation shows, VSA not only enables AILFISH to refute more false positives, but also scales much better to large contracts compared to a classic summary-based symbolic evaluation strategy.

We evaluated AILFISH on the entire data set from ETHERSCAN (89,853 contracts), and showed that our tool is efficient and effective in detecting state-inconsistency bugs. AILFISH significantly outperforms all five state-of-the-art smart contract analyzers we evaluated against, in the number of reported false positives and false negatives. For example, on average AILFISH took only 30.79 seconds to analyze a smart contract, which is 31 times faster than MYTHRIL, and six orders of magnitude faster than SECURIFY.

In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:

- We define state-inconsistency vulnerabilities and identify two of its root-causes (Section III), including a new reentrancy attack pattern that has not been investigated in the previous literature.
- We model state-inconsistency detection as hazardous access queries over a unified, compact graph representation (called a storage dependency graph (SDG)), which encodes the high-level semantics of smart contracts over global states. (Section IV)
- We propose a novel value-summary analysis that efficiently computes global constraints over storage variables, which when combined with symbolic evaluation, enables AILFISH to significantly reduce false alarms. (Section VII)
- We perform a systematic evaluation of AILFISH on the entire data set from ETHERSCAN. Not only does AILFISH outperform state-of-the-art smart contract analyzers in terms of both run-time and precision, but also is able to uncover 47 zero-day vulnerabilities (out of 195 contracts that we could manually analyze) not detected by any other tool. (Section VIII)
- In the spirit of open science, we pledge to release both the tool and the experimental data to further future research.

II. BACKGROUND

This section introduces the notion of the state of a smart contract, and provides a brief overview of the vulnerabilities leading to an inconsistent state during a contract’s execution.

Smart contract. Ethereum smart contracts are written in high-level languages like SOLIDITY, VYPER, etc., and are compiled down to the EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) bytecode. Public/external methods of a contract, which act as independent entry points of interaction, can be invoked in two ways: either by a transaction, or from another contract. We refer to the invocation of a public/external method from outside the contract as an event. Note that events exclude method calls originated from inside the contract, i.e., a method $f$ calling another method $g$. A schedule $\mathcal{H}$ is a valid sequence of events that can be executed by the EVM. The events of a schedule can originate from one or more transactions. Persistent data of a contract is stored in the storage variables which are, in turn, recorded in the blockchain. The contract state $\Delta = (V, B)$ is a tuple, where $V = \{V_1, V_2, V_3, \ldots, V_n\}$ is the set of all the storage variables of a contract, and $B$ is its balance.

State inconsistency (SI). When the events of a schedule $\mathcal{H}$ execute on an initial state $\Delta$ of a contract, it reaches the final state $\Delta'$. However, due to the presence of several sources of non-determinism during the execution of a smart contract on the Ethereum network, $\Delta'$ is not always predictable. For example, two transactions are not guaranteed to be processed in the order in which they got scheduled. Also, an external call $e$ originated from a method $f$ of a contract $C$ can transfer control to a malicious actor, who can now subvert the original control and data-flow by re-entering $C$ through any public method $f' \in C$ in the same transaction, even before the execution of $f$ completes. Let $\mathcal{H}_1$ be a schedule that does not exhibit any of the above-mentioned non-deterministic behavior. However, due to either reordering of transactions, or reentrant calls, it might be possible to rearrange the events of $\mathcal{H}_1$ to form another schedule $\mathcal{H}_2$. If those two schedules individually operate on the same initial state $\Delta$, but yield different final states, we consider the contract to have a state-inconsistency.

Reentrancy. If a contract $A$ calls another contract $B$, the Ethereum protocol allows $B$ to call back to any public/external method $m$ of $A$ in the same transaction before even finishing the original invocation. An attack happens when $B$ reenters $A$ in an inconsistent state before $A$ gets the chance to update its internal state in the original call. Launching an attack executes operations that consume gas. Though, SOLIDITY tries to prevent such attacks by limiting the gas stipend to 2,300 when the call is made through send and transfer APIs, the call opcode puts no such restriction—thereby making the attack possible.

In Figure 1A the withdraw method transfers Ethers to a user if their account balance permits, and then updates the account accordingly. From the external call at Line 4, a malicious user (attacker) can reenter the withdraw method of the Bank contract. It makes Line 3 read a stale value of the account balance, which was supposed to be updated at Line 5 in the original call. Repeated calls to the Bank contract can drain it
In Figure 1(a) the accounts mapping is updated after the external call at Line 4. This allows the malicious caller to reenter the withdraw() function in an inconsistent state. Figure 1(b) presents a contract that implements a queuing system that reserves slots on a first-come-first-serve basis leading to a potential TOD attack.

Though the example presented above depicts a typical reentrancy attack scenario, such attacks can occur in a more convoluted setting, e.g., cross-function, create-based, and delegate-based, as studied in prior work [50]. A cross-function attack spans across multiple functions. For example, a function f1 in the victim contract A issues an untrusted external call, which transfers the control over to the attacker B. In turn, B reenters A, but through a different function f2. A delegate-based attack happens when the victim contract A delegates the control to another contract C, where contract C issues an untrusted external call. In case of a create-based attack, the victim contract A creates a new child contract C, which issues an untrusted external call inside its constructor.

Transaction Order Dependence (TOD). Every Ethereum transaction specifies the upper limit of the gas amount one is willing to spend on that transaction. Miners choose the ones offering the most incentive for their mining work, thereby inevitably making the transactions offering lower gas prices starve for an indefinitely amount of time. By the time a transaction T1 (scheduled at time t1) is picked up by a miner, the network and the contract states might change due to another transaction T2 (scheduled at time t2) getting executed beforehand, though t1 < t2. This is known as Transaction Order Dependence (TOD) [10], or front-running attack. Figure 1(c) features a queuing system where an attacker can reserve a slot (Line 3.4) by submitting a transaction. An attacker can succeed in getting that slot by eavesdropping on the gas limit set by the victim transaction, and incentivizing the miner by submitting a transaction with a higher gas limit. Refer to Section IV where we connect reentrancy and TOD bugs to our notion of state-inconsistency.

III. MOTIVATION

This section introduces motivating examples of state-inconsistency (SI) vulnerabilities, the challenges associated with automatically detecting them, how state-of-the-art techniques fail to tackle those challenges, and our solution.

A. Identifying the root causes of SI vulnerabilities

By manually analyzing prior instances of reentrancy and TOD bugs—two popular SI vulnerabilities (Section II), and the warnings emitted by the existing automated analysis tools [50], [8], [54], [46], we observe that an SI vulnerability occurs when the following preconditions are met: (i) two method executions, or transactions—both referred to as threads (th)—operate on the same storage state, and (ii) either of the two happens—(a) Stale Read (SR): The attacker thread th_a—figures out the flow of execution to read a stale value from storage(v) before the victim thread th_b gets the chance to legitimately update the same in its flow of execution. The reentrancy vulnerability presented in Figure 1(a) is the result of a stale read. (b) Destructive Write (DW): The attacker thread th_a diverts the flow of execution to preemptively write to storage(v) before the victim thread th_b gets the chance to legitimately read the same in its flow of execution. The TOD vulnerability presented in Figure 1(b) is the result of a destructive write.

While the SR pattern is well-studied in the existing literature [54], [50], [46], [23], and detected by the respective tools with varying degree of accuracy, the reentrancy attack induced by the DW pattern has never been explored by the academic research community. Due to its conservative strategy of flagging any state access following an external call without considering if it creates an inconsistent state, MYTHRIIL raises alarms for a super-set of DW patterns, leading to a high number of false positives. In this work, we not only identify the root causes of SI vulnerabilities, but also unify the detection of both the patterns with the notion of hazardous access (Section III).

B. Running examples

Example 1. The contract in Figure 2 is vulnerable to reentrancy due to destructive write. It allows for the splitting of funds held in the payer’s account between two payees—a and b. For a payer with id id, updateSplit records the fraction (%) of her fund to be sent to the first payer in splits[id] (Line 5). In turn, splitFunds transfers splits[id] fraction of the payer’s total fund to payee a, and the remaining to payee b. Assuming that the payer with id = 0 is the attacker, she executes the following sequence of calls in a transaction—(1) calls updateSplit(0,100) to set payee a’s split to 100% (Line 5); (2) calls splitFunds(0) to transfer her entire fund to payee a (Line 16); (3) from the fallback function, reenters updateSplit(0,0) to set payee a’s split to 0% (Line 5); (4) returns to splitFunds where her entire fund is again transferred (Line 19) to payee b. Consequently, the attacker is able to trick the contract into double-spending the amount of Ethers held in the payer’s account.

Example 2. The contract in Figure 3 is non-vulnerable (safe). The withdrawBalance method allows the caller to withdraw funds from her account. The storage variable userBalance is updated (Line 10) after the external call (Line 9). In absence of the mutex, the contract could contain a reentrancy bug due to the delayed update. However, the mutex is set to true when the function is entered the first time. If an attacker attempts to reenter withdrawBalance from her fallback function, the check at Line 4 will foil such an attempt. Also, the transfer method adjusts the account balances of a sender and a receiver, and is not reentrant due to the same reason (mutex).
C. State of the vulnerability analyses

In light of the examples above, we outline the key challenges encountered by the state-of-the-art techniques, i.e., SECURIFY [54], VANDAL [23], MYTHRL [1], OYENTE [46], and SEREUM [50] that find state-inconsistency (SI) vulnerabilities. Table I summarizes our observations.

Cross-function attack. The public methods in a smart contract act as independent entry points. Instead of reentering the same function, as in the case of a traditional reentrancy attack, in a cross-function attack, the attacker can reenter the contract through any public function. Detecting cross-function vulnerabilities poses a significantly harder challenge than single-function reentrancy, because every external call can jump back to any public method—leading to an explosion in the search space due to a large number of potential call targets.

Unfortunately, most of the state of the art techniques cannot detect cross-function attacks. For example, the No Write After Call (NW) strategy of SECURIFY identifies a storage variable write (SSTORE) following a CALL operation as a potential violation. MYTHRL adopts a similar policy, except it also warns when a state variable is read after an external call. Both VANDAL and OYENTE check if a CALL instruction at a program point can be reached by a recursive call to the enclosing function. In all four tools, reentrancy is modeled after The DAO [11] attack, and therefore scoped within a single function. Since the attack demonstrated in Example 1 spans across both the updateSplit and splitFunds methods, detecting such an attack is out of scope for these tools. Coincidentally, the last three tools raise alarms here for the wrong reason, due to the over-approximation in their detection strategies. SEREUM is a run-time bug detector that detects cross-function attacks. When a transaction returns from an external call, SEREUM write-locks all the storage variables that influenced control-flow decisions in any previous invocation of the contract during the external call. If a locked variable is re-written going forward, an attack is detected. SEREUM fails to detect the attack in Example 1 without the updateSplit method is not vulnerable, since splits[id] cannot be modified any more. However, MYTHRL, OYENTE, and VANDAL flag the modified example as vulnerable, due to the conservative detection strategies they adopt, as discussed before.

Our solution: We distinguish between benign and vulnerable reentrancies, i.e., reentrancy as a feature vs. a bug. We only consider reentrancy to be vulnerable if it can be leveraged to induce a state-inconsistency (SI). Precisely, if two operations (a) operate on the same state variable, (b) are reachable from public methods, and (c) at-least one is a write—we call these two operations a hazardous access pair. The notion of hazardous access unifies both Stale Read (SR), and Destructive Write (DW). SAILFISH performs a lightweight static analysis to detect such hazardous accesses. Since the modified Example 1 (without the updateSplit method) presented above does not contain any hazardous access pair, we do not flag it as vulnerable.

Scalability. Any SOLIDITY method marked as either public or external can be called by an external entry any number of times. A recent extension [18] of SEREUM adds support for unconditional reentrancy attacks by tracking data-flow dependencies. However, they only track data-flows from storage variables to the parameters of calls. As a result, even with this extension, SEREUM would fail to detect the attack in Example 1.
TABLE I: Comparison of smart-contract bug-finding tools.

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- Full ☑ Partial O No support. Cr.: Cross-function, Haz.: Hazardous access, Sel.: Scalability, Off.: Offline detection

Times in any arbitrary order—which translates to an unbounded search space during static reasoning. SECURIFY [54] relies on a Datalog-based data-flow analysis, which might fail to reach a fixed point in a reasonable amount of time, as the size of the contract grows. MYTHRIL [3] and OYENTE [46] are symbolic-execution-based tools that share the common problems suffered by any symbolic engine.

Our solution: In SAILFISH, the symbolic verifier validates a program path involving hazardous accesses. Unfortunately, the path could access state variables that are likely to be used elsewhere in the contract. It would be very expensive for a symbolic checker to perform a whole-contract analysis required to precisely model those state variables. We augment the verifier with a value summary that over-approximates the side-effects of the public methods on the state variables across all executions. This results in an inexpensive symbolic evaluation that conservatively prunes false positives.

Offline bug detection. Once deployed, a contract becomes immutable. Therefore, it is important to be able to detect bugs prior to the deployment. However, offline (static) approaches come with their unique challenges. Unlike an online (dynamic) tool that detects an ongoing attack in just one execution, a static tool needs to reason about all possible combinations of the contract’s public methods while analyzing SI issues. As a static approach, SAILFISH needs to tackle all these challenges.

D. SAILFISH overview

This section provides an overview (Figure 4) of SAILFISH which consists of the EXPLORER and the REFINER modules.

EXPLORER. From a contract’s source, SAILFISH statically builds a storage dependency graph (SDG) (Section V-A) which over-approximates the read-write accesses (Section V-B) on the storage variables along all possible execution paths. State-inconsistency (SI) vulnerabilities are modeled as graph queries over the SDG. If the query results in an empty set, the contract is certainly non-vulnerable. Otherwise, we generate a counter-example which is subject to further validation by the REFINER.

Example 1 Example 1 (Figure 2) contains a reentrancy bug that spans across two functions. The attacker is able to create an SI by leveraging hazardous accesses—splits[id] influences (read) the argument of the external call at Line 16 in splitFunds, and it is set (write) at Line 5 in updateSplit. The counter-example returned by the EXPLORER is 1a → 1b → 16 → 1a. Similarly, in Example 2 (Figure 3), when withdrawBalance is composed with transfer to model a cross-function attack, SAILFISH detects the write at Line 10, and the read at Line 19 as hazardous. Corresponding counter-example is 4 ... 9 → 17 ... 19. In both the cases, the EXPLORER detects a potential SI, so conservatively they are flagged as possibly vulnerable. However, this is incorrect for Example 2. Thus, we require an additional step to refine the initial results.

REFINER. Although the counter-examples obtained from the EXPLORER span across only two public functions P1 and P2, the path conditions in the counter-examples may involve state variables that can be operated on by the public methods P* other than those two. For example, in case of reentrancy, the attacker can alter the contract state by invoking P* after the external call-site—which makes reentry to P2 possible. To alleviate this issue, we perform a contract-wide value-summary analysis that computes the necessary pre-conditions to set the values of storage variables. The symbolic verifier consults the value summary when evaluating the path constraints.

Example 2 In Example 2 (Figure 3), the REFINER would conservatively assume the mutex to be unconstrained after the external call at Line 9 in absence of a value summary—which would make the path condition feasible. However, the summary (Section VI) informs the symbolic checker that all the possible program flows require the mutex already to be false, in order to set the mutex to false again. Since the pre-condition conflicts with the program-state δ = {mutex ← true} (set by Line 6), SAILFISH refutes the possibility of the presence of a reentrancy, thereby pruning the false warning.

IV. STATE INCONSISTENCY BUGS

In this section, we introduce the notion of state-inconsistency, and how it is related to reentrancy and TOD bugs.

Let Ƒ be the list of all public/external functions in a contract C defined later in Figure 9. For each function F ∈ Ƒ, we denote F.statements to be the statements of F, and f = F.name to be the name of F. In Ethereum, one or more functions can be invoked in a transaction T. Since the contract code is executed by the EVM, the value of its program counter (PC) deterministically identifies every statement s ∈ F.statements during run-time. An event e = ⟨pc, f(œ), inv⟩ is a 3-tuple that represents the inv-th invocation of the function F called from outside (i.e., external to the contract C) with arguments œ. Identical invocation of a function F is associated with the same arguments. For events, we disregard internal subroutine calls, e.g., if the function F calls another public function G from inside its body, the latter invocation does not generate an event. In other words, the notion of events captures the occurrences when a public/external method of a contract is called externally, i.e., across the contract boundary. Functions in events can be called in two ways: either directly by T, or by another contract. If an external call statement s_c ∈ Ƒ.statements results in a reentrant invocation of F, then
pc holds the value of the program counter of sc. In this case, we say that the execution of \( F \) is contained within that of \( F_c \). However, the value \( pc = 0 \) indicates that \( F \) is invoked by \( T \), and not due to the invocation of any other method in \( C \).

**Definition 1 (Schedule).** A schedule \( \mathcal{H} = [e_1, e_2, ..., e_n] \), \( \forall e \in \mathcal{H}, e.f \in \{F, \text{name}\} \in \mathcal{F} \} \) is a valid sequence of \( n \) events that can be executed by the EVM. The events, when executed in order on an initial contract state \( \Delta \), yield the final state \( \Delta' \), i.e., \( \Delta \overset{e_1}{\rightarrow} \overset{e_2}{\rightarrow} \overset{e_n}{\rightarrow} \Delta' \), which we denote as \( \Delta \overset{\mathcal{H}}{\rightarrow} \Delta' \). The set of all possible schedules is denoted by \( \mathcal{H} \).

**Definition 2 (Equivalent schedules).** Two schedules \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \), where \( \vert H_1 \vert = \vert H_2 \vert \), are equivalent, if \( \forall e \in \mathcal{H}_1, \exists e' \in \mathcal{H}_2 \) such that \( e.f = e'.f \land e.inv = e'.inv \), and \( \forall e' \in \mathcal{H}_2, \exists e \in \mathcal{H}_1 \), such that \( e'.f = e.f \land e'.inv = e.inv \). We denote it by \( \mathcal{H}_1 \equiv \mathcal{H}_2 \).

Intuitively, equivalent schedules contain the same set of function invocations.

**Definition 3 (Transformation function).** A transformation function \( \mu : \mathcal{H} \rightarrow \mathcal{H} \) accepts a schedule \( \mathcal{H} \), and transforms it to an equivalent schedule \( \mathcal{H}' \equiv \mathcal{H} \) by employing one of two possible strategies at a time—(i) mutates \( pc \) of an event \( \exists e' \in \mathcal{H}' \), such that \( e'.pc \) holds a valid non-zero value, (ii) permutes \( \mathcal{H} \). These strategies correspond to two possible ways of transaction ordering, respectively: (a) when a contract performs an external call, it can be leveraged to re-enter the contract through internal transactions, (b) the external transactions of a contract can be mined in any arbitrary order.

**Definition 4 (State inconsistency bug).** For a contract instance \( C \), an initial state \( \Delta \), and a schedule \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) where \( \forall e \in \mathcal{H}_1, e.pc = 0 \), if there exists a schedule \( \mathcal{H}_2 = \mu(\mathcal{H}_1) \), where \( \Delta \overset{\mathcal{H}_1}{\rightarrow} \Delta_1 \) and \( \Delta_1 \overset{\mathcal{H}_2}{\rightarrow} \Delta_2 \), then \( C \) is said to have a state-inconsistency bug, iff \( \Delta_1 \neq \Delta_2 \).

**Definition 5 (Reentrancy bug).** If a contract \( C \) contains an SI bug due to two schedules \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2 = \mu(\mathcal{H}_1) \), such that \( \exists e \in \mathcal{H}_2 (e.pc \neq 0) \) (first transformation strategy), then the contract is said to have a reentrancy bug.

In other words, \( e.pc \neq 0 \) implies that \( e.f \) is a reentrant invocation due to an external call in \( C \).

**Definition 6 (Generalized TOD bug).** If a contract \( C \) contains an SI bug due to two schedules \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2 = \mu(\mathcal{H}_1) \), such that \( \mathcal{H}_2 \) is a permutation (second transformation strategy) of \( \mathcal{H}_1 \), then the contract is said to have a generalized transaction order dependence (G-TOD), or event ordering bug (EO) \textsuperscript{[43]}.

Permutation of events corresponds to the fact that the transactions can be re-ordered due to the inherent non-determinism in the network, e.g., miner’s scheduling strategy, gas supplied, etc. In this work, we limit the detection to only those cases where Ether transfer is affected by state-inconsistency—which is in line with the previous work \textsuperscript{[54], [46]}. We refer to those as TOD bugs.

### V. EXPLORER: LIGHTWEIGHT EXPLORATION OVER SDG

This section introduces the storage dependency graph (SDG), a graph abstraction that captures the control and data flow relations between the storage variables and the critical program instructions, e.g., control-flow deciding, and state-changing operations of a smart contract. To detect SI bugs, we then define hazardous access, which is modeled as queries over the SDG.

**A. Storage dependency graph (SDG)**

In a smart contract, the public methods are the entry-points which can be called by an attacker. SAILFISH builds a storage dependency graph (SDG) \( \mathcal{N} = (V, E, \chi) \) that models the execution flow as if it was subverted by an attacker, and how the subverted flow impacts the global state of the contract. Specifically, the SDG encodes the following information:

**Nodes.** A node of an SDG represents either a storage variable, or a statement operating on a storage variable. If \( V \) be the set of all storage variables of a contract, and \( S \) be the statements operating on \( V \), the set of nodes \( V := \{V \cup S\} \).

**Edges.** An edge of an SDG represents either the data-flow dependency between a storage variable and a statement, or the relative ordering of statements according to the program control-flow. \( \chi(E) \rightarrow \{D, W, O\} \) is a labeling function that maps an edge to one of the three types. A directed edge \((u, v)\) from node \( u \) to node \( v \) is labeled as (a) \( D \): if \( u \in V, v \in V \), and the statement \( v \) is data-dependent on the state variable \( u \) (b) \( W \): if \( u \in S, v \in V \), and the state variable \( u \) is written by the statement \( u \) (c) \( O \): if \( u \in S, v \in S \), and statement \( u \) precedes statement \( v \) in the control-flow graph.

We encode the rules for constructing an SDG in Datalog. First, we introduce the reader to Datalog preliminaries, and then describe the construction rules.

**Datalog preliminaries.** A Datalog program consists of a set of rules and a set of facts. Facts simply declare predicates that evaluate to true. For example, \( \text{parent}("Bill", "Mary") \) states that Bill is a parent of Mary. Each Datalog rule defines a predicate as a conjunction of other predicates. For example, the rule: \( \text{ancestor}(x, y) :- \text{parent}(x, z), \text{ancestor}(z, y) \) — says that \( \text{ancestor}(x, y) \) is true, if both \( \text{parent}(x, z) \) and \( \text{ancestor}(z, y) \) are true. In addition to variables, predicates can also contain constants, which are surrounded by double quotes, or “don’t cares”, denoted by underscores.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{reach}(s_1, s_2) &::= s_2 \text{ is reachable from } s_1 \\
\text{intermediate}(s_1, s_2, s_3) &::= \text{reach}(s_1, s_2), \text{reach}(s_2, s_3) \\
\text{succ}(s_1, s_2) &::= s_2 \text{ is the successor of } s_1 \\
\text{extcall}(s, cv) &::= s \text{ is an external call, } \text{cv is the call value} \\
\text{entry}(s, m) &::= s \text{ is an entry node of method } m \\
\text{exit}(s, m) &::= s \text{ is an exit node of method } m \\
\text{storage}(v) &::= v \text{ is a storage variable} \\
\text{write}(s, v) &::= s \text{ updates variable } v \\
\text{depend}(s, v) &::= s \text{ is data-flow dependent on } v \\
\text{owner}(s) &::= \text{only owner executes } s
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 5: Built-in rules for ICFG related predicates.

**Base ICFG facts.** The base facts of our inference engine describe the instructions in the application’s inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG). In particular, Figure 5 shows the base rules that are derived from a classical ICFG, where \( s, m \) and \( v \) correspond to a statement, method, and variable respectively. SAILFISH uses a standard static taint analysis out-of-the-box to restrict the entries in the extcall predicate. Additionally, \( \text{owner}(s) \) represents that \( s \) can only be executed by contract
owners, which enables SAILFISH to model SI attacks precisely. Refer to Appendix V-B for details.

\[ \text{sdg}(s_1, v, \cdot') : = \text{write}(s_1, v).\text{storage}(v) \]
\[ \text{sdg}(s_1, v, \cdot') : = \text{depend}(s_1, v).\text{storage}(v) \]
\[ \text{sdg}(s_1, s_2, \cdot') : = \text{sdg}(s_1, \cdot).\text{reach}(s_1, s_2).\text{sdg}(s_2, \cdot'), \text{intermediate}(s_1, s_2) \]
\[ \text{sdg}(s_1, s_2, \cdot') : = \text{extcall}(s_1, \cdot)_\text{entry}(s_2, \cdot)_\text{exit}(s_1, \cdot)_\text{node}(s_2) \]

Fig. 6: Rules for constructing SDG.

**SDG construction.** The basic facts generated from the previous step can be leveraged to construct the SDG. As shown in Fig 6, a “write-edge” of an SDG is labeled as ‘\( W \)’, and is constructed by checking whether storage variable \( v \) gets updated in statement \( s \). Similarly, a “data-dependency edge” is labeled as ‘\( D \)’, and is constructed by determining whether the statement \( s \) is data-dependent on the storage variable \( v \). Furthermore, we also have the “order-edge” to denote the order between two statements, and those edges can be drawn by checking the reachability between nodes in the original ICFG. Finally, an external call in SOLIDITY can be weaponized by the attacker by hijacking the current execution. In particular, once an external call is invoked, it may trigger the callback function of the attacker who can perform arbitrary operations to manipulate the storage states of the original contract. To model these semantics, we also add extra ‘\( O' \)' -edges to connect external calls with other public functions that can potentially update storage variables that may influence the execution of the current external call. Specifically, we add an extra order-edge to connect the external call to the entry point of another public function \( m \), as well as an order-edge from the exit node of \( m \) to the successor of the original external call.

**Example 3** Consider Example 1 (Figure 2) that demonstrates an SI vulnerability due to both splitFunds and updateSplit methods operating on a state variable \( \text{splits}[id] \). Figure 7 models this attack semantics. \( \text{deposits} \) and \( \text{splits}[id] \) correspond to the variable nodes in the graph. Line 12 writes to \( \text{deposits} \); thus establishing a \( W \) relation from the instruction to the variable node. Line 16 and Line 19 are data-dependent on both the state variables. Hence, we connect the related nodes with \( D \) edges. Finally, the instruction nodes are linked together with directed \( O \) edges following the control-flow. To model the reentrancy attack, we created an edge from the external call node \( \Rightarrow \) the point of \( \text{splitFunds} \). Next, we remove the edge between the external call \( \Rightarrow \) and its successor \( \Rightarrow \). Lastly, we add an edge between \( \Rightarrow \), the exit node of \( \text{updateSplit} \), and \( \Rightarrow \), the following instruction in \( \text{updateSplit} \).

**B. Hazardous access**

Following our discussion in Section IV to detect SI bugs in a smart contract, one needs to enumerate and evaluate all possible schedules on every contract state—which is computationally infeasible. To enable scalable detection of SI bugs statically, we define hazardous access, which is inspired by the classical data race problem, where two different execution paths operate on the same storage variable, and at least one operation is a write. In a smart contract, the execution paths correspond to two executions of public function(s).

As shown in the hazard(.) predicate in Figure 8 a hazardous access is a tuple denoted by \((s_1, s_2, v)\), where \( v \) is a storage variable which both the statements \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) operate on, and either \( s_1 \) or \( s_2 \), or both are write operations. While deriving the data-flow dependency predicate \( \text{sdg}(s, v, \cdot', \cdot') \), we consider both direct and indirect dependencies of the variable \( v \). We say that a statement \( s \) operates on a variable \( v \) if either \( s \) is an assignment of variable \( v \) or \( s \) contains an expression that is dependent on variable \( s \).

**SAILFISH** identifies hazardous access statically by querying the contract’s SDG, which is a path-condition agnostic data structure. A non-empty query result indicates the existence of a hazardous access. However, these accesses might not be feasible in reality due to conflicting path conditions. The REFINER module (Section VI) uses symbolic evaluation to prune such infeasible accesses.

**C. State inconsistency bug detection**

As discussed in Section IV a smart contract contains an SI bug if there exists two schedules that result in a different contract state, i.e., the values of the storage variables. Instead of enumerating all possible schedules (per definition) statically which is computationally infeasible, we use hazardous access as a proxy to detect the root cause of SI. Two schedules can result in different contract states if: (a) there exist two operations, where at least one is a write access, on a common storage variable, and (b) the relative order of such operations differ in two schedules. The hazardous access captures the first (a) condition. Now, in addition to hazardous access, SI bugs require to hold certain conditions that can alter (b) the relative order of the operations in the hazardous access pair. For reentrancy, SAILFISH checks if a hazardous access pair is reachable in a reentrant execution, as it can alter the execution order of the statements in a hazardous access pair. To detect TOD, SAILFISH checks whether an Ether transfer call is reachable from one of the statements in a hazardous access pair. In this case, the relative execution order of those statements determines the amount of Ether transfer.

**Reentrancy detection.** A malicious reentrancy query (Figure 8) looks for a hazardous access pair \( \langle s_1, s_2 \rangle \) such that both \( s_1 \) and...
hazard($s_1,s_2,v$) := storage($v$).sdg($s_1,v'$),
\[ \text{sdg}(s_2,v',s_1 \neq s_2) \]
reentry($s_1,s_2$) := extcall($s_1$).reach($s_1$).reach($s_2$),
\[ \text{extcall}(s_2).reach(s_1).reach(s_2) \]
tod($s_1,s_2$) := extcall($s_1$).reach($s_1$).owner($s_1$).owner($s_2$),
\[ \text{extcall}(s_2).reach(s_1).owner(s_2) \]

Base case:
\[ \text{cex}(s_0,s_1) := \text{entry}(s_0).\text{success}(s_0,s_1).f(s_1,s_2), \]
\[ \text{extcall}(s_1).\text{reach}(s_1,s_1'), s' \in \{s_1,s_2,s_3\} \]

Inductive case:
\[ \text{cex}(s_1,s_2) := \text{cex}(s_1,s_1).\text{success}(s_1,s_2).f(s_3,s_4), \]
\[ \text{extcall}(s_1').\text{reach}(s_2,s'), s' \in \{s_3,s_4,s_5\} \]

Fig. 8: Rules for hazardous access and counter-examples.

\textit{s_2} are reachable from an external call in the SDG, and executable by an attacker.

To detect \textit{delegate-based} reentrancy attacks, where the delegatecall destination is tainted, we treat delegatecall in the same way as the extcall in Figure 8. For untainted delegatecall destinations, if the source code of the delegate contract is available, \textsc{Sailfish} constructs an SDG that combines both the contracts. If neither the source, nor the address of the delegate contract is available, \textsc{Sailfish} treats delegatecall in the same way as an unsafe external call. For \textit{create-based} attacks, since the source code of the child contract is a part of the parent contract, \textsc{Sailfish} builds the SDG by combining both the creator (parent) and the created (child) contracts. Subsequently, \textsc{Sailfish} leverages the existing queries in Figure 8 on the combined SDG. For untainted extcall, and delegatecall destinations, \textsc{Sailfish} performs inter-contract (Appendix V-A) analysis to build an SDG combining both contracts.

\textbf{Example 4} When run on the SDG in Figure 7 (Example 1), the query returns the tuple $\langle 3, 5 \rangle$, because they both operate on the state variable \textit{splits}, and belong to distinct public methods, \textit{viz.}, \textit{splitFunds} and \textit{updateSplit} respectively.

\textbf{TOD detection.} As explained in Section VI-A, TOD happens when Ether transfer is affected by re-ordering transactions. Hence, a hazardous pair $\langle s_1, s_2 \rangle$ forms a TOD if the following conditions hold: 1) an external call is reachable from either $s_1$ or $s_2$, and 2) the amount of Ether sent by the external call is greater than zero.

\textsc{Sailfish} supports all three TOD patterns supported by \textsc{Securify}—(i) TOD Transfer specifies that the precondition of an Ether transfer, e.g., a condition $c$ guarding the transfer, is influenced by transaction ordering. (ii) TOD Amount indicates that the amount $a$ of Ether transfer is dependent on transaction ordering, and (iii) TOD Receiver defines that the external call destination $e$ is influenced by the transaction ordering. To detect these attacks, \textsc{Sailfish} reasons if $c$, or $a$, or $e$ is data-flow dependent on some $\text{storage}(v)$, and the statements corresponding to those three are involved in forming a hazardous pair.

\textbf{Counter-example generation.} If a query over the SDG returns $\bot$ (empty), then the contract is safe, because the SDG models the state inconsistency in the contract. On the other hand, if the query returns a list of pairs $\langle s_1, s_2 \rangle$, \textsc{Sailfish} performs a \textit{refinement} step to determine if those pairs are indeed feasible. Since the original output pairs (i.e., $\langle s_1, s_2 \rangle$) cannot be directly consumed by the symbolic execution engine, \textsc{Sailfish} leverages the cex-rule in Figure 8 to compute the minimum ICFG $G$ that contains statements $s_1$, $s_2$, and the relevant external call $s'$. In the base case, cex-rule includes edges between entry points and their successors that can transitively reach $s_1$, $s_2$, or $s'$. In the inductive case, for every node $s_i$ that is already in the graph, we recursively include its successors that can also reach $s_1$, $s_2$, or $s'$.

Example 5 \textsc{Sailfish} extracts the graph slice starting from the root (not shown in Figure 7) of the SDG to node 3. The algorithm extracts the sub-graph $[\text{root}] \xrightarrow{2} 4 \xrightarrow{5} 3$, maps all the SDG nodes to the corresponding ICFG nodes, and computes the final path slice which the \textsc{Refiner} runs on.

\section{VI. \textbf{Refiner: Symbolic Evaluation with Value Summary}}

As explained in Section VII, if the \textsc{Explorer} module reports an alarm, then there are two possibilities: either the contract is indeed vulnerable, or the current counter-example (i.e., subgraph generated by the rules in Figure 8) is infeasible. Thus, \textsc{Sailfish} proceeds to refine the subgraph by leveraging symbolic evaluation (Section VI-B). However, as we show later in the evaluation, a naive symbolic evaluation whose storage variables are completely unconstrained will raise several false positives. To address this challenge, the \textsc{Refiner} module in \textsc{Sailfish} leverages a lightweight value summary analysis (Section VI-A) that output the potential symbolic values of each storage variable under different constraints, which will be used as the pre-condition of the symbolic evaluation (Section VI-B).

\subsection{A. Value summary analysis (VSA)}

For each storage variable, the goal of value summary analysis (VSA) is to compute its invariant that holds through the life-cycle of a smart contract. While summary-based analysis has been applied in many different applications before, there is no off-the-shelf VSA for smart contracts that we could leverage for the following reasons: (a) \textbf{Precision}. A value summary based on abstract interpretation \cite{SIV} that soundly computes the interval for each storage variable scales well, but since it ignores the path conditions under which the interval holds, it may lead to \textit{weaker preconditions} that are not sufficient to prune infeasible paths. For the example in Figure 3 a naive and scalable analysis will ignore the control flows, and conclude that the summary of \textit{mutex} is $\top$ (either true or false), which will be useless to the following symbolic evaluation, since \textit{mutex} is unconstrained. (b) \textbf{Scalability}. A path-by-path summary \cite{SIV}, that relies on symbolic execution first computes the pre-condition pre$_w$, post-condition post$_w$, and per-path summary $\phi_w = \text{pre}_w \land \text{post}_w$ for every path $W$. The overall summary $\phi_f$ of the function $f$ is the disjunction of individual path summaries, \textit{i.e.}, $\phi_f = \bigvee_w \phi_w$. We identify the following barriers in adopting this approach out of the box: (i) \textit{Generation}: The approach is computationally intensive due to well-known path explosion problem. (ii) \textit{Application}: The summary being the unification of the constraints collected along all the paths, such a summary is complex, which poses a significant challenge to the solver. In fact, when we evaluated (Appendix I) our technique by plugging...
in a similar path-by-path summary, the analysis timed out for 21.50% of the contracts due to the increased cost of the refine phase. (iii) Usability: Lastly, such a summary is precise, yet expensive. Computing a precise summary is beneficial only when it is used sufficient times. Our aim is to build a usable system that scales well in two dimensions—both to large contracts, and a large number of contracts. As the dataset is not deduplicated, the scope of reusability is narrow. Therefore, an expensive summary does not pay off well given our use case. What we need in SAILFISH is a summarization technique that has a small resource footprint, yet offers reasonable precision for the specific problem domain, i.e., smart contracts.

Therefore, we design a domain-specific VSA (Figure 10) to tackle both the challenges: (a) Precision: Unlike previous scalable summary techniques that map each variable to an interval whose path conditions are merged, we compensate for such precision loss at the merge points of the control flows using an idea inspired by symbolic union [53]—our analysis stitches the branch conditions to their corresponding symbolic variables at the merge points. (b) Scalability: (i) Generation: This design choice, while being more precise, could still suffer from path explosion. To mitigate this issue, our analysis first starts with a precise abstract domain that captures concrete values and their corresponding path conditions, and then gradually sacrifices the precision in the context of statements that are difficult, or expensive to reason about, e.g., loops, return values of external calls, updates over nested data structures, etc. (ii) Application: Lastly, we carefully design the evaluation rules (If-rule in Figure 10) that selectively drop path conditions at the confluence points—which leads to simpler constraints at the cost of potential precision loss. However, our evaluation of SAILFISH suggests that, indeed, our design of VSA strikes a reasonable trade-off in the precision-scalability spectrum in terms of both bug detection and analysis time.

To formalize our rules for VSA, we introduce a simplified language in Figure 9. In particular, a contract \( P \) consists of (a) a list of public functions \( F \) (private functions are inline), (b) a value environment \( \delta \) that maps variables or program identifiers to concrete or symbolic values, and (c) a path environment \( \pi \) that maps a location \( loc \) to its path constraint \( C \). It is a boolean value encoding the branch decisions taken to reach the current state. Moreover, each function \( F \) consists of arguments, return values, and a list of statements containing loops, branches, and sequential statements, etc. Our expressions \( e \) include common features in SOLIDITY such as storage access, struct initialization, and arithmetic expressions (function invocation is handled within a statement), etc. Furthermore, since all private functions are inline, we assume that the syntax for calling an external function with return variable \( r \) is \( r = f(\vec{e}) \). Finally, we introduce a havoc operator to make those variables in hard-to-analyze statements unconstrained, e.g., \( \text{havoc}(s) \) changes each variable in \( s \) to \( \top \) (completely unconstrained).

Figure 10 shows a representative subset of the inference rules for computing the summary. A program state consists of the value environment \( \delta \) and the path condition \( \pi \). A rule \( \langle e, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow \langle v, \delta', \pi' \rangle \) says that a successful execution of \( e \) in the program state \( \langle \delta, \pi \rangle \) results in value \( v \) and the state \( \langle \delta', \pi' \rangle \).

**Expression.** There are several rules to compute the rules for different expressions \( e \). In particular, if \( e \) is a constant \( c \), the value summary for \( e \) is \( c \) itself. If \( e \) is an argument of a public function \( F_i \) whose values are completely under the control of an attacker, the “Argument” rule will havoc \( e \) and assume that its value can be any value of a particular type.

**Helper functions.** The \( \text{dom}(\delta) \) returns all the keys of an environment \( \delta \). The \( \text{has}(e) \) returns variables written by \( e \).

**Collections.** For a variable of type Array or Map, our value summary rules do not differentiate elements under different indices or keys. In particular, for a variable \( a \) of type array, the “store” rule performs a weak update by unifying all the previous values stored in \( a \) with the new value \( e_0 \). We omit the rule for the map since it is similar to an array. Though the rule is imprecise as it loses track of the values under different indices, it summarizes possible values that are stored in \( a \).

**Assignment.** The “assign” rule essentially keeps the value summaries for all variables from the old value environment \( \delta \) except for mapping \( e_0 \) to its new value \( e_1 \).

**External calls.** Since all private and internal functions are assumed to be inline, we assume all function invocations are external. As we do not know how the attacker is going to interact with the contract via external calls, we assume that it can return arbitrary values. Here is the key intuition of the “ext” rule: for any invocation to an external function, we havoc its return variable \( r \).

**Loop.** Finally, since computing value summaries for variables inside loop bodies are very expensive and hard to scale to complex contracts, our “loop” rule simply havoc all variables that are written in the loop bodies.

**Conditional.** Rule “if” employs a meta-function \( \mu \) to merge states from alternative execution paths.

\[
\mu(b,v_1,v_2) = \begin{cases} 
\{\langle T,v_1 \rangle \} & \text{if } b \text{ == true} \\
\{\langle T,v_2 \rangle \} & \text{if } b \text{ == false} \\
\{\langle b,v_1 \rangle, \langle \neg b, v_2 \rangle \} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

In particular, the rule first computes the symbolic expression \( v_0 \) for the branch condition \( e_0 \). If \( v_0 \) is evaluated to \( \text{true} \), then the rule continues with the \text{then} branch \( e_1 \) and computes its value
\[
\mathcal{P} = (\delta, \pi, \mathcal{F}, (\mathcal{F}_0, \delta, \pi)) \rightsquigarrow (\text{void}, \delta, \pi) \\
\vdots \\
(\mathcal{F}_n, \delta, \pi) \rightsquigarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi') \\
(\mathcal{P}, \delta, \pi) \rightsquigarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi') \\
(\text{function } f(x) \text{ s returns } y, \delta, \pi) \rightsquigarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi') \\
(\text{const}) \text{ isArgument}(a) \text{ v = havoc(a)} (\text{Argument}) \\
(\langle a, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\langle v, \delta', \pi' \rangle)) (\text{Binop}) \\
\delta' = \{y \rightarrow \delta(y) \mid y \in \text{dom}(\delta) \land y \neq a\} \cup \{a[0] \rightarrow \delta(a[0]) \cup \langle \pi, v_0 \rangle\} \\
(\langle a[0] = e_0, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi)) (\text{Load}) \\
\delta' = \{y \rightarrow \delta(y) \mid y \in \text{dom}(\delta) \land y \neq e_0\} \cup \{e_0[0] \rightarrow \langle \pi, e_1 \rangle \} \cup \{\langle r \rightarrow \langle \pi, \text{havoc}(r) \rangle \rangle \} \\
(\langle r = f(\varepsilon), \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi)) (\text{Exit}) \\
\delta' = \{y \rightarrow \delta(y) \mid y \in \text{lhs}(e_1)\} \cup \{x \rightarrow \langle \pi, \text{havoc}(y) \rangle \mid y \in \text{lhs}(e_1)\} \\
(\langle x = v, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi)) (\text{Loop}) \\
\delta' = \{y \rightarrow \delta(y) \mid y \in \text{dom}(\delta) \land y \neq e_0\} \cup \{\langle e_0, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi) \} (\text{IF}) \\
\delta' = \{y \rightarrow \delta(y) \mid y \in \text{dom}(\delta) \land y \neq e_0\} \cup \{\langle e_0, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi) \} (\text{IF}) \\
\delta = \delta \land \delta_1 \lor \delta_2 \\
(\langle e_0_1, e_1_2, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi)) \\
\delta' = \{y \rightarrow \delta(y) \mid y \in \text{dom}(\delta) \land y \neq e_0\} \cup \{\langle e_0, \delta, \pi \rangle \rightarrow (\text{void}, \delta', \pi) \}
\]

that ignores all path conditions, a valid path in SDG does not always map to a feasible execution path in the original ICFG. As a result, we have to symbolically evaluate \( G \) and confirm whether \( \pi \) is indeed feasible.

A naive symbolic evaluation strategy is to evaluate \( G \) by precisely following its control flows while assuming that all storage variables are completely unconstrained (\( \top \)). With this assumption, as our ablation study shows (Figure 11), \textsc{AILFISH} fails to refute a significant amount of false alarms. So, the key question that we need to address is: How can we symbolically check the reachability of \( G \) while constraining the range of storage variables without losing too much precision? This is where \textsc{VSA} comes into play. Recall that the output of our \textsc{VSA} maps each storage variable into a set of abstract values together with their corresponding path constraints in which the values hold. Before invoking the symbolic evaluation engine, we union those value summaries into a global pre-condition that is enforced through the whole symbolic evaluation.

\textbf{Example 6} Recall in Fig 3 the \textsc{EXPLORER} reports a false alarm due to the over-approximation of the SDG. We now illustrate how to leverage \textsc{VSA} to refute this false alarm.

\textbf{Step 1:} By applying the \textsc{VSA} rules in Figure 10 to the contract in Figure 3 \textsc{AILFISH} generates the summary for storage variable \( \text{mutex} \): \{\langle \text{mutex} = \text{false}, \text{false} \rangle, \langle \text{mutex} = \text{false}, \text{true} \rangle\}. In other words, after invoking any sequence of public functions, \( \text{mutex} \) can be updated to \text{true} or \text{false}, if pre-condition \text{mutex}==false holds. Here, we omit the summary of other storage variables (\textit{e.g., userBalance}) for simplicity.

\textbf{Step 2:} Now, by applying the symbolic checker on the \texttt{withdrawBalance} function for the first time, \textsc{AILFISH} generates the following path condition \( \pi \): \text{mutex==false} \land \text{userBalance[msg.sender] > amount} as well as the following program state \( \delta \) before invoking the external call at Line 9: \( \delta = \{ \langle \text{mutex} \rightarrow \text{true} \rangle \ldots \} \)

\textbf{Step 3:} After Step 2, the current program state \( \delta \) indicates that the value of \( \text{mutex} \) is \text{true}. Note that to execute the then-branch of \texttt{withdrawBalance}, \text{mutex} must be \text{false}. Based on the value summary of \text{mutex} in Step 1, the pre-condition to set \text{mutex} to \text{false} is \text{mutex} = \text{false}. However, the pre-condition is not satisfiable under the current state \( \delta \). Therefore, although the attacker can re-enter the \texttt{withdrawBalance} method through the callback mechanism, it is impossible for the attacker to re-enter the then-branch at Line 6, and trigger the external call at Line 9. Thus, \textsc{AILFISH} discards the reentrancy report as false positive.

\section{Implementation}

\textbf{Explorer.} It is a lightweight static analysis that lifts the smart contract to an SDG. The analysis is built on top of the \textsc{SLITHER} \cite{23} framework that lifts \textsc{SOLIDITY} source code to its intermediate representation called \textsc{SLITHIR}. \textsc{AILFISH} uses \textsc{SLITHER}'s API, including the taint analysis, out of the box.

\textbf{Refiner.} \textsc{AILFISH} leverages \textsc{ROSETTE} \cite{23} to symbolically check the feasibility of the counter-examples. \textsc{ROSETTE} programs use assertions and symbolic values to formulate queries about
program behavior, which are then solved with off-the-shelf SMT solvers. Sailfish uses \texttt{(solve expr)} query that searches for a binding of symbolic variables to concrete values that satisfies the assertions encountered during the symbolic evaluation of the program expression \texttt{expr}.

VIII. Evaluation

In this section, we describe a series of experiments that are designed to answer the following research questions: RQ1. How effective is Sailfish compared to the existing smart contracts analyzers with respect to vulnerability detection? RQ2. How scalable is Sailfish compared to the existing smart contracts analyzers? RQ3. How effective is the Refine phase in pruning false alarms?

A. Experimental setup

Dataset. We have crawled the source code of all 91,921 contracts from Etherscan [16], which cover a period until October 31, 2020. We excluded 2,068 contracts that either require very old versions (<0.3.x) of the Solidity compiler, or were developed using the Vyper framework. As a result, after deduplication, our evaluation dataset consists of 89,853 Solidity smart contracts. Further, to gain a better understanding of how each tool scales as the size of the contract increases, we have divided the entire dataset, which we refer to as full dataset, into three mutually-exclusive sub-datasets based on the number of lines of source code—small ([0,500]), medium ([500,1000]), and large ([1000,∞]) datasets consisting of 73,433, 11,730, and 4,690 contracts, respectively. We report performance metrics individually for all three datasets.

Analysis setup. We ran our analysis on a Celery v4.4.4 [19] cluster consisting of six identical machines running Ubuntu 18.04.3 Server, each equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 v2@3.00 GHz processor (40 core) and 256 GB memory.

Analysis of real-world contracts. We evaluated Sailfish against four other static analysis tools, \textit{viz.}, SecureRFy [54], Vandal [23], Mythril [3], Oyente [45], and one dynamic analysis tool, \textit{viz.}, Serpent [60]—capable of finding either reentrancy, or TOD, or both. Given the influx of smart contract related research in recent years, we have carefully chosen a representative subset of the available tools that employ a broad range of minimally overlapping techniques for bug detection. Smartcheck [52] and Slither [28] were omitted because their reentrancy detection patterns are identical to SecureRFy’s NW (No Write After Ext. Call) signature.

We run all the static analysis tools, including Sailfish, on the full dataset under the analysis configuration detailed earlier. If a tool supports both reentrancy and TOD bug types, it was configured to detect both. We summarize the results of the analyses in Table II. For each of the analysis tools and analyzed contracts, we record one of the four possible outcomes—\textit{(a)} safe: no vulnerability was detected \textit{(b)} unsafe: a potential state-inconsistency bug was detected \textit{(c)} timeout: the analysis failed to converge within the time budget (20 minutes) \textit{(d)} error: the analysis aborted due to infrastructure issues, \textit{e.g.}, unsupported Solidity version, or a framework bug, \textit{etc}. For example, the latest Solidity version at the time of writing is 0.8.3, while Oyente supports only up to version 0.4.19.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bug</th>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Safe</th>
<th>Unsafe</th>
<th>Timeout</th>
<th>Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reentrancy</td>
<td>SecureRFy</td>
<td>72,149</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>10,581</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vandal</td>
<td>40,607</td>
<td>45,971</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mythril</td>
<td>25,705</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>59,296</td>
<td>1,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oyente</td>
<td>26,924</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>62,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sailfish</td>
<td>83,171</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>3,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOD</td>
<td>SecureRFy</td>
<td>59,439</td>
<td>19,031</td>
<td>10,581</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oyente</td>
<td>23,721</td>
<td>3,472</td>
<td>62,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sailfish</td>
<td>77,692</td>
<td>7,555</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>3,395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II: Comparison of bug finding abilities of tools

B. Vulnerability detection

In this section, we report the fraction (\%) of safe, unsafe (warnings), and timed-out contracts reported by each tool with respect to the total number of contracts successfully analyzed by that tool, excluding the “error” cases.

Comparison against other tools. SecureRFy, Mythril, Oyente, Vandal, and Sailfish report potential reentrancy in 7.10%, 4.18%, 0.99%, 52.27%, and 2.40% of the contracts. Though all five static analysis tools detect reentrancy bugs, TOD detection is supported by only three tools, \textit{i.e.}, SecureRFy, Oyente, and Sailfish which raise potential TOD warnings in 21.37%, 12.77%, and 8.74% of the contracts.

Mythril, being a symbolic execution based tool, demonstrates obvious scalability issues: It timed out for 66.84% of the contracts. Though Oyente is based on symbolic execution as well, it is difficult to properly assess its scalability. The reason is that Oyente failed to analyze most of the contracts in our dataset due to the unsupported Solidity version, which explains the low rate of warnings that Oyente emits. Unlike symbolic execution, static analysis seems to scale well. SecureRFy timed-out for only 11.88% of the contracts, which is significantly lower than that of Mythril. When we investigated the reason for SecureRFy timing out, it appeared that the Datalog-based data-flow analysis (that SecureRFy relies on) fails to reach a fixed-point for larger contracts. Vandal’s static analysis is inexpensive and shows good scalability, but suffers from poor precision. In fact, Vandal flags as many as 52.27% of all contracts as vulnerable to reentrancy—which makes Vandal reports hard to triage due to the overwhelming amount of warnings. Vandal timed out for the least (1.56%) number of contracts. Interestingly, SecureRFy generates fewer reentrancy warnings than Mythril. This can be attributed to the fact that the \texttt{NW} policy of SecureRFy considers a write after an external call as vulnerable, while Mythril conservatively warns about both read and write. However, Sailfish strikes a balance between both scalability and precision as it timed-out only for 1.40% of the contracts, and generates the fewest alarms.

Ground truth determination. To be able to provide better insights into the results, we performed manual analysis on a randomly sampled subset of 750 contracts ranging up to 3,000 lines of code, out of a total of 6,581 contracts successfully analyzed by all five static analysis tools, without any timeout or error. We believe that the size of the dataset is in line with prior work [51, 42]. We prepared the ground truth by manually inspecting the contracts for reentrancy and TOD bugs using the following criteria: \textit{(a)} Reentrancy: The untrusted external
call allows the attacker to re-enter the contract, which makes it possible to operate on an inconsistent internal state. **(b) TOD:** A front-running transaction can divert the control-flow, or alter the Ether-flow, e.g., Ether amount, call destination, etc., of a previously scheduled transaction.

In the end, the manual analysis identified 26 and 110 contracts with reentrancy and TOD vulnerabilities, respectively. We then ran each tool on this dataset, and report the number of correct (TP), incorrect (FP), and missed (FN) detection by each tool in Table III. For both reentrancy and TOD, SAILFISH detected all the vulnerabilities (TP) with zero missed detection (FN), while maintaining the lowest false positive (FP) rate. We discuss the FPs and FN of the tools in the subsequent sections.

**False positive analysis.** While reasoning about the false positives generated by different tools for the reentrancy bug, we observe that both VANDAL and OYENTE consider every external call to be reentrant if it can be reached in a recursive call to the calling contract. However, a reentrant call is *benign* unless it operates on an inconsistent state of the contract. SECURIFY considers SOLIDITY send and transfer APIs as external calls, and raises violation alerts. Since the gas limit (2,300) for these APIs is inadequate to mount a reentrancy attack, we refrain from modeling these APIs in our analysis. Additionally, SECURIFY failed to identify whether a function containing the external call is access-protected, e.g., it contains the msg.sender == owner check, which prohibits anyone else but only the contract owner from entering the function. For both the cases above, though the EXPLORER detected such functions as potentially unsafe, the benefit of symbolic evaluation became evident as the REFINER eliminated these alerts in the subsequent phase.

MYTHRIL detects a state variable read after an external call as malicious reentrancy. However, if that variable is not written in any other function, that deems the read *safe*. Since SAILFISH looks for *hazardous access* as a pre-requisite of reentrancy, it does not raise a warning there. However, SAILFISH incurs false positives due to imprecise static taint analysis. A real-world case study of such a false positive is presented in Appendix II-C.

To detect TOD attacks, SECURIFY checks for writes to a storage variable that influences an Ether-sending external call. We observed that several contracts flagged by SECURIFY have storage writes inside the contract’s constructor. Hence, such writes can only happen once during contract creation. Moreover, several contracts flagged by SECURIFY have both storage variable writes, and the Ether sending external call inside methods which are guarded by predicates like require(msg.sender == owner)—limiting access to these methods only to the contract owner. Therefore, these methods cannot be leveraged to launch a TOD attack. SAILFISH prunes the former case during the EXPLORE phase itself. For the latter, SAILFISH leverages the REFINER phase, where it finds no difference in the satisfiability of two different symbolic evaluation traces. In Appendix II-C, we present a real-world case where both SECURIFY and SAILFISH incur a false positive due to insufficient reasoning of contract semantics.

**False negative analysis.** SECURIFY missed valid reentrancy bugs because it considers only Ether sending call instructions. In reality, any call can be leveraged to trigger reentrancy by transferring control to the attacker if its destination is tainted. To consider this scenario, SAILFISH carries out a taint analysis to determine external calls with tainted destinations. Additionally, SECURIFY missed reentrancy bugs due to lack of support for destructive write (DW), and delegate-based patterns. False negatives incurred by MYTHRIL are due to its incomplete state space exploration within specified time-out. Our manual analysis did not observe any missed detection by SAILFISH.

**Finding zero-day bugs using SAILFISH.** In order to demonstrate that SAILFISH is capable of finding zero-day vulnerabilities, we first identified the contracts flagged only by SAILFISH, but no other tool. Out of total 401 reentrancy-only and 721 TOD-only contracts, we manually selected 88 and 107 contracts, respectively. We limited our selection effort only to contracts that contain at most 500 lines of code, and are relatively easier to reason about in a reasonable time budget. Our manual analysis confirms 47 contracts are *exploitable* (not just vulnerable)—meaning that they can be leveraged by an attacker to accomplish a malicious goal, e.g., draining Ether, or corrupting application-specific metadata, thereby driving the contract to an unintended state. We present a few vulnerable patterns, and their exploitability in Appendix II-A.

**Exploitability of the bugs.** We classified the true alerts emitted by SAILFISH into the following categories—*An exploitable* bug leading to the stealing of Ether, or application-specific metadata corruption (e.g., an index, a counter, etc.), and a *non-exploitable* yet vulnerable bug that can be reached, or triggered (unlike a false positive), but its side-effect is not persistent. For example, a reentrant call (the attacker) is able to write to some state variable V in an unintended way. However, along the flow of execution, V is overwritten, and its correct value is restored. Therefore, the effect of reentrancy did not persist. Another example would be a state variable that is incorrectly modified during the reentrant call, but the modification does not interfere with the application logic, e.g., it is just written in a log. Out of the 47 zero-day bugs that SAILFISH discovered, 11 allow an attacker to drain Ethers, and for the remaining 36 contracts, the bugs, at the very least (minimum impact), allow the attacker to corrupt contract metadata—leading to detrimental effects on the underlying application. For example, during our manual analysis, we encountered a vulnerable contract implementing a housing tracker that the allowed addition, removal, and modification of housing details. If a house owner adds a new house, the contract mandates the old housing listing to become inactive, i.e., at any point, there can only be one house owned by an owner that can remain in an active state. However, we could leverage the reentrancy bug in the contract in a way so that an owner can have more than one active listing. Therefore, these 36 contracts could very well be used for stealing Ethers as

| Tool    | Reentrancy | | | | | | TOD | | | | |
|---------|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SECURIFY | 9 163 17 102 244 8 | | | | | | VANDAL | 26 626 0 | | | | |
| MYTHRIL | 7 334 19 | | | | | | OYENTE | 8 16 18 | 71 116 39 | | | |
| SAILFISH | 26 11 0 | 110 59 0 | | | | | | | | | | |

**Table III:** Manual determination of the ground truth.
Comparison against Sereum. Since Sereum is not publicly available, we could only compare SAILFISH on the contracts in their released dataset. Sereum [50] flagged total 16 contracts for potential reentrancy attacks, of which 6 had their sources available in the Etherscan, and therefore, could be analyzed by SAILFISH. Four out of those 6 contracts were developed for old SOLIDITY versions (<0.3.x)—not supported by our framework. We ported those contracts to a supported SOLIDITY version (0.4.14) by making minor syntactic changes not related to their functionality. According to Sereum, of those 6 contracts, only one (TheDAO) was a true vulnerability, while five others were false alarms. While SAILFISH correctly detects TheDAO as unsafe, it raises a false alarm for another contract (CCRB) due to imprecise modeling of untrusted external calls.

**RQ1:** SAILFISH emits the fewest warnings in the full dataset, and finds 47 zero-day vulnerabilities. On our manual analysis dataset, SAILFISH detects all the vulnerabilities with the lowest false positive rate.

### C. Performance analysis

Table IV reports the average analysis times for each of the small, medium, and large datasets along with the full dataset. As the data shows, the analysis time increases with the size of the dataset for all the tools. VANDAL [23] is the fastest analysis across all the four datasets with an average analysis time of 30.68 seconds with highest emitted warnings (52.27%). SECURIFY [54] is approximately 6x more expensive than VANDAL over the entire dataset. The average analysis time of MYTHRIL [5] is remarkably high (941.04 seconds), which correlates with its high number of time-out cases (66.84%). In fact, MYTHRIL’s analysis time even for the small dataset is as high as 917.99 seconds. However, another symbolic execution based tool OYENTE [46] has average analysis time close to 19% to that of MYTHRIL, as it fails to analyze most of the medium to large contracts due to the unsupported SOLIDITY version. Over the entire dataset, SAILFISH takes as low as 30.79 seconds with mean analysis times of 9.80, 80.78, and 246.89 seconds for small, medium, and large ones, respectively. The mean static analysis time is 21.74 seconds as compared to the symbolic evaluation phase, which takes 39.22 seconds. The value summary computation has a mean analysis time of 0.06 seconds.

**RQ2:** While the analysis time of SAILFISH is comparable to that of VANDAL, it is 6, 31, and 6 times faster than SECURIFY, MYTHRIL, and OYENTE, respectively.

### IX. Limitations

**Source-code dependency.** Although SAILFISH is built on top of the SLITHER [28] framework, which requires access to the source code, we do not rely on any rich semantic information from the contract source to aid our analysis. In fact, our choice of source code was motivated by our intention to build SAILFISH as a tool for developers, while enabling easier debugging and introspection as a side-effect. Our techniques are not tied to source code, and could be applied directly to bytecode by porting the analysis on top of a contract decompiler that supports variable and CFG recovery.

**Potential unsoundness.** We do not claim soundness with respect to the detection rules of reentrancy and TOD bugs. Also, the metalanguage our value-summary analysis is based on distills the core...
features of the SOLIDITY language, it is not expressive enough to model all the complex aspects [41], e.g., exception propagation, transaction reversion, out-of-gas, etc. In turn, this becomes the source of unsoundness of the REFIRER. Additionally, SAILFISH relies on SLITHER [28] for static analysis. Therefore, any soundness issues in SLITHER, e.g., incomplete call graph construction due to indirect or unresolved external calls, inline assembly, etc., will be propagated to SAILFISH.

X. RELATED WORK

Static analysis. Static analysis tools such as SECURIFY [54], MADMAX [36], ZEUS [42], SMARTCHECK [52], and SLITHER [28] detect specific vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Due to their reliance on bug patterns, they over-approximate program states, which can cause false positives and missed detection of bugs. To mitigate this issue, we identified two complementary causes of SI bugs—Stale read and Destructive write. While the former is more precise than the patterns found in the previous work, the latter, which is not explored in the literature, plays a role in the missed detection of bugs (Section III). Unlike SAILFISH, which focuses on SI bugs, MADMAX [36] uses a logic-based paradigm to target gas-focused vulnerabilities. SECURIFY [54] first computes control and data-flow facts, and then checks for compliance and violation signatures. SLITHER [28] uses data-flow analysis to detect bug patterns scoped within a single function. The bugs identified by these tools are either local in nature, or they refrain from doing any path-sensitive reasoning—leading to spurious alarms. To alleviate this issue, SAILFISH introduces the REFINE phase that prunes significant numbers of false alarms.

Symbolic execution. MYTHRIL [3], OYENTE [46], ETHBMC [32], SMARTSCOPE [30], and MANTICORE [13] rely on symbolic execution to explore the state-space of the contract. ETHBMC [32], a bounded model checker, models EVM transactions as state transitions. TEETER [44] generates constraints along a critical path having attacker-controlled instructions. These tools suffer from the limitation of traditional symbolic execution, e.g., path explosion, and do not scale well. However, SAILFISH uses the symbolic execution only for validation, i.e., it resorts to under-constrained symbolic execution aided by VSA that over-approximates the preconditions required to update the state variables across all executions.

Dynamic analysis. While SEREUM [50] and SODA [26] perform run-time checks within the context of a modified EVM, TXSPECTOR [59] performs a post-mortem analysis of transactions. ECFCHECKER [47] detects if the execution of a smart contract is effectively callback-free (ECF), i.e., it checks if two execution traces, with and without callbacks, are equivalent—a property that holds for a contract not vulnerable to reentrancy attacks. SAILFISH generalizes ECF with the notion of hazardous access for SI attacks. Thus, SAILFISH is not restricted to reentrancy, instead, can express all properties that are caused by state inconsistencies. Dynamic analysis tools [40], [56], [57], [2], [47] rely on manually-written test oracles to detect violations in response to inputs generated according to blackbox or greybox strategies. Though precise, these tools lack coverage—which is not an issue for static analysis tools, such as SAILFISH.

State inconsistency (SI) notions. SERIF [25] detects reentrancy attacks using a notion of trusted-untrusted computation that happens when a low-integrity code, invoked by a high-integrity code, calls back into the high-integrity code before returning. Code components are explicitly annotated with information flow (trust) labels, which further requires a semantic understanding of the contract. Then, they design a type system that uses those trust labels to enforce secure information flow through the use of a combination of static and dynamic locks. However, this notion is unable to capture TOD vulnerabilities, another important class of SI bugs. In SAILFISH, we take a different approach where we define SI bugs in terms of the side-effect, i.e., creation of an inconsistent state, of a successful attack. Further, we model the possibility of an inconsistent state resulting from such an attack through hazardous access. Perez et al. [48], VANDAL [23], OYENTE [46] consider reentrancy to be the possibility of being able to re-enter the calling function. Not only do these tools consider only single-function reentrancy, but also the notion encompasses legitimate (benign) reentrancy scenarios [50], e.g., ones that arise due to withdrawal pattern in SOLIDITY. In addition, SAILFISH requires the existence of hazardous access, which enables us to account for cross-function reentrancy bugs, as well as model only malicious reentrancy scenarios. To detect reentrancy, SECURIFY [54] looks for the violation of the “no write after external call” (NW) pattern, which is similar to the “Stale Read” (SR) notion of SAILFISH. Not all the tools that support reentrancy bugs have support for TOD. While SAILFISH shares its notion of TOD with SECURIFY, OYENTE marks a contract vulnerable to TOD if two traces have different Ether flows. Unlike SAILFISH for which hazardous access is a pre-requisite, OYENTE raises alarm for independent Ether flows not even related to SI.

XI. CONCLUSION

We propose SAILFISH, a scalable hybrid tool for automatically identifying SI bugs in smart contracts. SAILFISH combines lightweight exploration phase followed by symbolic evaluation aided by our novel VSA. On the Etherscan dataset, SAILFISH significantly outperforms state of the art analyzers in terms of precision, and performance, identifying 47 previously unknown vulnerable (and exploitable) contracts.

XII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Fig. 12: Relative speedup due to value summary over a path-by-path function summary.


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[Meng Xu, Chenxiong Qian, Kangjie Lu, Michael Backes, and Taesoo Kim. Precise and scalable detection of double-fetch bugs in os kernels. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2018.]


APPENDIX I
EXTENDED EVALUATION

Speedup due to value-summary analysis: To characterize the performance gain from the value-summary analysis, we have further designed this experiment where, instead of our value summary (VS), we provide a standard path-by-path function summary [31, 33, 20] (PS) to the REFINER module. From 16,853 contracts for which SAILFISH raised warnings (which are also the contracts sent to the REFINER), we randomly picked a subset of 2,000 contracts (i) which belong to either medium, or large dataset, and (ii) VS configuration finished successfully without timing out—for this experiment. We define speedup factor $s = \frac{t_{PS}}{t_{VS}}$, where $t_{m}$ is the amount of time spent in the symbolic evaluation phase in mode $m$. In PS mode, SAILFISH timed out for 21.50% of the contracts owing to the increased cost of the REFINER phase. Figure [12] presents a histogram of the speedup factor distribution of the remaining 1,570 contracts for which the analyses terminated in both the modes.

Our novel value summary analysis is significantly faster than a classic summary-based analysis.

APPENDIX II
CASE STUDIES

A. Zero-day vulnerabilities

In this section, we present the unique vulnerabilities found by SAILFISH—not detected by any other tool. We have redacted the code, and masked the program elements for the sake of anonymity and simplicity. The fact that the origin of the smart contracts can not be traced back in most of the cases makes it hard to report these bugs to the concerned developers. Also, once a contract gets deployed, it is difficult to fix any bug due to the immutable nature of the blockchain.

Cross-function reentrancy: Figure [13] presents a simplified real-world contract—vulnerable to cross-function reentrancy attack due to Destructive Write (DW). An attacker can set both item_1.creator (Line 11), and item_1.game (Line 12) to an arbitrary value by invoking funcB(). In funcA(), an amount amt is transferred to item_1.creator through transferFrom—an untrusted external contract call. Therefore, when the external call is underway, the attacker can call funcB() to reset both item_1.creator, and item_1.game. Hence, item_1.fee gets transferred to a different address when Line 6 gets executed.

Delegate-based reentrancy: Figure [14] presents a real-world contract, which is vulnerable to delegate-based reentrancy attack.

The contract contains three functions—(a) funcA contains the delegatecall, (b) funcB() allows application data to be modified if the assertion is satisfied, and (c) funcC contains an untrusted external call. A malicious payload can be injected in the _data argument of funcA, which, in turn, invokes funcC() with a tainted destination _to. The receiver at Line 14 is now attacker-controlled, which allows the attacker to reenter to funcB with _isTokenFallback inconsistently set to true; thus rendering the assertion at Line 8 useless.

CREAM Finance reentrancy attack. By exploiting a reentrancy vulnerability in the CREAM Finance, a decentralized lending protocol, the attacker stole 402,079,976 AMP tokens, and 2,804.96 Ethereums on August 31, 2021 [1]. The attack involved two contracts: CREAM Finance contract C, and AMP token (ERC777) contract A. The borrow() method of C
calls the transfer() method of A, which, in turn, calls the tokenReceived() hook of the receiver contract R. Such a hook is simply a function in R that is called when tokens are sent to it. The vulnerability that the attacker leveraged is that there was a state (S) update in C.borrow() following the external call to A.transfer(). Since, A.transfer() further calls R.tokenReceived() before even the original C.borrow() call returns, the attacker took this opportunity to reenter C before even the state update could take place.

Since the version of SLITHER that SAILFISH uses lacks support for all types of SOLIDITY tuples, we could not run our tool as-is on the contract C. To see whether our approach can still detect the above vulnerability by leveraging its inter-contract analysis, we redacted the contracts to eliminate syntactic complexity unrelated to the actual vulnerability. When run on the simplified contract, SAILFISH successfully flagged it as vulnerable to the reentrancy attack, as expected.

Transaction order dependency: TOD may enable an attacker to earn profit by front-running a victim’s transaction. For example, during our manual analysis, we encountered a contract where the contract owner can set the price of an item on demand. A user will pay a higher price for the item if the owner maliciously front-runs the user’s transaction (purchase order), and sets the price to a higher value. In another contract that enables buying and selling of tokens in exchange for Ether, the token price was inversely proportional with the current token supply. Therefore, an attacker can front-run a buy transaction T, and buy n tokens having a total price \( p_T \). After T is executed, the token price will increase due to a drop in the supply. The attacker can then sell those n tokens at a higher price, totaling price \( p_h \), and making a profit of \( (p_h - p_T) \). We illustrate one more real-world example of a TOD attack in Figure 15. recordBet() allows a user to place a bet, and then it adds (Line 4) the bet amount to the total balance of the contract. In settleBet(), a user receives a fraction of the total bet amount as the reward amount. Therefore, if two invocations of settleBet() having same bet value race against each other, the front-running one will earn higher reward as the value of totalBlnc[!bet], which reward is calculated on, will also be higher in that case.

A. Advantage of value-summary analysis.

Figure 16 shows a real-world contract that demonstrates the benefit of the value-summary analysis. A modifier in SOLIDITY is an additional piece of code which wraps the execution of a function. Where the underscore (_) is put inside the modifier decides when to execute the original function. In this example, the public function reapFarm is guarded by the modifier nonReentrant, which sets the reentrancy_lock (shortened as L) on entry, and resets it after exit. Due to the hazardous access (Line 14 and Line 18) detected onworkedDone, EXPLORER flags this contract as potentially vulnerable. However, the value summary analysis observes that the require clause at Line 7 needs to be satisfied in order to be able to modify the lock variable L, which is encoded as: \( L = \{false, L = false, true, L = true\} \). In other words, there does not exist a program path that sets L to false, if the current value of L is true. While making the external call at Line 16, the program state is \( \delta = \{L \rightarrow true, \ldots\} \), which means that L is true at that program point. Taking both the value summary and the program state into account, the REFINER decides that the corresponding path leading to the potential reentrancy bug is infeasible.

C. False positives for reentrancy and TOD

Reentrancy. Figure 17 features a real-world contract where bToken is set inside the constructor. The static taint analysis that SAILFISH performs disregards the fact that Line 5 is guarded by a require clause in the line before; thereby making the variable tainted. Later at Line 9 when the balanceOf method is invoked on bToken, SAILFISH raises a false alarm.

TOD. Figure 18 presents a real-world donation collection contract, where the contract transfers the collected donations to its recipient of choice. Both SAILFISH and ECURIFY raise TOD warning as the transferred amount, \( , donations \) at Line 7, can be modified by function pay() at Line 3. Though the amount of Ether withdrawn (donations) is different depending on which of withdrawDonations() and pay() get scheduled first—this does not do any harm as far as the functionality is concerned. In fact, if pay() front-runs
withdrawDonations(), the recipient is rewarded with a greater amount of donation. Therefore, this specific scenario does not correspond to a TOD attack.

```solidity
contract Depay{
  function pay(..., uint donation) {
    donations += donation;
  }
  function withdrawDonations(address recipient) {
    require(msg.sender == developer);
    recipient.transfer(donation);
  }
}
```

Fig. 18: False positive of TOD.

### Appendix III
#### Extended Related Work

**Hybrid analysis.** Composition of static analysis and symbolic execution has been applied to find bugs in programs other than smart contracts. For example, SYSLINT [24] uses static analysis to find potential buggy paths in large codebases, followed by an under-constrained symbolic execution to verify the feasibility of those paths. WOODPECKER [27] uses rule-directed symbolic execution to explore only relevant paths in a program. To find double fetch bugs in OS kernels, DEADLINE [38] employs static analysis to prune paths, and later performs symbolic execution only on those paths containing multiple reads. Several other tools [22, 29, 33, 39, 38] employ similar hybrid techniques for testing, verification, and bug finding. Such hybrid analyses have been proved effective to either prune uninteresting paths, or selectively explore interesting parts of the program. In SAILFISH, we use static analysis to filter out interesting contracts, find potentially vulnerable paths, and compute value-summary to be used in conjunction with the symbolic execution—to achieve both scalability, and precision.

### Appendix IV
#### Extended Discussion

**Imprecise analysis components.** SAILFISH performs inter-contract analysis (Appendix IV.A) when the source code of the called contract is present in our database, and more importantly, the external call destination \(d\) is statically known. If either of the conditions does not hold, SAILFISH treats such an external call as *untrusted*, thereby losing precision. The question of external call destination \(d\) resolution comes only when SAILFISH is used on contracts that have been deployed already. For cases where \(d\) is set at run-time, our prototype relies on only contract creation transactions. If \(d\) is set through a public setter method, our current prototype cannot detect those cases, though it would not be hard to extend the implementation to support this case as well. Moreover, SAILFISH incurs false positives due to the imprecise taint analysis engine from SLITHER. Therefore, using an improved taint analysis will benefit SAILFISH’s precision.

**Bytecode-based analysis.** SAILFISH relies on control-flow recovery, taint analysis, and symbolic evaluation as its fundamental building blocks. Recovering source-level rich data structures, e.g., array, strings, mappings, etc., is not a requirement for our analysis. Even for EVM bytecode, recovering the entry points of public methods is relatively easier due to the “jump-table” like structure that the SOLIDITY compiler inserts at the beginning of the compiled bytecode. Typically, it is expected for a decomplier platform to provide the building blocks in the form of an API, which then could be used to port SAILFISH for bytecode analysis. That said, the performance and precision of our analysis are limited by the efficacy of the underlying decompiler. Thanks to the recent research [5], [35], [4], [45] on EVM decompilers and static analysis, significant progress has been made in this front.

**Other bugs induced by hazardous access.** If a contract contains hazardous access, but no reentrancy/TOD vulnerability, that can still lead to a class of bugs called Event Ordering (EO) bugs [43], due to the asynchronous callbacks initiated from an off-chain service like Oracle. We consider such bugs as out of scope for this work.

### Appendix V
#### Technical details

**A. Inter-contract analysis**

To model inter-contract interaction as precisely as possible, we perform a backward data-flow analysis starting from the destination \(d\) of an external call (e.g., call, delegatecall, etc.), which leads to the following three possibilities: (a) \(d\) is visible from source, (b) \(d\) is set by the owner at run-time, e.g., in the constructor during contract creation. In this case, we further infer \(d\) by analyzing existing transactions, e.g., by looking into the arguments of the contract-creating transaction, and (c) \(d\) is attacker-controlled. While crawling, we build a database from the contract address to its respective source. Hence, for cases (a) and (b) where \(d\) is statically known, we incorporate the target contract in our analysis if its source is present in our database. If either the source is not present, or \(d\) is tainted (case (c)), we treat such calls as *untrusted*, requiring no further analysis.

**B. Detecting owner-only statements**

In the context of smart contract, the *owner* refers to one or more addresses that play certain administrative roles, e.g., contract creation, destruction, etc. Typically, critical functionalities of the contract can only be exercised by the owner. We call the statements that implement such functionalities as *owner-only statements*. Determining the precise set of owner-only statements in a contract can be challenging as it requires reasoning about complex path conditions. SAILFISH, instead, computes a over-approximate set of owner-only statements during the computation of base ICFG facts. This enables SAILFISH, during the EXPLORE phase, to not consider certain hazardous access pairs that can not be exercised by an attacker. To start with, SAILFISH initializes the analysis by collecting the set of storage variables (owner-only variables) \(\mathcal{O}\) defined during the contract creation. Then, the algorithm computes the transitive closure of all the storage variables which have *write* operations that are control-flow dependent on \(\mathcal{O}\). Finally, to compute the set of owner-only statements, SAILFISH collects the statements which have their execution dependent on \(\mathcal{O}\).